git-commit-vandalism/builtin/receive-pack.c

1813 lines
45 KiB
C
Raw Normal View History

#include "builtin.h"
#include "lockfile.h"
#include "pack.h"
#include "refs.h"
#include "pkt-line.h"
#include "sideband.h"
#include "run-command.h"
#include "exec_cmd.h"
#include "commit.h"
#include "object.h"
#include "remote.h"
#include "connect.h"
#include "transport.h"
receive-pack: detect aliased updates which can occur with symrefs When pushing to a remote repo the sending side filters out aliased updates (e.g., foo:baz bar:baz). However, it is not possible for the sender to know if two refs are aliased on the receiving side via symrefs. Here is one such scenario: $ git init origin $ (cd origin && touch file && git add file && git commit -a -m intial) $ git clone --bare origin origin.git $ rm -rf origin $ git clone origin.git client $ git clone --mirror client backup.git && $ (cd backup.git && git remote set-head origin --auto) $ (cd client && git remote add --mirror backup ../backup.git && echo change1 > file && git commit -a -m change1 && git push origin && git push backup ) The push to backup fails with: Counting objects: 5, done. Writing objects: 100% (3/3), 244 bytes, done. Total 3 (delta 0), reused 0 (delta 0) Unpacking objects: 100% (3/3), done. error: Ref refs/remotes/origin/master is at ef3... but expected 262... remote: error: failed to lock refs/remotes/origin/master To ../backup.git 262cd57..ef307ff master -> master 262cd57..ef307ff origin/HEAD -> origin/HEAD ! [remote rejected] origin/master -> origin/master (failed to lock) error: failed to push some refs to '../backup.git' The reason is that refs/remotes/origin/HEAD is a symref to refs/remotes/origin/master, but it is not possible for the sending side to unambiguously know this. This commit fixes the issue by having receive-pack ignore any update to a symref whose target is being identically updated. If a symref and its target are being updated inconsistently, then the update for both fails with an error message ("refusing inconsistent update...") to help diagnose the situation. Signed-off-by: Jay Soffian <jaysoffian@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2010-04-20 00:19:18 +02:00
#include "string-list.h"
#include "sha1-array.h"
#include "connected.h"
#include "argv-array.h"
#include "version.h"
#include "tag.h"
#include "gpg-interface.h"
receive-pack: allow hooks to ignore its standard input stream The pre-receive and post-receive hooks were designed to be an improvement over old style update and post-update hooks, which take the update information on their command line and are limited by the command line length limit. The same information is fed from the standard input to pre/post-receive hooks instead to lift this limitation. It has been mandatory for these new style hooks to consume the update information fully from the standard input stream. Otherwise, they would risk killing the receive-pack process via SIGPIPE. If a hook does not want to look at all the information, it is easy to send its standard input to /dev/null (perhaps a niche use of hook might need to know only the fact that a push was made, without having to know what objects have been pushed to update which refs), and this has already been done by existing hooks that are written carefully. However, because there is no good way to consistently fail hooks that do not consume the input fully (a small push may result in a short update record that may fit within the pipe buffer, to which the receive-pack process may manage to write before the hook has a chance to exit without reading anything, which will not result in a death-by-SIGPIPE of receive-pack), it can lead to a hard to diagnose "once in a blue moon" phantom failure. Lift this "hooks must consume their input fully" mandate. A mandate that is not enforced strictly is not helping us to catch mistakes in hooks. If a hook has a good reason to decide the outcome of its operation without reading the information we feed it, let it do so as it pleases. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2014-09-13 00:48:07 +02:00
#include "sigchain.h"
#include "fsck.h"
static const char receive_pack_usage[] = "git receive-pack <git-dir>";
enum deny_action {
DENY_UNCONFIGURED,
DENY_IGNORE,
DENY_WARN,
DENY_REFUSE,
DENY_UPDATE_INSTEAD
};
static int deny_deletes;
static int deny_non_fast_forwards;
static enum deny_action deny_current_branch = DENY_UNCONFIGURED;
static enum deny_action deny_delete_current = DENY_UNCONFIGURED;
static int receive_fsck_objects = -1;
static int transfer_fsck_objects = -1;
static struct strbuf fsck_msg_types = STRBUF_INIT;
static int receive_unpack_limit = -1;
static int transfer_unpack_limit = -1;
static int advertise_atomic_push = 1;
static int unpack_limit = 100;
static int report_status;
static int use_sideband;
static int use_atomic;
static int quiet;
static int prefer_ofs_delta = 1;
static int auto_update_server_info;
static int auto_gc = 1;
static int fix_thin = 1;
signed push: allow stale nonce in stateless mode When operating with the stateless RPC mode, we will receive a nonce issued by another instance of us that advertised our capability and refs some time ago. Update the logic to check received nonce to detect this case, compute how much time has passed since the nonce was issued and report the status with a new environment variable GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_SLOP to the hooks. GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_STATUS will report "SLOP" in such a case. The hooks are free to decide how large a slop it is willing to accept. Strictly speaking, the "nonce" is not really a "nonce" anymore in the stateless RPC mode, as it will happily take any "nonce" issued by it (which is protected by HMAC and its secret key) as long as it is fresh enough. The degree of this security degradation, relative to the native protocol, is about the same as the "we make sure that the 'git push' decided to update our refs with new objects based on the freshest observation of our refs by making sure the values they claim the original value of the refs they ask us to update exactly match the current state" security is loosened to accomodate the stateless RPC mode in the existing code without this series, so there is no need for those who are already using smart HTTP to push to their repositories to be alarmed any more than they already are. In addition, the server operator can set receive.certnonceslop configuration variable to specify how stale a nonce can be (in seconds). When this variable is set, and if the nonce received in the certificate that passes the HMAC check was less than that many seconds old, hooks are given "OK" in GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_STATUS (instead of "SLOP") and the received nonce value is given in GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE, which makes it easier for a simple-minded hook to check if the certificate we received is recent enough. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2014-09-05 19:46:04 +02:00
static int stateless_rpc;
static const char *service_dir;
static const char *head_name;
static void *head_name_to_free;
static int sent_capabilities;
static int shallow_update;
static const char *alt_shallow_file;
push: the beginning of "git push --signed" While signed tags and commits assert that the objects thusly signed came from you, who signed these objects, there is not a good way to assert that you wanted to have a particular object at the tip of a particular branch. My signing v2.0.1 tag only means I want to call the version v2.0.1, and it does not mean I want to push it out to my 'master' branch---it is likely that I only want it in 'maint', so the signature on the object alone is insufficient. The only assurance to you that 'maint' points at what I wanted to place there comes from your trust on the hosting site and my authentication with it, which cannot easily audited later. Introduce a mechanism that allows you to sign a "push certificate" (for the lack of better name) every time you push, asserting that what object you are pushing to update which ref that used to point at what other object. Think of it as a cryptographic protection for ref updates, similar to signed tags/commits but working on an orthogonal axis. The basic flow based on this mechanism goes like this: 1. You push out your work with "git push --signed". 2. The sending side learns where the remote refs are as usual, together with what protocol extension the receiving end supports. If the receiving end does not advertise the protocol extension "push-cert", an attempt to "git push --signed" fails. Otherwise, a text file, that looks like the following, is prepared in core: certificate version 0.1 pusher Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> 1315427886 -0700 7339ca65... 21580ecb... refs/heads/master 3793ac56... 12850bec... refs/heads/next The file begins with a few header lines, which may grow as we gain more experience. The 'pusher' header records the name of the signer (the value of user.signingkey configuration variable, falling back to GIT_COMMITTER_{NAME|EMAIL}) and the time of the certificate generation. After the header, a blank line follows, followed by a copy of the protocol message lines. Each line shows the old and the new object name at the tip of the ref this push tries to update, in the way identical to how the underlying "git push" protocol exchange tells the ref updates to the receiving end (by recording the "old" object name, the push certificate also protects against replaying). It is expected that new command packet types other than the old-new-refname kind will be included in push certificate in the same way as would appear in the plain vanilla command packets in unsigned pushes. The user then is asked to sign this push certificate using GPG, formatted in a way similar to how signed tag objects are signed, and the result is sent to the other side (i.e. receive-pack). In the protocol exchange, this step comes immediately before the sender tells what the result of the push should be, which in turn comes before it sends the pack data. 3. When the receiving end sees a push certificate, the certificate is written out as a blob. The pre-receive hook can learn about the certificate by checking GIT_PUSH_CERT environment variable, which, if present, tells the object name of this blob, and make the decision to allow or reject this push. Additionally, the post-receive hook can also look at the certificate, which may be a good place to log all the received certificates for later audits. Because a push certificate carry the same information as the usual command packets in the protocol exchange, we can omit the latter when a push certificate is in use and reduce the protocol overhead. This however is not included in this patch to make it easier to review (in other words, the series at this step should never be released without the remainder of the series, as it implements an interim protocol that will be incompatible with the final one). As such, the documentation update for the protocol is left out of this step. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2014-09-12 20:17:07 +02:00
static struct strbuf push_cert = STRBUF_INIT;
static unsigned char push_cert_sha1[20];
static struct signature_check sigcheck;
static const char *push_cert_nonce;
static const char *cert_nonce_seed;
static const char *NONCE_UNSOLICITED = "UNSOLICITED";
static const char *NONCE_BAD = "BAD";
static const char *NONCE_MISSING = "MISSING";
static const char *NONCE_OK = "OK";
signed push: allow stale nonce in stateless mode When operating with the stateless RPC mode, we will receive a nonce issued by another instance of us that advertised our capability and refs some time ago. Update the logic to check received nonce to detect this case, compute how much time has passed since the nonce was issued and report the status with a new environment variable GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_SLOP to the hooks. GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_STATUS will report "SLOP" in such a case. The hooks are free to decide how large a slop it is willing to accept. Strictly speaking, the "nonce" is not really a "nonce" anymore in the stateless RPC mode, as it will happily take any "nonce" issued by it (which is protected by HMAC and its secret key) as long as it is fresh enough. The degree of this security degradation, relative to the native protocol, is about the same as the "we make sure that the 'git push' decided to update our refs with new objects based on the freshest observation of our refs by making sure the values they claim the original value of the refs they ask us to update exactly match the current state" security is loosened to accomodate the stateless RPC mode in the existing code without this series, so there is no need for those who are already using smart HTTP to push to their repositories to be alarmed any more than they already are. In addition, the server operator can set receive.certnonceslop configuration variable to specify how stale a nonce can be (in seconds). When this variable is set, and if the nonce received in the certificate that passes the HMAC check was less than that many seconds old, hooks are given "OK" in GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_STATUS (instead of "SLOP") and the received nonce value is given in GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE, which makes it easier for a simple-minded hook to check if the certificate we received is recent enough. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2014-09-05 19:46:04 +02:00
static const char *NONCE_SLOP = "SLOP";
static const char *nonce_status;
signed push: allow stale nonce in stateless mode When operating with the stateless RPC mode, we will receive a nonce issued by another instance of us that advertised our capability and refs some time ago. Update the logic to check received nonce to detect this case, compute how much time has passed since the nonce was issued and report the status with a new environment variable GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_SLOP to the hooks. GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_STATUS will report "SLOP" in such a case. The hooks are free to decide how large a slop it is willing to accept. Strictly speaking, the "nonce" is not really a "nonce" anymore in the stateless RPC mode, as it will happily take any "nonce" issued by it (which is protected by HMAC and its secret key) as long as it is fresh enough. The degree of this security degradation, relative to the native protocol, is about the same as the "we make sure that the 'git push' decided to update our refs with new objects based on the freshest observation of our refs by making sure the values they claim the original value of the refs they ask us to update exactly match the current state" security is loosened to accomodate the stateless RPC mode in the existing code without this series, so there is no need for those who are already using smart HTTP to push to their repositories to be alarmed any more than they already are. In addition, the server operator can set receive.certnonceslop configuration variable to specify how stale a nonce can be (in seconds). When this variable is set, and if the nonce received in the certificate that passes the HMAC check was less than that many seconds old, hooks are given "OK" in GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_STATUS (instead of "SLOP") and the received nonce value is given in GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE, which makes it easier for a simple-minded hook to check if the certificate we received is recent enough. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2014-09-05 19:46:04 +02:00
static long nonce_stamp_slop;
static unsigned long nonce_stamp_slop_limit;
static struct ref_transaction *transaction;
static enum deny_action parse_deny_action(const char *var, const char *value)
{
if (value) {
if (!strcasecmp(value, "ignore"))
return DENY_IGNORE;
if (!strcasecmp(value, "warn"))
return DENY_WARN;
if (!strcasecmp(value, "refuse"))
return DENY_REFUSE;
if (!strcasecmp(value, "updateinstead"))
return DENY_UPDATE_INSTEAD;
}
if (git_config_bool(var, value))
return DENY_REFUSE;
return DENY_IGNORE;
}
static int receive_pack_config(const char *var, const char *value, void *cb)
{
upload/receive-pack: allow hiding ref hierarchies A repository may have refs that are only used for its internal bookkeeping purposes that should not be exposed to the others that come over the network. Teach upload-pack to omit some refs from its initial advertisement by paying attention to the uploadpack.hiderefs multi-valued configuration variable. Do the same to receive-pack via the receive.hiderefs variable. As a convenient short-hand, allow using transfer.hiderefs to set the value to both of these variables. Any ref that is under the hierarchies listed on the value of these variable is excluded from responses to requests made by "ls-remote", "fetch", etc. (for upload-pack) and "push" (for receive-pack). Because these hidden refs do not count as OUR_REF, an attempt to fetch objects at the tip of them will be rejected, and because these refs do not get advertised, "git push :" will not see local branches that have the same name as them as "matching" ones to be sent. An attempt to update/delete these hidden refs with an explicit refspec, e.g. "git push origin :refs/hidden/22", is rejected. This is not a new restriction. To the pusher, it would appear that there is no such ref, so its push request will conclude with "Now that I sent you all the data, it is time for you to update the refs. I saw that the ref did not exist when I started pushing, and I want the result to point at this commit". The receiving end will apply the compare-and-swap rule to this request and rejects the push with "Well, your update request conflicts with somebody else; I see there is such a ref.", which is the right thing to do. Otherwise a push to a hidden ref will always be "the last one wins", which is not a good default. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2013-01-19 01:08:30 +01:00
int status = parse_hide_refs_config(var, value, "receive");
if (status)
return status;
if (strcmp(var, "receive.denydeletes") == 0) {
deny_deletes = git_config_bool(var, value);
return 0;
}
if (strcmp(var, "receive.denynonfastforwards") == 0) {
deny_non_fast_forwards = git_config_bool(var, value);
return 0;
}
if (strcmp(var, "receive.unpacklimit") == 0) {
receive_unpack_limit = git_config_int(var, value);
return 0;
}
if (strcmp(var, "transfer.unpacklimit") == 0) {
transfer_unpack_limit = git_config_int(var, value);
return 0;
}
if (strcmp(var, "receive.fsck.skiplist") == 0) {
const char *path;
if (git_config_pathname(&path, var, value))
return 1;
strbuf_addf(&fsck_msg_types, "%cskiplist=%s",
fsck_msg_types.len ? ',' : '=', path);
free((char *)path);
return 0;
}
if (skip_prefix(var, "receive.fsck.", &var)) {
if (is_valid_msg_type(var, value))
strbuf_addf(&fsck_msg_types, "%c%s=%s",
fsck_msg_types.len ? ',' : '=', var, value);
else
warning("Skipping unknown msg id '%s'", var);
return 0;
}
if (strcmp(var, "receive.fsckobjects") == 0) {
receive_fsck_objects = git_config_bool(var, value);
return 0;
}
if (strcmp(var, "transfer.fsckobjects") == 0) {
transfer_fsck_objects = git_config_bool(var, value);
return 0;
}
if (!strcmp(var, "receive.denycurrentbranch")) {
deny_current_branch = parse_deny_action(var, value);
return 0;
}
if (strcmp(var, "receive.denydeletecurrent") == 0) {
deny_delete_current = parse_deny_action(var, value);
return 0;
}
if (strcmp(var, "repack.usedeltabaseoffset") == 0) {
prefer_ofs_delta = git_config_bool(var, value);
return 0;
}
if (strcmp(var, "receive.updateserverinfo") == 0) {
auto_update_server_info = git_config_bool(var, value);
return 0;
}
if (strcmp(var, "receive.autogc") == 0) {
auto_gc = git_config_bool(var, value);
return 0;
}
if (strcmp(var, "receive.shallowupdate") == 0) {
shallow_update = git_config_bool(var, value);
return 0;
}
if (strcmp(var, "receive.certnonceseed") == 0)
return git_config_string(&cert_nonce_seed, var, value);
push: the beginning of "git push --signed" While signed tags and commits assert that the objects thusly signed came from you, who signed these objects, there is not a good way to assert that you wanted to have a particular object at the tip of a particular branch. My signing v2.0.1 tag only means I want to call the version v2.0.1, and it does not mean I want to push it out to my 'master' branch---it is likely that I only want it in 'maint', so the signature on the object alone is insufficient. The only assurance to you that 'maint' points at what I wanted to place there comes from your trust on the hosting site and my authentication with it, which cannot easily audited later. Introduce a mechanism that allows you to sign a "push certificate" (for the lack of better name) every time you push, asserting that what object you are pushing to update which ref that used to point at what other object. Think of it as a cryptographic protection for ref updates, similar to signed tags/commits but working on an orthogonal axis. The basic flow based on this mechanism goes like this: 1. You push out your work with "git push --signed". 2. The sending side learns where the remote refs are as usual, together with what protocol extension the receiving end supports. If the receiving end does not advertise the protocol extension "push-cert", an attempt to "git push --signed" fails. Otherwise, a text file, that looks like the following, is prepared in core: certificate version 0.1 pusher Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> 1315427886 -0700 7339ca65... 21580ecb... refs/heads/master 3793ac56... 12850bec... refs/heads/next The file begins with a few header lines, which may grow as we gain more experience. The 'pusher' header records the name of the signer (the value of user.signingkey configuration variable, falling back to GIT_COMMITTER_{NAME|EMAIL}) and the time of the certificate generation. After the header, a blank line follows, followed by a copy of the protocol message lines. Each line shows the old and the new object name at the tip of the ref this push tries to update, in the way identical to how the underlying "git push" protocol exchange tells the ref updates to the receiving end (by recording the "old" object name, the push certificate also protects against replaying). It is expected that new command packet types other than the old-new-refname kind will be included in push certificate in the same way as would appear in the plain vanilla command packets in unsigned pushes. The user then is asked to sign this push certificate using GPG, formatted in a way similar to how signed tag objects are signed, and the result is sent to the other side (i.e. receive-pack). In the protocol exchange, this step comes immediately before the sender tells what the result of the push should be, which in turn comes before it sends the pack data. 3. When the receiving end sees a push certificate, the certificate is written out as a blob. The pre-receive hook can learn about the certificate by checking GIT_PUSH_CERT environment variable, which, if present, tells the object name of this blob, and make the decision to allow or reject this push. Additionally, the post-receive hook can also look at the certificate, which may be a good place to log all the received certificates for later audits. Because a push certificate carry the same information as the usual command packets in the protocol exchange, we can omit the latter when a push certificate is in use and reduce the protocol overhead. This however is not included in this patch to make it easier to review (in other words, the series at this step should never be released without the remainder of the series, as it implements an interim protocol that will be incompatible with the final one). As such, the documentation update for the protocol is left out of this step. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2014-09-12 20:17:07 +02:00
signed push: allow stale nonce in stateless mode When operating with the stateless RPC mode, we will receive a nonce issued by another instance of us that advertised our capability and refs some time ago. Update the logic to check received nonce to detect this case, compute how much time has passed since the nonce was issued and report the status with a new environment variable GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_SLOP to the hooks. GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_STATUS will report "SLOP" in such a case. The hooks are free to decide how large a slop it is willing to accept. Strictly speaking, the "nonce" is not really a "nonce" anymore in the stateless RPC mode, as it will happily take any "nonce" issued by it (which is protected by HMAC and its secret key) as long as it is fresh enough. The degree of this security degradation, relative to the native protocol, is about the same as the "we make sure that the 'git push' decided to update our refs with new objects based on the freshest observation of our refs by making sure the values they claim the original value of the refs they ask us to update exactly match the current state" security is loosened to accomodate the stateless RPC mode in the existing code without this series, so there is no need for those who are already using smart HTTP to push to their repositories to be alarmed any more than they already are. In addition, the server operator can set receive.certnonceslop configuration variable to specify how stale a nonce can be (in seconds). When this variable is set, and if the nonce received in the certificate that passes the HMAC check was less than that many seconds old, hooks are given "OK" in GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_STATUS (instead of "SLOP") and the received nonce value is given in GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE, which makes it easier for a simple-minded hook to check if the certificate we received is recent enough. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2014-09-05 19:46:04 +02:00
if (strcmp(var, "receive.certnonceslop") == 0) {
nonce_stamp_slop_limit = git_config_ulong(var, value);
return 0;
}
if (strcmp(var, "receive.advertiseatomic") == 0) {
advertise_atomic_push = git_config_bool(var, value);
return 0;
}
return git_default_config(var, value, cb);
}
static void show_ref(const char *path, const unsigned char *sha1)
{
if (sent_capabilities) {
packet_write(1, "%s %s\n", sha1_to_hex(sha1), path);
} else {
struct strbuf cap = STRBUF_INIT;
strbuf_addstr(&cap,
"report-status delete-refs side-band-64k quiet");
if (advertise_atomic_push)
strbuf_addstr(&cap, " atomic");
if (prefer_ofs_delta)
strbuf_addstr(&cap, " ofs-delta");
if (push_cert_nonce)
strbuf_addf(&cap, " push-cert=%s", push_cert_nonce);
strbuf_addf(&cap, " agent=%s", git_user_agent_sanitized());
packet_write(1, "%s %s%c%s\n",
sha1_to_hex(sha1), path, 0, cap.buf);
strbuf_release(&cap);
sent_capabilities = 1;
}
}
static int show_ref_cb(const char *path_full, const struct object_id *oid,
int flag, void *unused)
{
const char *path = strip_namespace(path_full);
if (ref_is_hidden(path, path_full))
return 0;
/*
* Advertise refs outside our current namespace as ".have"
* refs, so that the client can use them to minimize data
* transfer but will otherwise ignore them. This happens to
* cover ".have" that are thrown in by add_one_alternate_ref()
* to mark histories that are complete in our alternates as
* well.
*/
if (!path)
path = ".have";
show_ref(path, oid->hash);
return 0;
}
static void show_one_alternate_sha1(const unsigned char sha1[20], void *unused)
{
show_ref(".have", sha1);
}
static void collect_one_alternate_ref(const struct ref *ref, void *data)
{
struct sha1_array *sa = data;
sha1_array_append(sa, ref->old_oid.hash);
}
static void write_head_info(void)
{
struct sha1_array sa = SHA1_ARRAY_INIT;
for_each_alternate_ref(collect_one_alternate_ref, &sa);
sha1_array_for_each_unique(&sa, show_one_alternate_sha1, NULL);
sha1_array_clear(&sa);
for_each_ref(show_ref_cb, NULL);
if (!sent_capabilities)
show_ref("capabilities^{}", null_sha1);
make the sender advertise shallow commits to the receiver If either receive-pack or upload-pack is called on a shallow repository, shallow commits (*) will be sent after the ref advertisement (but before the packet flush), so that the receiver has the full "shape" of the sender's commit graph. This will be needed for the receiver to update its .git/shallow if necessary. This breaks the protocol for all clients trying to push to a shallow repo, or fetch from one. Which is basically the same end result as today's "is_repository_shallow() && die()" in receive-pack and upload-pack. New clients will be made aware of shallow upstream and can make use of this information. The sender must send all shallow commits that are sent in the following pack. It may send more shallow commits than necessary. upload-pack for example may choose to advertise no shallow commits if it knows in advance that the pack it's going to send contains no shallow commits. But upload-pack is the server, so we choose the cheaper way, send full .git/shallow and let the client deal with it. Smart HTTP is not affected by this patch. Shallow support on smart-http comes later separately. (*) A shallow commit is a commit that terminates the revision walker. It is usually put in .git/shallow in order to keep the revision walker from going out of bound because there is no guarantee that objects behind this commit is available. Signed-off-by: Nguyễn Thái Ngọc Duy <pclouds@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2013-12-05 14:02:32 +01:00
advertise_shallow_grafts(1);
/* EOF */
packet_flush(1);
}
struct command {
struct command *next;
const char *error_string;
unsigned int skip_update:1,
did_not_exist:1;
int index;
unsigned char old_sha1[20];
unsigned char new_sha1[20];
char ref_name[FLEX_ARRAY]; /* more */
};
static void rp_error(const char *err, ...) __attribute__((format (printf, 1, 2)));
static void rp_warning(const char *err, ...) __attribute__((format (printf, 1, 2)));
static void report_message(const char *prefix, const char *err, va_list params)
{
int sz;
char msg[4096];
sz = xsnprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), "%s", prefix);
sz += vsnprintf(msg + sz, sizeof(msg) - sz, err, params);
if (sz > (sizeof(msg) - 1))
sz = sizeof(msg) - 1;
msg[sz++] = '\n';
if (use_sideband)
send_sideband(1, 2, msg, sz, use_sideband);
else
xwrite(2, msg, sz);
}
static void rp_warning(const char *err, ...)
{
va_list params;
va_start(params, err);
report_message("warning: ", err, params);
va_end(params);
}
static void rp_error(const char *err, ...)
{
va_list params;
va_start(params, err);
report_message("error: ", err, params);
va_end(params);
}
static int copy_to_sideband(int in, int out, void *arg)
{
char data[128];
while (1) {
ssize_t sz = xread(in, data, sizeof(data));
if (sz <= 0)
break;
send_sideband(1, 2, data, sz, use_sideband);
}
close(in);
return 0;
}
#define HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE 64
static void hmac_sha1(unsigned char *out,
const char *key_in, size_t key_len,
const char *text, size_t text_len)
{
unsigned char key[HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE];
unsigned char k_ipad[HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE];
unsigned char k_opad[HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE];
int i;
git_SHA_CTX ctx;
/* RFC 2104 2. (1) */
memset(key, '\0', HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE);
if (HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE < key_len) {
git_SHA1_Init(&ctx);
git_SHA1_Update(&ctx, key_in, key_len);
git_SHA1_Final(key, &ctx);
} else {
memcpy(key, key_in, key_len);
}
/* RFC 2104 2. (2) & (5) */
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(key); i++) {
k_ipad[i] = key[i] ^ 0x36;
k_opad[i] = key[i] ^ 0x5c;
}
/* RFC 2104 2. (3) & (4) */
git_SHA1_Init(&ctx);
git_SHA1_Update(&ctx, k_ipad, sizeof(k_ipad));
git_SHA1_Update(&ctx, text, text_len);
git_SHA1_Final(out, &ctx);
/* RFC 2104 2. (6) & (7) */
git_SHA1_Init(&ctx);
git_SHA1_Update(&ctx, k_opad, sizeof(k_opad));
git_SHA1_Update(&ctx, out, 20);
git_SHA1_Final(out, &ctx);
}
static char *prepare_push_cert_nonce(const char *path, unsigned long stamp)
{
struct strbuf buf = STRBUF_INIT;
unsigned char sha1[20];
strbuf_addf(&buf, "%s:%lu", path, stamp);
hmac_sha1(sha1, buf.buf, buf.len, cert_nonce_seed, strlen(cert_nonce_seed));;
strbuf_release(&buf);
/* RFC 2104 5. HMAC-SHA1-80 */
strbuf_addf(&buf, "%lu-%.*s", stamp, 20, sha1_to_hex(sha1));
return strbuf_detach(&buf, NULL);
}
/*
* NEEDSWORK: reuse find_commit_header() from jk/commit-author-parsing
* after dropping "_commit" from its name and possibly moving it out
* of commit.c
*/
static char *find_header(const char *msg, size_t len, const char *key)
{
int key_len = strlen(key);
const char *line = msg;
while (line && line < msg + len) {
const char *eol = strchrnul(line, '\n');
if ((msg + len <= eol) || line == eol)
return NULL;
if (line + key_len < eol &&
!memcmp(line, key, key_len) && line[key_len] == ' ') {
int offset = key_len + 1;
return xmemdupz(line + offset, (eol - line) - offset);
}
line = *eol ? eol + 1 : NULL;
}
return NULL;
}
static const char *check_nonce(const char *buf, size_t len)
{
char *nonce = find_header(buf, len, "nonce");
signed push: allow stale nonce in stateless mode When operating with the stateless RPC mode, we will receive a nonce issued by another instance of us that advertised our capability and refs some time ago. Update the logic to check received nonce to detect this case, compute how much time has passed since the nonce was issued and report the status with a new environment variable GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_SLOP to the hooks. GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_STATUS will report "SLOP" in such a case. The hooks are free to decide how large a slop it is willing to accept. Strictly speaking, the "nonce" is not really a "nonce" anymore in the stateless RPC mode, as it will happily take any "nonce" issued by it (which is protected by HMAC and its secret key) as long as it is fresh enough. The degree of this security degradation, relative to the native protocol, is about the same as the "we make sure that the 'git push' decided to update our refs with new objects based on the freshest observation of our refs by making sure the values they claim the original value of the refs they ask us to update exactly match the current state" security is loosened to accomodate the stateless RPC mode in the existing code without this series, so there is no need for those who are already using smart HTTP to push to their repositories to be alarmed any more than they already are. In addition, the server operator can set receive.certnonceslop configuration variable to specify how stale a nonce can be (in seconds). When this variable is set, and if the nonce received in the certificate that passes the HMAC check was less than that many seconds old, hooks are given "OK" in GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_STATUS (instead of "SLOP") and the received nonce value is given in GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE, which makes it easier for a simple-minded hook to check if the certificate we received is recent enough. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2014-09-05 19:46:04 +02:00
unsigned long stamp, ostamp;
char *bohmac, *expect = NULL;
const char *retval = NONCE_BAD;
if (!nonce) {
retval = NONCE_MISSING;
goto leave;
} else if (!push_cert_nonce) {
retval = NONCE_UNSOLICITED;
goto leave;
} else if (!strcmp(push_cert_nonce, nonce)) {
retval = NONCE_OK;
goto leave;
}
signed push: allow stale nonce in stateless mode When operating with the stateless RPC mode, we will receive a nonce issued by another instance of us that advertised our capability and refs some time ago. Update the logic to check received nonce to detect this case, compute how much time has passed since the nonce was issued and report the status with a new environment variable GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_SLOP to the hooks. GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_STATUS will report "SLOP" in such a case. The hooks are free to decide how large a slop it is willing to accept. Strictly speaking, the "nonce" is not really a "nonce" anymore in the stateless RPC mode, as it will happily take any "nonce" issued by it (which is protected by HMAC and its secret key) as long as it is fresh enough. The degree of this security degradation, relative to the native protocol, is about the same as the "we make sure that the 'git push' decided to update our refs with new objects based on the freshest observation of our refs by making sure the values they claim the original value of the refs they ask us to update exactly match the current state" security is loosened to accomodate the stateless RPC mode in the existing code without this series, so there is no need for those who are already using smart HTTP to push to their repositories to be alarmed any more than they already are. In addition, the server operator can set receive.certnonceslop configuration variable to specify how stale a nonce can be (in seconds). When this variable is set, and if the nonce received in the certificate that passes the HMAC check was less than that many seconds old, hooks are given "OK" in GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_STATUS (instead of "SLOP") and the received nonce value is given in GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE, which makes it easier for a simple-minded hook to check if the certificate we received is recent enough. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2014-09-05 19:46:04 +02:00
if (!stateless_rpc) {
/* returned nonce MUST match what we gave out earlier */
retval = NONCE_BAD;
goto leave;
}
/*
* In stateless mode, we may be receiving a nonce issued by
* another instance of the server that serving the same
* repository, and the timestamps may not match, but the
* nonce-seed and dir should match, so we can recompute and
* report the time slop.
*
* In addition, when a nonce issued by another instance has
* timestamp within receive.certnonceslop seconds, we pretend
* as if we issued that nonce when reporting to the hook.
*/
/* nonce is concat(<seconds-since-epoch>, "-", <hmac>) */
if (*nonce <= '0' || '9' < *nonce) {
retval = NONCE_BAD;
goto leave;
}
stamp = strtoul(nonce, &bohmac, 10);
if (bohmac == nonce || bohmac[0] != '-') {
retval = NONCE_BAD;
goto leave;
}
expect = prepare_push_cert_nonce(service_dir, stamp);
if (strcmp(expect, nonce)) {
/* Not what we would have signed earlier */
retval = NONCE_BAD;
goto leave;
}
/*
* By how many seconds is this nonce stale? Negative value
* would mean it was issued by another server with its clock
* skewed in the future.
*/
ostamp = strtoul(push_cert_nonce, NULL, 10);
nonce_stamp_slop = (long)ostamp - (long)stamp;
if (nonce_stamp_slop_limit &&
labs(nonce_stamp_slop) <= nonce_stamp_slop_limit) {
signed push: allow stale nonce in stateless mode When operating with the stateless RPC mode, we will receive a nonce issued by another instance of us that advertised our capability and refs some time ago. Update the logic to check received nonce to detect this case, compute how much time has passed since the nonce was issued and report the status with a new environment variable GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_SLOP to the hooks. GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_STATUS will report "SLOP" in such a case. The hooks are free to decide how large a slop it is willing to accept. Strictly speaking, the "nonce" is not really a "nonce" anymore in the stateless RPC mode, as it will happily take any "nonce" issued by it (which is protected by HMAC and its secret key) as long as it is fresh enough. The degree of this security degradation, relative to the native protocol, is about the same as the "we make sure that the 'git push' decided to update our refs with new objects based on the freshest observation of our refs by making sure the values they claim the original value of the refs they ask us to update exactly match the current state" security is loosened to accomodate the stateless RPC mode in the existing code without this series, so there is no need for those who are already using smart HTTP to push to their repositories to be alarmed any more than they already are. In addition, the server operator can set receive.certnonceslop configuration variable to specify how stale a nonce can be (in seconds). When this variable is set, and if the nonce received in the certificate that passes the HMAC check was less than that many seconds old, hooks are given "OK" in GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_STATUS (instead of "SLOP") and the received nonce value is given in GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE, which makes it easier for a simple-minded hook to check if the certificate we received is recent enough. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2014-09-05 19:46:04 +02:00
/*
* Pretend as if the received nonce (which passes the
* HMAC check, so it is not a forged by third-party)
* is what we issued.
*/
free((void *)push_cert_nonce);
push_cert_nonce = xstrdup(nonce);
retval = NONCE_OK;
} else {
retval = NONCE_SLOP;
}
leave:
free(nonce);
signed push: allow stale nonce in stateless mode When operating with the stateless RPC mode, we will receive a nonce issued by another instance of us that advertised our capability and refs some time ago. Update the logic to check received nonce to detect this case, compute how much time has passed since the nonce was issued and report the status with a new environment variable GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_SLOP to the hooks. GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_STATUS will report "SLOP" in such a case. The hooks are free to decide how large a slop it is willing to accept. Strictly speaking, the "nonce" is not really a "nonce" anymore in the stateless RPC mode, as it will happily take any "nonce" issued by it (which is protected by HMAC and its secret key) as long as it is fresh enough. The degree of this security degradation, relative to the native protocol, is about the same as the "we make sure that the 'git push' decided to update our refs with new objects based on the freshest observation of our refs by making sure the values they claim the original value of the refs they ask us to update exactly match the current state" security is loosened to accomodate the stateless RPC mode in the existing code without this series, so there is no need for those who are already using smart HTTP to push to their repositories to be alarmed any more than they already are. In addition, the server operator can set receive.certnonceslop configuration variable to specify how stale a nonce can be (in seconds). When this variable is set, and if the nonce received in the certificate that passes the HMAC check was less than that many seconds old, hooks are given "OK" in GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_STATUS (instead of "SLOP") and the received nonce value is given in GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE, which makes it easier for a simple-minded hook to check if the certificate we received is recent enough. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2014-09-05 19:46:04 +02:00
free(expect);
return retval;
}
push: the beginning of "git push --signed" While signed tags and commits assert that the objects thusly signed came from you, who signed these objects, there is not a good way to assert that you wanted to have a particular object at the tip of a particular branch. My signing v2.0.1 tag only means I want to call the version v2.0.1, and it does not mean I want to push it out to my 'master' branch---it is likely that I only want it in 'maint', so the signature on the object alone is insufficient. The only assurance to you that 'maint' points at what I wanted to place there comes from your trust on the hosting site and my authentication with it, which cannot easily audited later. Introduce a mechanism that allows you to sign a "push certificate" (for the lack of better name) every time you push, asserting that what object you are pushing to update which ref that used to point at what other object. Think of it as a cryptographic protection for ref updates, similar to signed tags/commits but working on an orthogonal axis. The basic flow based on this mechanism goes like this: 1. You push out your work with "git push --signed". 2. The sending side learns where the remote refs are as usual, together with what protocol extension the receiving end supports. If the receiving end does not advertise the protocol extension "push-cert", an attempt to "git push --signed" fails. Otherwise, a text file, that looks like the following, is prepared in core: certificate version 0.1 pusher Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> 1315427886 -0700 7339ca65... 21580ecb... refs/heads/master 3793ac56... 12850bec... refs/heads/next The file begins with a few header lines, which may grow as we gain more experience. The 'pusher' header records the name of the signer (the value of user.signingkey configuration variable, falling back to GIT_COMMITTER_{NAME|EMAIL}) and the time of the certificate generation. After the header, a blank line follows, followed by a copy of the protocol message lines. Each line shows the old and the new object name at the tip of the ref this push tries to update, in the way identical to how the underlying "git push" protocol exchange tells the ref updates to the receiving end (by recording the "old" object name, the push certificate also protects against replaying). It is expected that new command packet types other than the old-new-refname kind will be included in push certificate in the same way as would appear in the plain vanilla command packets in unsigned pushes. The user then is asked to sign this push certificate using GPG, formatted in a way similar to how signed tag objects are signed, and the result is sent to the other side (i.e. receive-pack). In the protocol exchange, this step comes immediately before the sender tells what the result of the push should be, which in turn comes before it sends the pack data. 3. When the receiving end sees a push certificate, the certificate is written out as a blob. The pre-receive hook can learn about the certificate by checking GIT_PUSH_CERT environment variable, which, if present, tells the object name of this blob, and make the decision to allow or reject this push. Additionally, the post-receive hook can also look at the certificate, which may be a good place to log all the received certificates for later audits. Because a push certificate carry the same information as the usual command packets in the protocol exchange, we can omit the latter when a push certificate is in use and reduce the protocol overhead. This however is not included in this patch to make it easier to review (in other words, the series at this step should never be released without the remainder of the series, as it implements an interim protocol that will be incompatible with the final one). As such, the documentation update for the protocol is left out of this step. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2014-09-12 20:17:07 +02:00
static void prepare_push_cert_sha1(struct child_process *proc)
{
static int already_done;
if (!push_cert.len)
return;
if (!already_done) {
struct strbuf gpg_output = STRBUF_INIT;
struct strbuf gpg_status = STRBUF_INIT;
int bogs /* beginning_of_gpg_sig */;
push: the beginning of "git push --signed" While signed tags and commits assert that the objects thusly signed came from you, who signed these objects, there is not a good way to assert that you wanted to have a particular object at the tip of a particular branch. My signing v2.0.1 tag only means I want to call the version v2.0.1, and it does not mean I want to push it out to my 'master' branch---it is likely that I only want it in 'maint', so the signature on the object alone is insufficient. The only assurance to you that 'maint' points at what I wanted to place there comes from your trust on the hosting site and my authentication with it, which cannot easily audited later. Introduce a mechanism that allows you to sign a "push certificate" (for the lack of better name) every time you push, asserting that what object you are pushing to update which ref that used to point at what other object. Think of it as a cryptographic protection for ref updates, similar to signed tags/commits but working on an orthogonal axis. The basic flow based on this mechanism goes like this: 1. You push out your work with "git push --signed". 2. The sending side learns where the remote refs are as usual, together with what protocol extension the receiving end supports. If the receiving end does not advertise the protocol extension "push-cert", an attempt to "git push --signed" fails. Otherwise, a text file, that looks like the following, is prepared in core: certificate version 0.1 pusher Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> 1315427886 -0700 7339ca65... 21580ecb... refs/heads/master 3793ac56... 12850bec... refs/heads/next The file begins with a few header lines, which may grow as we gain more experience. The 'pusher' header records the name of the signer (the value of user.signingkey configuration variable, falling back to GIT_COMMITTER_{NAME|EMAIL}) and the time of the certificate generation. After the header, a blank line follows, followed by a copy of the protocol message lines. Each line shows the old and the new object name at the tip of the ref this push tries to update, in the way identical to how the underlying "git push" protocol exchange tells the ref updates to the receiving end (by recording the "old" object name, the push certificate also protects against replaying). It is expected that new command packet types other than the old-new-refname kind will be included in push certificate in the same way as would appear in the plain vanilla command packets in unsigned pushes. The user then is asked to sign this push certificate using GPG, formatted in a way similar to how signed tag objects are signed, and the result is sent to the other side (i.e. receive-pack). In the protocol exchange, this step comes immediately before the sender tells what the result of the push should be, which in turn comes before it sends the pack data. 3. When the receiving end sees a push certificate, the certificate is written out as a blob. The pre-receive hook can learn about the certificate by checking GIT_PUSH_CERT environment variable, which, if present, tells the object name of this blob, and make the decision to allow or reject this push. Additionally, the post-receive hook can also look at the certificate, which may be a good place to log all the received certificates for later audits. Because a push certificate carry the same information as the usual command packets in the protocol exchange, we can omit the latter when a push certificate is in use and reduce the protocol overhead. This however is not included in this patch to make it easier to review (in other words, the series at this step should never be released without the remainder of the series, as it implements an interim protocol that will be incompatible with the final one). As such, the documentation update for the protocol is left out of this step. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2014-09-12 20:17:07 +02:00
already_done = 1;
if (write_sha1_file(push_cert.buf, push_cert.len, "blob", push_cert_sha1))
hashclr(push_cert_sha1);
memset(&sigcheck, '\0', sizeof(sigcheck));
sigcheck.result = 'N';
bogs = parse_signature(push_cert.buf, push_cert.len);
if (verify_signed_buffer(push_cert.buf, bogs,
push_cert.buf + bogs, push_cert.len - bogs,
&gpg_output, &gpg_status) < 0) {
; /* error running gpg */
} else {
sigcheck.payload = push_cert.buf;
sigcheck.gpg_output = gpg_output.buf;
sigcheck.gpg_status = gpg_status.buf;
parse_gpg_output(&sigcheck);
}
strbuf_release(&gpg_output);
strbuf_release(&gpg_status);
nonce_status = check_nonce(push_cert.buf, bogs);
push: the beginning of "git push --signed" While signed tags and commits assert that the objects thusly signed came from you, who signed these objects, there is not a good way to assert that you wanted to have a particular object at the tip of a particular branch. My signing v2.0.1 tag only means I want to call the version v2.0.1, and it does not mean I want to push it out to my 'master' branch---it is likely that I only want it in 'maint', so the signature on the object alone is insufficient. The only assurance to you that 'maint' points at what I wanted to place there comes from your trust on the hosting site and my authentication with it, which cannot easily audited later. Introduce a mechanism that allows you to sign a "push certificate" (for the lack of better name) every time you push, asserting that what object you are pushing to update which ref that used to point at what other object. Think of it as a cryptographic protection for ref updates, similar to signed tags/commits but working on an orthogonal axis. The basic flow based on this mechanism goes like this: 1. You push out your work with "git push --signed". 2. The sending side learns where the remote refs are as usual, together with what protocol extension the receiving end supports. If the receiving end does not advertise the protocol extension "push-cert", an attempt to "git push --signed" fails. Otherwise, a text file, that looks like the following, is prepared in core: certificate version 0.1 pusher Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> 1315427886 -0700 7339ca65... 21580ecb... refs/heads/master 3793ac56... 12850bec... refs/heads/next The file begins with a few header lines, which may grow as we gain more experience. The 'pusher' header records the name of the signer (the value of user.signingkey configuration variable, falling back to GIT_COMMITTER_{NAME|EMAIL}) and the time of the certificate generation. After the header, a blank line follows, followed by a copy of the protocol message lines. Each line shows the old and the new object name at the tip of the ref this push tries to update, in the way identical to how the underlying "git push" protocol exchange tells the ref updates to the receiving end (by recording the "old" object name, the push certificate also protects against replaying). It is expected that new command packet types other than the old-new-refname kind will be included in push certificate in the same way as would appear in the plain vanilla command packets in unsigned pushes. The user then is asked to sign this push certificate using GPG, formatted in a way similar to how signed tag objects are signed, and the result is sent to the other side (i.e. receive-pack). In the protocol exchange, this step comes immediately before the sender tells what the result of the push should be, which in turn comes before it sends the pack data. 3. When the receiving end sees a push certificate, the certificate is written out as a blob. The pre-receive hook can learn about the certificate by checking GIT_PUSH_CERT environment variable, which, if present, tells the object name of this blob, and make the decision to allow or reject this push. Additionally, the post-receive hook can also look at the certificate, which may be a good place to log all the received certificates for later audits. Because a push certificate carry the same information as the usual command packets in the protocol exchange, we can omit the latter when a push certificate is in use and reduce the protocol overhead. This however is not included in this patch to make it easier to review (in other words, the series at this step should never be released without the remainder of the series, as it implements an interim protocol that will be incompatible with the final one). As such, the documentation update for the protocol is left out of this step. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2014-09-12 20:17:07 +02:00
}
if (!is_null_sha1(push_cert_sha1)) {
argv_array_pushf(&proc->env_array, "GIT_PUSH_CERT=%s",
sha1_to_hex(push_cert_sha1));
argv_array_pushf(&proc->env_array, "GIT_PUSH_CERT_SIGNER=%s",
sigcheck.signer ? sigcheck.signer : "");
argv_array_pushf(&proc->env_array, "GIT_PUSH_CERT_KEY=%s",
sigcheck.key ? sigcheck.key : "");
argv_array_pushf(&proc->env_array, "GIT_PUSH_CERT_STATUS=%c",
sigcheck.result);
if (push_cert_nonce) {
argv_array_pushf(&proc->env_array,
"GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE=%s",
push_cert_nonce);
argv_array_pushf(&proc->env_array,
"GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_STATUS=%s",
nonce_status);
signed push: allow stale nonce in stateless mode When operating with the stateless RPC mode, we will receive a nonce issued by another instance of us that advertised our capability and refs some time ago. Update the logic to check received nonce to detect this case, compute how much time has passed since the nonce was issued and report the status with a new environment variable GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_SLOP to the hooks. GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_STATUS will report "SLOP" in such a case. The hooks are free to decide how large a slop it is willing to accept. Strictly speaking, the "nonce" is not really a "nonce" anymore in the stateless RPC mode, as it will happily take any "nonce" issued by it (which is protected by HMAC and its secret key) as long as it is fresh enough. The degree of this security degradation, relative to the native protocol, is about the same as the "we make sure that the 'git push' decided to update our refs with new objects based on the freshest observation of our refs by making sure the values they claim the original value of the refs they ask us to update exactly match the current state" security is loosened to accomodate the stateless RPC mode in the existing code without this series, so there is no need for those who are already using smart HTTP to push to their repositories to be alarmed any more than they already are. In addition, the server operator can set receive.certnonceslop configuration variable to specify how stale a nonce can be (in seconds). When this variable is set, and if the nonce received in the certificate that passes the HMAC check was less than that many seconds old, hooks are given "OK" in GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_STATUS (instead of "SLOP") and the received nonce value is given in GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE, which makes it easier for a simple-minded hook to check if the certificate we received is recent enough. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2014-09-05 19:46:04 +02:00
if (nonce_status == NONCE_SLOP)
argv_array_pushf(&proc->env_array,
"GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_SLOP=%ld",
signed push: allow stale nonce in stateless mode When operating with the stateless RPC mode, we will receive a nonce issued by another instance of us that advertised our capability and refs some time ago. Update the logic to check received nonce to detect this case, compute how much time has passed since the nonce was issued and report the status with a new environment variable GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_SLOP to the hooks. GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_STATUS will report "SLOP" in such a case. The hooks are free to decide how large a slop it is willing to accept. Strictly speaking, the "nonce" is not really a "nonce" anymore in the stateless RPC mode, as it will happily take any "nonce" issued by it (which is protected by HMAC and its secret key) as long as it is fresh enough. The degree of this security degradation, relative to the native protocol, is about the same as the "we make sure that the 'git push' decided to update our refs with new objects based on the freshest observation of our refs by making sure the values they claim the original value of the refs they ask us to update exactly match the current state" security is loosened to accomodate the stateless RPC mode in the existing code without this series, so there is no need for those who are already using smart HTTP to push to their repositories to be alarmed any more than they already are. In addition, the server operator can set receive.certnonceslop configuration variable to specify how stale a nonce can be (in seconds). When this variable is set, and if the nonce received in the certificate that passes the HMAC check was less than that many seconds old, hooks are given "OK" in GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_STATUS (instead of "SLOP") and the received nonce value is given in GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE, which makes it easier for a simple-minded hook to check if the certificate we received is recent enough. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2014-09-05 19:46:04 +02:00
nonce_stamp_slop);
}
push: the beginning of "git push --signed" While signed tags and commits assert that the objects thusly signed came from you, who signed these objects, there is not a good way to assert that you wanted to have a particular object at the tip of a particular branch. My signing v2.0.1 tag only means I want to call the version v2.0.1, and it does not mean I want to push it out to my 'master' branch---it is likely that I only want it in 'maint', so the signature on the object alone is insufficient. The only assurance to you that 'maint' points at what I wanted to place there comes from your trust on the hosting site and my authentication with it, which cannot easily audited later. Introduce a mechanism that allows you to sign a "push certificate" (for the lack of better name) every time you push, asserting that what object you are pushing to update which ref that used to point at what other object. Think of it as a cryptographic protection for ref updates, similar to signed tags/commits but working on an orthogonal axis. The basic flow based on this mechanism goes like this: 1. You push out your work with "git push --signed". 2. The sending side learns where the remote refs are as usual, together with what protocol extension the receiving end supports. If the receiving end does not advertise the protocol extension "push-cert", an attempt to "git push --signed" fails. Otherwise, a text file, that looks like the following, is prepared in core: certificate version 0.1 pusher Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> 1315427886 -0700 7339ca65... 21580ecb... refs/heads/master 3793ac56... 12850bec... refs/heads/next The file begins with a few header lines, which may grow as we gain more experience. The 'pusher' header records the name of the signer (the value of user.signingkey configuration variable, falling back to GIT_COMMITTER_{NAME|EMAIL}) and the time of the certificate generation. After the header, a blank line follows, followed by a copy of the protocol message lines. Each line shows the old and the new object name at the tip of the ref this push tries to update, in the way identical to how the underlying "git push" protocol exchange tells the ref updates to the receiving end (by recording the "old" object name, the push certificate also protects against replaying). It is expected that new command packet types other than the old-new-refname kind will be included in push certificate in the same way as would appear in the plain vanilla command packets in unsigned pushes. The user then is asked to sign this push certificate using GPG, formatted in a way similar to how signed tag objects are signed, and the result is sent to the other side (i.e. receive-pack). In the protocol exchange, this step comes immediately before the sender tells what the result of the push should be, which in turn comes before it sends the pack data. 3. When the receiving end sees a push certificate, the certificate is written out as a blob. The pre-receive hook can learn about the certificate by checking GIT_PUSH_CERT environment variable, which, if present, tells the object name of this blob, and make the decision to allow or reject this push. Additionally, the post-receive hook can also look at the certificate, which may be a good place to log all the received certificates for later audits. Because a push certificate carry the same information as the usual command packets in the protocol exchange, we can omit the latter when a push certificate is in use and reduce the protocol overhead. This however is not included in this patch to make it easier to review (in other words, the series at this step should never be released without the remainder of the series, as it implements an interim protocol that will be incompatible with the final one). As such, the documentation update for the protocol is left out of this step. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2014-09-12 20:17:07 +02:00
}
}
typedef int (*feed_fn)(void *, const char **, size_t *);
static int run_and_feed_hook(const char *hook_name, feed_fn feed, void *feed_state)
{
struct child_process proc = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT;
struct async muxer;
const char *argv[2];
int code;
argv[0] = find_hook(hook_name);
if (!argv[0])
return 0;
argv[1] = NULL;
proc.argv = argv;
proc.in = -1;
proc.stdout_to_stderr = 1;
if (use_sideband) {
memset(&muxer, 0, sizeof(muxer));
muxer.proc = copy_to_sideband;
muxer.in = -1;
code = start_async(&muxer);
if (code)
return code;
proc.err = muxer.in;
}
prepare_push_cert_sha1(&proc);
code = start_command(&proc);
if (code) {
if (use_sideband)
finish_async(&muxer);
return code;
}
receive-pack: allow hooks to ignore its standard input stream The pre-receive and post-receive hooks were designed to be an improvement over old style update and post-update hooks, which take the update information on their command line and are limited by the command line length limit. The same information is fed from the standard input to pre/post-receive hooks instead to lift this limitation. It has been mandatory for these new style hooks to consume the update information fully from the standard input stream. Otherwise, they would risk killing the receive-pack process via SIGPIPE. If a hook does not want to look at all the information, it is easy to send its standard input to /dev/null (perhaps a niche use of hook might need to know only the fact that a push was made, without having to know what objects have been pushed to update which refs), and this has already been done by existing hooks that are written carefully. However, because there is no good way to consistently fail hooks that do not consume the input fully (a small push may result in a short update record that may fit within the pipe buffer, to which the receive-pack process may manage to write before the hook has a chance to exit without reading anything, which will not result in a death-by-SIGPIPE of receive-pack), it can lead to a hard to diagnose "once in a blue moon" phantom failure. Lift this "hooks must consume their input fully" mandate. A mandate that is not enforced strictly is not helping us to catch mistakes in hooks. If a hook has a good reason to decide the outcome of its operation without reading the information we feed it, let it do so as it pleases. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2014-09-13 00:48:07 +02:00
sigchain_push(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
while (1) {
const char *buf;
size_t n;
if (feed(feed_state, &buf, &n))
break;
if (write_in_full(proc.in, buf, n) != n)
break;
}
close(proc.in);
if (use_sideband)
finish_async(&muxer);
receive-pack: allow hooks to ignore its standard input stream The pre-receive and post-receive hooks were designed to be an improvement over old style update and post-update hooks, which take the update information on their command line and are limited by the command line length limit. The same information is fed from the standard input to pre/post-receive hooks instead to lift this limitation. It has been mandatory for these new style hooks to consume the update information fully from the standard input stream. Otherwise, they would risk killing the receive-pack process via SIGPIPE. If a hook does not want to look at all the information, it is easy to send its standard input to /dev/null (perhaps a niche use of hook might need to know only the fact that a push was made, without having to know what objects have been pushed to update which refs), and this has already been done by existing hooks that are written carefully. However, because there is no good way to consistently fail hooks that do not consume the input fully (a small push may result in a short update record that may fit within the pipe buffer, to which the receive-pack process may manage to write before the hook has a chance to exit without reading anything, which will not result in a death-by-SIGPIPE of receive-pack), it can lead to a hard to diagnose "once in a blue moon" phantom failure. Lift this "hooks must consume their input fully" mandate. A mandate that is not enforced strictly is not helping us to catch mistakes in hooks. If a hook has a good reason to decide the outcome of its operation without reading the information we feed it, let it do so as it pleases. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2014-09-13 00:48:07 +02:00
sigchain_pop(SIGPIPE);
return finish_command(&proc);
}
struct receive_hook_feed_state {
struct command *cmd;
int skip_broken;
struct strbuf buf;
};
static int feed_receive_hook(void *state_, const char **bufp, size_t *sizep)
{
struct receive_hook_feed_state *state = state_;
struct command *cmd = state->cmd;
while (cmd &&
state->skip_broken && (cmd->error_string || cmd->did_not_exist))
cmd = cmd->next;
if (!cmd)
return -1; /* EOF */
strbuf_reset(&state->buf);
strbuf_addf(&state->buf, "%s %s %s\n",
sha1_to_hex(cmd->old_sha1), sha1_to_hex(cmd->new_sha1),
cmd->ref_name);
state->cmd = cmd->next;
if (bufp) {
*bufp = state->buf.buf;
*sizep = state->buf.len;
}
return 0;
}
static int run_receive_hook(struct command *commands, const char *hook_name,
int skip_broken)
{
struct receive_hook_feed_state state;
int status;
strbuf_init(&state.buf, 0);
state.cmd = commands;
state.skip_broken = skip_broken;
if (feed_receive_hook(&state, NULL, NULL))
return 0;
state.cmd = commands;
status = run_and_feed_hook(hook_name, feed_receive_hook, &state);
strbuf_release(&state.buf);
return status;
}
static int run_update_hook(struct command *cmd)
{
const char *argv[5];
struct child_process proc = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT;
int code;
argv[0] = find_hook("update");
if (!argv[0])
return 0;
argv[1] = cmd->ref_name;
argv[2] = sha1_to_hex(cmd->old_sha1);
argv[3] = sha1_to_hex(cmd->new_sha1);
argv[4] = NULL;
proc.no_stdin = 1;
proc.stdout_to_stderr = 1;
proc.err = use_sideband ? -1 : 0;
proc.argv = argv;
code = start_command(&proc);
if (code)
return code;
if (use_sideband)
copy_to_sideband(proc.err, -1, NULL);
return finish_command(&proc);
}
static int is_ref_checked_out(const char *ref)
{
if (is_bare_repository())
return 0;
if (!head_name)
return 0;
return !strcmp(head_name, ref);
}
static char *refuse_unconfigured_deny_msg[] = {
"By default, updating the current branch in a non-bare repository",
"is denied, because it will make the index and work tree inconsistent",
"with what you pushed, and will require 'git reset --hard' to match",
"the work tree to HEAD.",
"",
"You can set 'receive.denyCurrentBranch' configuration variable to",
"'ignore' or 'warn' in the remote repository to allow pushing into",
"its current branch; however, this is not recommended unless you",
"arranged to update its work tree to match what you pushed in some",
"other way.",
"",
"To squelch this message and still keep the default behaviour, set",
"'receive.denyCurrentBranch' configuration variable to 'refuse'."
};
static void refuse_unconfigured_deny(void)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(refuse_unconfigured_deny_msg); i++)
rp_error("%s", refuse_unconfigured_deny_msg[i]);
}
static char *refuse_unconfigured_deny_delete_current_msg[] = {
"By default, deleting the current branch is denied, because the next",
"'git clone' won't result in any file checked out, causing confusion.",
"",
"You can set 'receive.denyDeleteCurrent' configuration variable to",
"'warn' or 'ignore' in the remote repository to allow deleting the",
"current branch, with or without a warning message.",
"",
"To squelch this message, you can set it to 'refuse'."
};
static void refuse_unconfigured_deny_delete_current(void)
{
int i;
for (i = 0;
i < ARRAY_SIZE(refuse_unconfigured_deny_delete_current_msg);
i++)
rp_error("%s", refuse_unconfigured_deny_delete_current_msg[i]);
}
static int command_singleton_iterator(void *cb_data, unsigned char sha1[20]);
static int update_shallow_ref(struct command *cmd, struct shallow_info *si)
{
static struct lock_file shallow_lock;
struct sha1_array extra = SHA1_ARRAY_INIT;
const char *alt_file;
uint32_t mask = 1 << (cmd->index % 32);
int i;
trace_printf_key(&trace_shallow,
"shallow: update_shallow_ref %s\n", cmd->ref_name);
for (i = 0; i < si->shallow->nr; i++)
if (si->used_shallow[i] &&
(si->used_shallow[i][cmd->index / 32] & mask) &&
!delayed_reachability_test(si, i))
sha1_array_append(&extra, si->shallow->sha1[i]);
setup_alternate_shallow(&shallow_lock, &alt_file, &extra);
if (check_shallow_connected(command_singleton_iterator,
0, cmd, alt_file)) {
rollback_lock_file(&shallow_lock);
sha1_array_clear(&extra);
return -1;
}
commit_lock_file(&shallow_lock);
/*
* Make sure setup_alternate_shallow() for the next ref does
* not lose these new roots..
*/
for (i = 0; i < extra.nr; i++)
register_shallow(extra.sha1[i]);
si->shallow_ref[cmd->index] = 0;
sha1_array_clear(&extra);
return 0;
}
/*
* NEEDSWORK: we should consolidate various implementions of "are we
* on an unborn branch?" test into one, and make the unified one more
* robust. !get_sha1() based check used here and elsewhere would not
* allow us to tell an unborn branch from corrupt ref, for example.
* For the purpose of fixing "deploy-to-update does not work when
* pushing into an empty repository" issue, this should suffice for
* now.
*/
static int head_has_history(void)
{
unsigned char sha1[20];
return !get_sha1("HEAD", sha1);
}
static const char *push_to_deploy(unsigned char *sha1,
struct argv_array *env,
const char *work_tree)
{
const char *update_refresh[] = {
"update-index", "-q", "--ignore-submodules", "--refresh", NULL
};
const char *diff_files[] = {
"diff-files", "--quiet", "--ignore-submodules", "--", NULL
};
const char *diff_index[] = {
"diff-index", "--quiet", "--cached", "--ignore-submodules",
NULL, "--", NULL
};
const char *read_tree[] = {
"read-tree", "-u", "-m", NULL, NULL
};
struct child_process child = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT;
child.argv = update_refresh;
child.env = env->argv;
child.dir = work_tree;
child.no_stdin = 1;
child.stdout_to_stderr = 1;
child.git_cmd = 1;
if (run_command(&child))
return "Up-to-date check failed";
/* run_command() does not clean up completely; reinitialize */
child_process_init(&child);
child.argv = diff_files;
child.env = env->argv;
child.dir = work_tree;
child.no_stdin = 1;
child.stdout_to_stderr = 1;
child.git_cmd = 1;
if (run_command(&child))
return "Working directory has unstaged changes";
/* diff-index with either HEAD or an empty tree */
diff_index[4] = head_has_history() ? "HEAD" : EMPTY_TREE_SHA1_HEX;
child_process_init(&child);
child.argv = diff_index;
child.env = env->argv;
child.no_stdin = 1;
child.no_stdout = 1;
child.stdout_to_stderr = 0;
child.git_cmd = 1;
if (run_command(&child))
return "Working directory has staged changes";
read_tree[3] = sha1_to_hex(sha1);
child_process_init(&child);
child.argv = read_tree;
child.env = env->argv;
child.dir = work_tree;
child.no_stdin = 1;
child.no_stdout = 1;
child.stdout_to_stderr = 0;
child.git_cmd = 1;
if (run_command(&child))
return "Could not update working tree to new HEAD";
return NULL;
}
static const char *push_to_checkout_hook = "push-to-checkout";
static const char *push_to_checkout(unsigned char *sha1,
struct argv_array *env,
const char *work_tree)
{
argv_array_pushf(env, "GIT_WORK_TREE=%s", absolute_path(work_tree));
if (run_hook_le(env->argv, push_to_checkout_hook,
sha1_to_hex(sha1), NULL))
return "push-to-checkout hook declined";
else
return NULL;
}
static const char *update_worktree(unsigned char *sha1)
{
const char *retval;
const char *work_tree = git_work_tree_cfg ? git_work_tree_cfg : "..";
struct argv_array env = ARGV_ARRAY_INIT;
if (is_bare_repository())
return "denyCurrentBranch = updateInstead needs a worktree";
argv_array_pushf(&env, "GIT_DIR=%s", absolute_path(get_git_dir()));
if (!find_hook(push_to_checkout_hook))
retval = push_to_deploy(sha1, &env, work_tree);
else
retval = push_to_checkout(sha1, &env, work_tree);
argv_array_clear(&env);
return retval;
}
static const char *update(struct command *cmd, struct shallow_info *si)
{
const char *name = cmd->ref_name;
struct strbuf namespaced_name_buf = STRBUF_INIT;
const char *namespaced_name, *ret;
unsigned char *old_sha1 = cmd->old_sha1;
unsigned char *new_sha1 = cmd->new_sha1;
/* only refs/... are allowed */
if (!starts_with(name, "refs/") || check_refname_format(name + 5, 0)) {
rp_error("refusing to create funny ref '%s' remotely", name);
return "funny refname";
}
strbuf_addf(&namespaced_name_buf, "%s%s", get_git_namespace(), name);
namespaced_name = strbuf_detach(&namespaced_name_buf, NULL);
if (is_ref_checked_out(namespaced_name)) {
switch (deny_current_branch) {
case DENY_IGNORE:
break;
case DENY_WARN:
rp_warning("updating the current branch");
break;
case DENY_REFUSE:
case DENY_UNCONFIGURED:
rp_error("refusing to update checked out branch: %s", name);
if (deny_current_branch == DENY_UNCONFIGURED)
refuse_unconfigured_deny();
return "branch is currently checked out";
case DENY_UPDATE_INSTEAD:
ret = update_worktree(new_sha1);
if (ret)
return ret;
break;
}
}
if (!is_null_sha1(new_sha1) && !has_sha1_file(new_sha1)) {
error("unpack should have generated %s, "
"but I can't find it!", sha1_to_hex(new_sha1));
return "bad pack";
}
if (!is_null_sha1(old_sha1) && is_null_sha1(new_sha1)) {
if (deny_deletes && starts_with(name, "refs/heads/")) {
rp_error("denying ref deletion for %s", name);
return "deletion prohibited";
}
if (head_name && !strcmp(namespaced_name, head_name)) {
switch (deny_delete_current) {
case DENY_IGNORE:
break;
case DENY_WARN:
rp_warning("deleting the current branch");
break;
case DENY_REFUSE:
case DENY_UNCONFIGURED:
case DENY_UPDATE_INSTEAD:
if (deny_delete_current == DENY_UNCONFIGURED)
refuse_unconfigured_deny_delete_current();
rp_error("refusing to delete the current branch: %s", name);
return "deletion of the current branch prohibited";
default:
return "Invalid denyDeleteCurrent setting";
}
}
}
if (deny_non_fast_forwards && !is_null_sha1(new_sha1) &&
!is_null_sha1(old_sha1) &&
starts_with(name, "refs/heads/")) {
struct object *old_object, *new_object;
struct commit *old_commit, *new_commit;
old_object = parse_object(old_sha1);
new_object = parse_object(new_sha1);
if (!old_object || !new_object ||
old_object->type != OBJ_COMMIT ||
new_object->type != OBJ_COMMIT) {
error("bad sha1 objects for %s", name);
return "bad ref";
}
old_commit = (struct commit *)old_object;
new_commit = (struct commit *)new_object;
if (!in_merge_bases(old_commit, new_commit)) {
rp_error("denying non-fast-forward %s"
" (you should pull first)", name);
return "non-fast-forward";
}
}
if (run_update_hook(cmd)) {
rp_error("hook declined to update %s", name);
return "hook declined";
}
if (is_null_sha1(new_sha1)) {
struct strbuf err = STRBUF_INIT;
if (!parse_object(old_sha1)) {
old_sha1 = NULL;
if (ref_exists(name)) {
rp_warning("Allowing deletion of corrupt ref.");
} else {
rp_warning("Deleting a non-existent ref.");
cmd->did_not_exist = 1;
}
}
if (ref_transaction_delete(transaction,
namespaced_name,
old_sha1,
0, "push", &err)) {
rp_error("%s", err.buf);
strbuf_release(&err);
return "failed to delete";
}
strbuf_release(&err);
return NULL; /* good */
}
else {
struct strbuf err = STRBUF_INIT;
if (shallow_update && si->shallow_ref[cmd->index] &&
update_shallow_ref(cmd, si))
return "shallow error";
if (ref_transaction_update(transaction,
namespaced_name,
new_sha1, old_sha1,
0, "push",
&err)) {
rp_error("%s", err.buf);
strbuf_release(&err);
return "failed to update ref";
}
strbuf_release(&err);
return NULL; /* good */
}
}
static void run_update_post_hook(struct command *commands)
{
struct command *cmd;
int argc;
const char **argv;
struct child_process proc = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT;
const char *hook;
hook = find_hook("post-update");
for (argc = 0, cmd = commands; cmd; cmd = cmd->next) {
if (cmd->error_string || cmd->did_not_exist)
continue;
argc++;
}
if (!argc || !hook)
return;
argv = xmalloc(sizeof(*argv) * (2 + argc));
argv[0] = hook;
for (argc = 1, cmd = commands; cmd; cmd = cmd->next) {
if (cmd->error_string || cmd->did_not_exist)
continue;
argv[argc] = xstrdup(cmd->ref_name);
argc++;
}
argv[argc] = NULL;
proc.no_stdin = 1;
proc.stdout_to_stderr = 1;
proc.err = use_sideband ? -1 : 0;
proc.argv = argv;
if (!start_command(&proc)) {
if (use_sideband)
copy_to_sideband(proc.err, -1, NULL);
finish_command(&proc);
}
}
receive-pack: detect aliased updates which can occur with symrefs When pushing to a remote repo the sending side filters out aliased updates (e.g., foo:baz bar:baz). However, it is not possible for the sender to know if two refs are aliased on the receiving side via symrefs. Here is one such scenario: $ git init origin $ (cd origin && touch file && git add file && git commit -a -m intial) $ git clone --bare origin origin.git $ rm -rf origin $ git clone origin.git client $ git clone --mirror client backup.git && $ (cd backup.git && git remote set-head origin --auto) $ (cd client && git remote add --mirror backup ../backup.git && echo change1 > file && git commit -a -m change1 && git push origin && git push backup ) The push to backup fails with: Counting objects: 5, done. Writing objects: 100% (3/3), 244 bytes, done. Total 3 (delta 0), reused 0 (delta 0) Unpacking objects: 100% (3/3), done. error: Ref refs/remotes/origin/master is at ef3... but expected 262... remote: error: failed to lock refs/remotes/origin/master To ../backup.git 262cd57..ef307ff master -> master 262cd57..ef307ff origin/HEAD -> origin/HEAD ! [remote rejected] origin/master -> origin/master (failed to lock) error: failed to push some refs to '../backup.git' The reason is that refs/remotes/origin/HEAD is a symref to refs/remotes/origin/master, but it is not possible for the sending side to unambiguously know this. This commit fixes the issue by having receive-pack ignore any update to a symref whose target is being identically updated. If a symref and its target are being updated inconsistently, then the update for both fails with an error message ("refusing inconsistent update...") to help diagnose the situation. Signed-off-by: Jay Soffian <jaysoffian@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2010-04-20 00:19:18 +02:00
static void check_aliased_update(struct command *cmd, struct string_list *list)
{
struct strbuf buf = STRBUF_INIT;
const char *dst_name;
receive-pack: detect aliased updates which can occur with symrefs When pushing to a remote repo the sending side filters out aliased updates (e.g., foo:baz bar:baz). However, it is not possible for the sender to know if two refs are aliased on the receiving side via symrefs. Here is one such scenario: $ git init origin $ (cd origin && touch file && git add file && git commit -a -m intial) $ git clone --bare origin origin.git $ rm -rf origin $ git clone origin.git client $ git clone --mirror client backup.git && $ (cd backup.git && git remote set-head origin --auto) $ (cd client && git remote add --mirror backup ../backup.git && echo change1 > file && git commit -a -m change1 && git push origin && git push backup ) The push to backup fails with: Counting objects: 5, done. Writing objects: 100% (3/3), 244 bytes, done. Total 3 (delta 0), reused 0 (delta 0) Unpacking objects: 100% (3/3), done. error: Ref refs/remotes/origin/master is at ef3... but expected 262... remote: error: failed to lock refs/remotes/origin/master To ../backup.git 262cd57..ef307ff master -> master 262cd57..ef307ff origin/HEAD -> origin/HEAD ! [remote rejected] origin/master -> origin/master (failed to lock) error: failed to push some refs to '../backup.git' The reason is that refs/remotes/origin/HEAD is a symref to refs/remotes/origin/master, but it is not possible for the sending side to unambiguously know this. This commit fixes the issue by having receive-pack ignore any update to a symref whose target is being identically updated. If a symref and its target are being updated inconsistently, then the update for both fails with an error message ("refusing inconsistent update...") to help diagnose the situation. Signed-off-by: Jay Soffian <jaysoffian@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2010-04-20 00:19:18 +02:00
struct string_list_item *item;
struct command *dst_cmd;
unsigned char sha1[GIT_SHA1_RAWSZ];
char cmd_oldh[GIT_SHA1_HEXSZ + 1],
cmd_newh[GIT_SHA1_HEXSZ + 1],
dst_oldh[GIT_SHA1_HEXSZ + 1],
dst_newh[GIT_SHA1_HEXSZ + 1];
receive-pack: detect aliased updates which can occur with symrefs When pushing to a remote repo the sending side filters out aliased updates (e.g., foo:baz bar:baz). However, it is not possible for the sender to know if two refs are aliased on the receiving side via symrefs. Here is one such scenario: $ git init origin $ (cd origin && touch file && git add file && git commit -a -m intial) $ git clone --bare origin origin.git $ rm -rf origin $ git clone origin.git client $ git clone --mirror client backup.git && $ (cd backup.git && git remote set-head origin --auto) $ (cd client && git remote add --mirror backup ../backup.git && echo change1 > file && git commit -a -m change1 && git push origin && git push backup ) The push to backup fails with: Counting objects: 5, done. Writing objects: 100% (3/3), 244 bytes, done. Total 3 (delta 0), reused 0 (delta 0) Unpacking objects: 100% (3/3), done. error: Ref refs/remotes/origin/master is at ef3... but expected 262... remote: error: failed to lock refs/remotes/origin/master To ../backup.git 262cd57..ef307ff master -> master 262cd57..ef307ff origin/HEAD -> origin/HEAD ! [remote rejected] origin/master -> origin/master (failed to lock) error: failed to push some refs to '../backup.git' The reason is that refs/remotes/origin/HEAD is a symref to refs/remotes/origin/master, but it is not possible for the sending side to unambiguously know this. This commit fixes the issue by having receive-pack ignore any update to a symref whose target is being identically updated. If a symref and its target are being updated inconsistently, then the update for both fails with an error message ("refusing inconsistent update...") to help diagnose the situation. Signed-off-by: Jay Soffian <jaysoffian@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2010-04-20 00:19:18 +02:00
int flag;
strbuf_addf(&buf, "%s%s", get_git_namespace(), cmd->ref_name);
dst_name = resolve_ref_unsafe(buf.buf, 0, sha1, &flag);
strbuf_release(&buf);
receive-pack: detect aliased updates which can occur with symrefs When pushing to a remote repo the sending side filters out aliased updates (e.g., foo:baz bar:baz). However, it is not possible for the sender to know if two refs are aliased on the receiving side via symrefs. Here is one such scenario: $ git init origin $ (cd origin && touch file && git add file && git commit -a -m intial) $ git clone --bare origin origin.git $ rm -rf origin $ git clone origin.git client $ git clone --mirror client backup.git && $ (cd backup.git && git remote set-head origin --auto) $ (cd client && git remote add --mirror backup ../backup.git && echo change1 > file && git commit -a -m change1 && git push origin && git push backup ) The push to backup fails with: Counting objects: 5, done. Writing objects: 100% (3/3), 244 bytes, done. Total 3 (delta 0), reused 0 (delta 0) Unpacking objects: 100% (3/3), done. error: Ref refs/remotes/origin/master is at ef3... but expected 262... remote: error: failed to lock refs/remotes/origin/master To ../backup.git 262cd57..ef307ff master -> master 262cd57..ef307ff origin/HEAD -> origin/HEAD ! [remote rejected] origin/master -> origin/master (failed to lock) error: failed to push some refs to '../backup.git' The reason is that refs/remotes/origin/HEAD is a symref to refs/remotes/origin/master, but it is not possible for the sending side to unambiguously know this. This commit fixes the issue by having receive-pack ignore any update to a symref whose target is being identically updated. If a symref and its target are being updated inconsistently, then the update for both fails with an error message ("refusing inconsistent update...") to help diagnose the situation. Signed-off-by: Jay Soffian <jaysoffian@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2010-04-20 00:19:18 +02:00
if (!(flag & REF_ISSYMREF))
return;
dst_name = strip_namespace(dst_name);
if (!dst_name) {
rp_error("refusing update to broken symref '%s'", cmd->ref_name);
cmd->skip_update = 1;
cmd->error_string = "broken symref";
return;
}
if ((item = string_list_lookup(list, dst_name)) == NULL)
receive-pack: detect aliased updates which can occur with symrefs When pushing to a remote repo the sending side filters out aliased updates (e.g., foo:baz bar:baz). However, it is not possible for the sender to know if two refs are aliased on the receiving side via symrefs. Here is one such scenario: $ git init origin $ (cd origin && touch file && git add file && git commit -a -m intial) $ git clone --bare origin origin.git $ rm -rf origin $ git clone origin.git client $ git clone --mirror client backup.git && $ (cd backup.git && git remote set-head origin --auto) $ (cd client && git remote add --mirror backup ../backup.git && echo change1 > file && git commit -a -m change1 && git push origin && git push backup ) The push to backup fails with: Counting objects: 5, done. Writing objects: 100% (3/3), 244 bytes, done. Total 3 (delta 0), reused 0 (delta 0) Unpacking objects: 100% (3/3), done. error: Ref refs/remotes/origin/master is at ef3... but expected 262... remote: error: failed to lock refs/remotes/origin/master To ../backup.git 262cd57..ef307ff master -> master 262cd57..ef307ff origin/HEAD -> origin/HEAD ! [remote rejected] origin/master -> origin/master (failed to lock) error: failed to push some refs to '../backup.git' The reason is that refs/remotes/origin/HEAD is a symref to refs/remotes/origin/master, but it is not possible for the sending side to unambiguously know this. This commit fixes the issue by having receive-pack ignore any update to a symref whose target is being identically updated. If a symref and its target are being updated inconsistently, then the update for both fails with an error message ("refusing inconsistent update...") to help diagnose the situation. Signed-off-by: Jay Soffian <jaysoffian@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2010-04-20 00:19:18 +02:00
return;
cmd->skip_update = 1;
dst_cmd = (struct command *) item->util;
if (!hashcmp(cmd->old_sha1, dst_cmd->old_sha1) &&
!hashcmp(cmd->new_sha1, dst_cmd->new_sha1))
return;
dst_cmd->skip_update = 1;
find_unique_abbrev_r(cmd_oldh, cmd->old_sha1, DEFAULT_ABBREV);
find_unique_abbrev_r(cmd_newh, cmd->new_sha1, DEFAULT_ABBREV);
find_unique_abbrev_r(dst_oldh, dst_cmd->old_sha1, DEFAULT_ABBREV);
find_unique_abbrev_r(dst_newh, dst_cmd->new_sha1, DEFAULT_ABBREV);
receive-pack: detect aliased updates which can occur with symrefs When pushing to a remote repo the sending side filters out aliased updates (e.g., foo:baz bar:baz). However, it is not possible for the sender to know if two refs are aliased on the receiving side via symrefs. Here is one such scenario: $ git init origin $ (cd origin && touch file && git add file && git commit -a -m intial) $ git clone --bare origin origin.git $ rm -rf origin $ git clone origin.git client $ git clone --mirror client backup.git && $ (cd backup.git && git remote set-head origin --auto) $ (cd client && git remote add --mirror backup ../backup.git && echo change1 > file && git commit -a -m change1 && git push origin && git push backup ) The push to backup fails with: Counting objects: 5, done. Writing objects: 100% (3/3), 244 bytes, done. Total 3 (delta 0), reused 0 (delta 0) Unpacking objects: 100% (3/3), done. error: Ref refs/remotes/origin/master is at ef3... but expected 262... remote: error: failed to lock refs/remotes/origin/master To ../backup.git 262cd57..ef307ff master -> master 262cd57..ef307ff origin/HEAD -> origin/HEAD ! [remote rejected] origin/master -> origin/master (failed to lock) error: failed to push some refs to '../backup.git' The reason is that refs/remotes/origin/HEAD is a symref to refs/remotes/origin/master, but it is not possible for the sending side to unambiguously know this. This commit fixes the issue by having receive-pack ignore any update to a symref whose target is being identically updated. If a symref and its target are being updated inconsistently, then the update for both fails with an error message ("refusing inconsistent update...") to help diagnose the situation. Signed-off-by: Jay Soffian <jaysoffian@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2010-04-20 00:19:18 +02:00
rp_error("refusing inconsistent update between symref '%s' (%s..%s) and"
" its target '%s' (%s..%s)",
cmd->ref_name, cmd_oldh, cmd_newh,
dst_cmd->ref_name, dst_oldh, dst_newh);
cmd->error_string = dst_cmd->error_string =
"inconsistent aliased update";
}
static void check_aliased_updates(struct command *commands)
{
struct command *cmd;
struct string_list ref_list = STRING_LIST_INIT_NODUP;
receive-pack: detect aliased updates which can occur with symrefs When pushing to a remote repo the sending side filters out aliased updates (e.g., foo:baz bar:baz). However, it is not possible for the sender to know if two refs are aliased on the receiving side via symrefs. Here is one such scenario: $ git init origin $ (cd origin && touch file && git add file && git commit -a -m intial) $ git clone --bare origin origin.git $ rm -rf origin $ git clone origin.git client $ git clone --mirror client backup.git && $ (cd backup.git && git remote set-head origin --auto) $ (cd client && git remote add --mirror backup ../backup.git && echo change1 > file && git commit -a -m change1 && git push origin && git push backup ) The push to backup fails with: Counting objects: 5, done. Writing objects: 100% (3/3), 244 bytes, done. Total 3 (delta 0), reused 0 (delta 0) Unpacking objects: 100% (3/3), done. error: Ref refs/remotes/origin/master is at ef3... but expected 262... remote: error: failed to lock refs/remotes/origin/master To ../backup.git 262cd57..ef307ff master -> master 262cd57..ef307ff origin/HEAD -> origin/HEAD ! [remote rejected] origin/master -> origin/master (failed to lock) error: failed to push some refs to '../backup.git' The reason is that refs/remotes/origin/HEAD is a symref to refs/remotes/origin/master, but it is not possible for the sending side to unambiguously know this. This commit fixes the issue by having receive-pack ignore any update to a symref whose target is being identically updated. If a symref and its target are being updated inconsistently, then the update for both fails with an error message ("refusing inconsistent update...") to help diagnose the situation. Signed-off-by: Jay Soffian <jaysoffian@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2010-04-20 00:19:18 +02:00
for (cmd = commands; cmd; cmd = cmd->next) {
struct string_list_item *item =
string_list_append(&ref_list, cmd->ref_name);
receive-pack: detect aliased updates which can occur with symrefs When pushing to a remote repo the sending side filters out aliased updates (e.g., foo:baz bar:baz). However, it is not possible for the sender to know if two refs are aliased on the receiving side via symrefs. Here is one such scenario: $ git init origin $ (cd origin && touch file && git add file && git commit -a -m intial) $ git clone --bare origin origin.git $ rm -rf origin $ git clone origin.git client $ git clone --mirror client backup.git && $ (cd backup.git && git remote set-head origin --auto) $ (cd client && git remote add --mirror backup ../backup.git && echo change1 > file && git commit -a -m change1 && git push origin && git push backup ) The push to backup fails with: Counting objects: 5, done. Writing objects: 100% (3/3), 244 bytes, done. Total 3 (delta 0), reused 0 (delta 0) Unpacking objects: 100% (3/3), done. error: Ref refs/remotes/origin/master is at ef3... but expected 262... remote: error: failed to lock refs/remotes/origin/master To ../backup.git 262cd57..ef307ff master -> master 262cd57..ef307ff origin/HEAD -> origin/HEAD ! [remote rejected] origin/master -> origin/master (failed to lock) error: failed to push some refs to '../backup.git' The reason is that refs/remotes/origin/HEAD is a symref to refs/remotes/origin/master, but it is not possible for the sending side to unambiguously know this. This commit fixes the issue by having receive-pack ignore any update to a symref whose target is being identically updated. If a symref and its target are being updated inconsistently, then the update for both fails with an error message ("refusing inconsistent update...") to help diagnose the situation. Signed-off-by: Jay Soffian <jaysoffian@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2010-04-20 00:19:18 +02:00
item->util = (void *)cmd;
}
string_list_sort(&ref_list);
receive-pack: detect aliased updates which can occur with symrefs When pushing to a remote repo the sending side filters out aliased updates (e.g., foo:baz bar:baz). However, it is not possible for the sender to know if two refs are aliased on the receiving side via symrefs. Here is one such scenario: $ git init origin $ (cd origin && touch file && git add file && git commit -a -m intial) $ git clone --bare origin origin.git $ rm -rf origin $ git clone origin.git client $ git clone --mirror client backup.git && $ (cd backup.git && git remote set-head origin --auto) $ (cd client && git remote add --mirror backup ../backup.git && echo change1 > file && git commit -a -m change1 && git push origin && git push backup ) The push to backup fails with: Counting objects: 5, done. Writing objects: 100% (3/3), 244 bytes, done. Total 3 (delta 0), reused 0 (delta 0) Unpacking objects: 100% (3/3), done. error: Ref refs/remotes/origin/master is at ef3... but expected 262... remote: error: failed to lock refs/remotes/origin/master To ../backup.git 262cd57..ef307ff master -> master 262cd57..ef307ff origin/HEAD -> origin/HEAD ! [remote rejected] origin/master -> origin/master (failed to lock) error: failed to push some refs to '../backup.git' The reason is that refs/remotes/origin/HEAD is a symref to refs/remotes/origin/master, but it is not possible for the sending side to unambiguously know this. This commit fixes the issue by having receive-pack ignore any update to a symref whose target is being identically updated. If a symref and its target are being updated inconsistently, then the update for both fails with an error message ("refusing inconsistent update...") to help diagnose the situation. Signed-off-by: Jay Soffian <jaysoffian@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2010-04-20 00:19:18 +02:00
for (cmd = commands; cmd; cmd = cmd->next) {
if (!cmd->error_string)
check_aliased_update(cmd, &ref_list);
}
receive-pack: detect aliased updates which can occur with symrefs When pushing to a remote repo the sending side filters out aliased updates (e.g., foo:baz bar:baz). However, it is not possible for the sender to know if two refs are aliased on the receiving side via symrefs. Here is one such scenario: $ git init origin $ (cd origin && touch file && git add file && git commit -a -m intial) $ git clone --bare origin origin.git $ rm -rf origin $ git clone origin.git client $ git clone --mirror client backup.git && $ (cd backup.git && git remote set-head origin --auto) $ (cd client && git remote add --mirror backup ../backup.git && echo change1 > file && git commit -a -m change1 && git push origin && git push backup ) The push to backup fails with: Counting objects: 5, done. Writing objects: 100% (3/3), 244 bytes, done. Total 3 (delta 0), reused 0 (delta 0) Unpacking objects: 100% (3/3), done. error: Ref refs/remotes/origin/master is at ef3... but expected 262... remote: error: failed to lock refs/remotes/origin/master To ../backup.git 262cd57..ef307ff master -> master 262cd57..ef307ff origin/HEAD -> origin/HEAD ! [remote rejected] origin/master -> origin/master (failed to lock) error: failed to push some refs to '../backup.git' The reason is that refs/remotes/origin/HEAD is a symref to refs/remotes/origin/master, but it is not possible for the sending side to unambiguously know this. This commit fixes the issue by having receive-pack ignore any update to a symref whose target is being identically updated. If a symref and its target are being updated inconsistently, then the update for both fails with an error message ("refusing inconsistent update...") to help diagnose the situation. Signed-off-by: Jay Soffian <jaysoffian@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2010-04-20 00:19:18 +02:00
string_list_clear(&ref_list, 0);
}
static int command_singleton_iterator(void *cb_data, unsigned char sha1[20])
{
struct command **cmd_list = cb_data;
struct command *cmd = *cmd_list;
if (!cmd || is_null_sha1(cmd->new_sha1))
return -1; /* end of list */
*cmd_list = NULL; /* this returns only one */
hashcpy(sha1, cmd->new_sha1);
return 0;
}
static void set_connectivity_errors(struct command *commands,
struct shallow_info *si)
{
struct command *cmd;
for (cmd = commands; cmd; cmd = cmd->next) {
struct command *singleton = cmd;
if (shallow_update && si->shallow_ref[cmd->index])
/* to be checked in update_shallow_ref() */
continue;
if (!check_everything_connected(command_singleton_iterator,
0, &singleton))
continue;
cmd->error_string = "missing necessary objects";
}
}
struct iterate_data {
struct command *cmds;
struct shallow_info *si;
};
static int iterate_receive_command_list(void *cb_data, unsigned char sha1[20])
{
struct iterate_data *data = cb_data;
struct command **cmd_list = &data->cmds;
struct command *cmd = *cmd_list;
for (; cmd; cmd = cmd->next) {
if (shallow_update && data->si->shallow_ref[cmd->index])
/* to be checked in update_shallow_ref() */
continue;
if (!is_null_sha1(cmd->new_sha1) && !cmd->skip_update) {
hashcpy(sha1, cmd->new_sha1);
*cmd_list = cmd->next;
return 0;
}
}
*cmd_list = NULL;
return -1; /* end of list */
}
upload/receive-pack: allow hiding ref hierarchies A repository may have refs that are only used for its internal bookkeeping purposes that should not be exposed to the others that come over the network. Teach upload-pack to omit some refs from its initial advertisement by paying attention to the uploadpack.hiderefs multi-valued configuration variable. Do the same to receive-pack via the receive.hiderefs variable. As a convenient short-hand, allow using transfer.hiderefs to set the value to both of these variables. Any ref that is under the hierarchies listed on the value of these variable is excluded from responses to requests made by "ls-remote", "fetch", etc. (for upload-pack) and "push" (for receive-pack). Because these hidden refs do not count as OUR_REF, an attempt to fetch objects at the tip of them will be rejected, and because these refs do not get advertised, "git push :" will not see local branches that have the same name as them as "matching" ones to be sent. An attempt to update/delete these hidden refs with an explicit refspec, e.g. "git push origin :refs/hidden/22", is rejected. This is not a new restriction. To the pusher, it would appear that there is no such ref, so its push request will conclude with "Now that I sent you all the data, it is time for you to update the refs. I saw that the ref did not exist when I started pushing, and I want the result to point at this commit". The receiving end will apply the compare-and-swap rule to this request and rejects the push with "Well, your update request conflicts with somebody else; I see there is such a ref.", which is the right thing to do. Otherwise a push to a hidden ref will always be "the last one wins", which is not a good default. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2013-01-19 01:08:30 +01:00
static void reject_updates_to_hidden(struct command *commands)
{
struct strbuf refname_full = STRBUF_INIT;
size_t prefix_len;
upload/receive-pack: allow hiding ref hierarchies A repository may have refs that are only used for its internal bookkeeping purposes that should not be exposed to the others that come over the network. Teach upload-pack to omit some refs from its initial advertisement by paying attention to the uploadpack.hiderefs multi-valued configuration variable. Do the same to receive-pack via the receive.hiderefs variable. As a convenient short-hand, allow using transfer.hiderefs to set the value to both of these variables. Any ref that is under the hierarchies listed on the value of these variable is excluded from responses to requests made by "ls-remote", "fetch", etc. (for upload-pack) and "push" (for receive-pack). Because these hidden refs do not count as OUR_REF, an attempt to fetch objects at the tip of them will be rejected, and because these refs do not get advertised, "git push :" will not see local branches that have the same name as them as "matching" ones to be sent. An attempt to update/delete these hidden refs with an explicit refspec, e.g. "git push origin :refs/hidden/22", is rejected. This is not a new restriction. To the pusher, it would appear that there is no such ref, so its push request will conclude with "Now that I sent you all the data, it is time for you to update the refs. I saw that the ref did not exist when I started pushing, and I want the result to point at this commit". The receiving end will apply the compare-and-swap rule to this request and rejects the push with "Well, your update request conflicts with somebody else; I see there is such a ref.", which is the right thing to do. Otherwise a push to a hidden ref will always be "the last one wins", which is not a good default. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2013-01-19 01:08:30 +01:00
struct command *cmd;
strbuf_addstr(&refname_full, get_git_namespace());
prefix_len = refname_full.len;
upload/receive-pack: allow hiding ref hierarchies A repository may have refs that are only used for its internal bookkeeping purposes that should not be exposed to the others that come over the network. Teach upload-pack to omit some refs from its initial advertisement by paying attention to the uploadpack.hiderefs multi-valued configuration variable. Do the same to receive-pack via the receive.hiderefs variable. As a convenient short-hand, allow using transfer.hiderefs to set the value to both of these variables. Any ref that is under the hierarchies listed on the value of these variable is excluded from responses to requests made by "ls-remote", "fetch", etc. (for upload-pack) and "push" (for receive-pack). Because these hidden refs do not count as OUR_REF, an attempt to fetch objects at the tip of them will be rejected, and because these refs do not get advertised, "git push :" will not see local branches that have the same name as them as "matching" ones to be sent. An attempt to update/delete these hidden refs with an explicit refspec, e.g. "git push origin :refs/hidden/22", is rejected. This is not a new restriction. To the pusher, it would appear that there is no such ref, so its push request will conclude with "Now that I sent you all the data, it is time for you to update the refs. I saw that the ref did not exist when I started pushing, and I want the result to point at this commit". The receiving end will apply the compare-and-swap rule to this request and rejects the push with "Well, your update request conflicts with somebody else; I see there is such a ref.", which is the right thing to do. Otherwise a push to a hidden ref will always be "the last one wins", which is not a good default. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2013-01-19 01:08:30 +01:00
for (cmd = commands; cmd; cmd = cmd->next) {
if (cmd->error_string)
continue;
strbuf_setlen(&refname_full, prefix_len);
strbuf_addstr(&refname_full, cmd->ref_name);
if (!ref_is_hidden(cmd->ref_name, refname_full.buf))
upload/receive-pack: allow hiding ref hierarchies A repository may have refs that are only used for its internal bookkeeping purposes that should not be exposed to the others that come over the network. Teach upload-pack to omit some refs from its initial advertisement by paying attention to the uploadpack.hiderefs multi-valued configuration variable. Do the same to receive-pack via the receive.hiderefs variable. As a convenient short-hand, allow using transfer.hiderefs to set the value to both of these variables. Any ref that is under the hierarchies listed on the value of these variable is excluded from responses to requests made by "ls-remote", "fetch", etc. (for upload-pack) and "push" (for receive-pack). Because these hidden refs do not count as OUR_REF, an attempt to fetch objects at the tip of them will be rejected, and because these refs do not get advertised, "git push :" will not see local branches that have the same name as them as "matching" ones to be sent. An attempt to update/delete these hidden refs with an explicit refspec, e.g. "git push origin :refs/hidden/22", is rejected. This is not a new restriction. To the pusher, it would appear that there is no such ref, so its push request will conclude with "Now that I sent you all the data, it is time for you to update the refs. I saw that the ref did not exist when I started pushing, and I want the result to point at this commit". The receiving end will apply the compare-and-swap rule to this request and rejects the push with "Well, your update request conflicts with somebody else; I see there is such a ref.", which is the right thing to do. Otherwise a push to a hidden ref will always be "the last one wins", which is not a good default. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2013-01-19 01:08:30 +01:00
continue;
if (is_null_sha1(cmd->new_sha1))
cmd->error_string = "deny deleting a hidden ref";
else
cmd->error_string = "deny updating a hidden ref";
}
strbuf_release(&refname_full);
upload/receive-pack: allow hiding ref hierarchies A repository may have refs that are only used for its internal bookkeeping purposes that should not be exposed to the others that come over the network. Teach upload-pack to omit some refs from its initial advertisement by paying attention to the uploadpack.hiderefs multi-valued configuration variable. Do the same to receive-pack via the receive.hiderefs variable. As a convenient short-hand, allow using transfer.hiderefs to set the value to both of these variables. Any ref that is under the hierarchies listed on the value of these variable is excluded from responses to requests made by "ls-remote", "fetch", etc. (for upload-pack) and "push" (for receive-pack). Because these hidden refs do not count as OUR_REF, an attempt to fetch objects at the tip of them will be rejected, and because these refs do not get advertised, "git push :" will not see local branches that have the same name as them as "matching" ones to be sent. An attempt to update/delete these hidden refs with an explicit refspec, e.g. "git push origin :refs/hidden/22", is rejected. This is not a new restriction. To the pusher, it would appear that there is no such ref, so its push request will conclude with "Now that I sent you all the data, it is time for you to update the refs. I saw that the ref did not exist when I started pushing, and I want the result to point at this commit". The receiving end will apply the compare-and-swap rule to this request and rejects the push with "Well, your update request conflicts with somebody else; I see there is such a ref.", which is the right thing to do. Otherwise a push to a hidden ref will always be "the last one wins", which is not a good default. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2013-01-19 01:08:30 +01:00
}
static int should_process_cmd(struct command *cmd)
{
return !cmd->error_string && !cmd->skip_update;
}
static void warn_if_skipped_connectivity_check(struct command *commands,
struct shallow_info *si)
{
struct command *cmd;
int checked_connectivity = 1;
for (cmd = commands; cmd; cmd = cmd->next) {
if (should_process_cmd(cmd) && si->shallow_ref[cmd->index]) {
error("BUG: connectivity check has not been run on ref %s",
cmd->ref_name);
checked_connectivity = 0;
}
}
if (!checked_connectivity)
die("BUG: connectivity check skipped???");
}
static void execute_commands_non_atomic(struct command *commands,
struct shallow_info *si)
{
struct command *cmd;
struct strbuf err = STRBUF_INIT;
for (cmd = commands; cmd; cmd = cmd->next) {
if (!should_process_cmd(cmd))
continue;
transaction = ref_transaction_begin(&err);
if (!transaction) {
rp_error("%s", err.buf);
strbuf_reset(&err);
cmd->error_string = "transaction failed to start";
continue;
}
cmd->error_string = update(cmd, si);
if (!cmd->error_string
&& ref_transaction_commit(transaction, &err)) {
rp_error("%s", err.buf);
strbuf_reset(&err);
cmd->error_string = "failed to update ref";
}
ref_transaction_free(transaction);
}
strbuf_release(&err);
}
static void execute_commands_atomic(struct command *commands,
struct shallow_info *si)
{
struct command *cmd;
struct strbuf err = STRBUF_INIT;
const char *reported_error = "atomic push failure";
transaction = ref_transaction_begin(&err);
if (!transaction) {
rp_error("%s", err.buf);
strbuf_reset(&err);
reported_error = "transaction failed to start";
goto failure;
}
for (cmd = commands; cmd; cmd = cmd->next) {
if (!should_process_cmd(cmd))
continue;
cmd->error_string = update(cmd, si);
if (cmd->error_string)
goto failure;
}
if (ref_transaction_commit(transaction, &err)) {
rp_error("%s", err.buf);
reported_error = "atomic transaction failed";
goto failure;
}
goto cleanup;
failure:
for (cmd = commands; cmd; cmd = cmd->next)
if (!cmd->error_string)
cmd->error_string = reported_error;
cleanup:
ref_transaction_free(transaction);
strbuf_release(&err);
}
static void execute_commands(struct command *commands,
const char *unpacker_error,
struct shallow_info *si)
{
struct command *cmd;
unsigned char sha1[20];
struct iterate_data data;
if (unpacker_error) {
for (cmd = commands; cmd; cmd = cmd->next)
cmd->error_string = "unpacker error";
return;
}
data.cmds = commands;
data.si = si;
if (check_everything_connected(iterate_receive_command_list, 0, &data))
set_connectivity_errors(commands, si);
upload/receive-pack: allow hiding ref hierarchies A repository may have refs that are only used for its internal bookkeeping purposes that should not be exposed to the others that come over the network. Teach upload-pack to omit some refs from its initial advertisement by paying attention to the uploadpack.hiderefs multi-valued configuration variable. Do the same to receive-pack via the receive.hiderefs variable. As a convenient short-hand, allow using transfer.hiderefs to set the value to both of these variables. Any ref that is under the hierarchies listed on the value of these variable is excluded from responses to requests made by "ls-remote", "fetch", etc. (for upload-pack) and "push" (for receive-pack). Because these hidden refs do not count as OUR_REF, an attempt to fetch objects at the tip of them will be rejected, and because these refs do not get advertised, "git push :" will not see local branches that have the same name as them as "matching" ones to be sent. An attempt to update/delete these hidden refs with an explicit refspec, e.g. "git push origin :refs/hidden/22", is rejected. This is not a new restriction. To the pusher, it would appear that there is no such ref, so its push request will conclude with "Now that I sent you all the data, it is time for you to update the refs. I saw that the ref did not exist when I started pushing, and I want the result to point at this commit". The receiving end will apply the compare-and-swap rule to this request and rejects the push with "Well, your update request conflicts with somebody else; I see there is such a ref.", which is the right thing to do. Otherwise a push to a hidden ref will always be "the last one wins", which is not a good default. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2013-01-19 01:08:30 +01:00
reject_updates_to_hidden(commands);
if (run_receive_hook(commands, "pre-receive", 0)) {
for (cmd = commands; cmd; cmd = cmd->next) {
if (!cmd->error_string)
cmd->error_string = "pre-receive hook declined";
}
Teach receive-pack to run pre-receive/post-receive hooks Bill Lear pointed out that it is easy to send out notifications of changes with the update hook, but successful execution of the update hook does not necessarily mean that the ref was actually updated. Lock contention on the ref or being unable to append to the reflog may prevent the ref from being changed. Sending out notifications prior to the ref actually changing is very misleading. To help this situation I am introducing two new hooks to the receive-pack flow: pre-receive and post-receive. These new hooks are invoked only once per receive-pack execution and are passed three arguments per ref (refname, old-sha1, new-sha1). The new post-receive hook is ideal for sending out notifications, as it has the complete list of all refnames that were successfully updated as well as the old and new SHA-1 values. This allows more interesting notifications to be sent. Multiple ref updates could be easily summarized into one email, for example. The new pre-receive hook is ideal for logging update attempts, as it is run only once for the entire receive-pack operation. It can also be used to verify multiple updates happen at once, e.g. an update to the `maint` head must also be accompained by a new annotated tag. Lots of documentation improvements for receive-pack are included in this change, as we want to make sure the new hooks are clearly explained. Signed-off-by: Shawn O. Pearce <spearce@spearce.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2007-03-07 22:52:05 +01:00
return;
}
receive-pack: detect aliased updates which can occur with symrefs When pushing to a remote repo the sending side filters out aliased updates (e.g., foo:baz bar:baz). However, it is not possible for the sender to know if two refs are aliased on the receiving side via symrefs. Here is one such scenario: $ git init origin $ (cd origin && touch file && git add file && git commit -a -m intial) $ git clone --bare origin origin.git $ rm -rf origin $ git clone origin.git client $ git clone --mirror client backup.git && $ (cd backup.git && git remote set-head origin --auto) $ (cd client && git remote add --mirror backup ../backup.git && echo change1 > file && git commit -a -m change1 && git push origin && git push backup ) The push to backup fails with: Counting objects: 5, done. Writing objects: 100% (3/3), 244 bytes, done. Total 3 (delta 0), reused 0 (delta 0) Unpacking objects: 100% (3/3), done. error: Ref refs/remotes/origin/master is at ef3... but expected 262... remote: error: failed to lock refs/remotes/origin/master To ../backup.git 262cd57..ef307ff master -> master 262cd57..ef307ff origin/HEAD -> origin/HEAD ! [remote rejected] origin/master -> origin/master (failed to lock) error: failed to push some refs to '../backup.git' The reason is that refs/remotes/origin/HEAD is a symref to refs/remotes/origin/master, but it is not possible for the sending side to unambiguously know this. This commit fixes the issue by having receive-pack ignore any update to a symref whose target is being identically updated. If a symref and its target are being updated inconsistently, then the update for both fails with an error message ("refusing inconsistent update...") to help diagnose the situation. Signed-off-by: Jay Soffian <jaysoffian@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2010-04-20 00:19:18 +02:00
check_aliased_updates(commands);
free(head_name_to_free);
head_name = head_name_to_free = resolve_refdup("HEAD", 0, sha1, NULL);
if (use_atomic)
execute_commands_atomic(commands, si);
else
execute_commands_non_atomic(commands, si);
if (shallow_update)
warn_if_skipped_connectivity_check(commands, si);
}
static struct command **queue_command(struct command **tail,
const char *line,
int linelen)
{
unsigned char old_sha1[20], new_sha1[20];
struct command *cmd;
const char *refname;
int reflen;
if (linelen < 83 ||
line[40] != ' ' ||
line[81] != ' ' ||
get_sha1_hex(line, old_sha1) ||
get_sha1_hex(line + 41, new_sha1))
die("protocol error: expected old/new/ref, got '%s'", line);
refname = line + 82;
reflen = linelen - 82;
cmd = xcalloc(1, sizeof(struct command) + reflen + 1);
hashcpy(cmd->old_sha1, old_sha1);
hashcpy(cmd->new_sha1, new_sha1);
memcpy(cmd->ref_name, refname, reflen);
cmd->ref_name[reflen] = '\0';
*tail = cmd;
return &cmd->next;
}
static void queue_commands_from_cert(struct command **tail,
struct strbuf *push_cert)
{
const char *boc, *eoc;
if (*tail)
die("protocol error: got both push certificate and unsigned commands");
boc = strstr(push_cert->buf, "\n\n");
if (!boc)
die("malformed push certificate %.*s", 100, push_cert->buf);
else
boc += 2;
eoc = push_cert->buf + parse_signature(push_cert->buf, push_cert->len);
while (boc < eoc) {
const char *eol = memchr(boc, '\n', eoc - boc);
tail = queue_command(tail, boc, eol ? eol - boc : eoc - eol);
boc = eol ? eol + 1 : eoc;
}
}
static struct command *read_head_info(struct sha1_array *shallow)
{
struct command *commands = NULL;
struct command **p = &commands;
for (;;) {
pkt-line: provide a LARGE_PACKET_MAX static buffer Most of the callers of packet_read_line just read into a static 1000-byte buffer (callers which handle arbitrary binary data already use LARGE_PACKET_MAX). This works fine in practice, because: 1. The only variable-sized data in these lines is a ref name, and refs tend to be a lot shorter than 1000 characters. 2. When sending ref lines, git-core always limits itself to 1000 byte packets. However, the only limit given in the protocol specification in Documentation/technical/protocol-common.txt is LARGE_PACKET_MAX; the 1000 byte limit is mentioned only in pack-protocol.txt, and then only describing what we write, not as a specific limit for readers. This patch lets us bump the 1000-byte limit to LARGE_PACKET_MAX. Even though git-core will never write a packet where this makes a difference, there are two good reasons to do this: 1. Other git implementations may have followed protocol-common.txt and used a larger maximum size. We don't bump into it in practice because it would involve very long ref names. 2. We may want to increase the 1000-byte limit one day. Since packets are transferred before any capabilities, it's difficult to do this in a backwards-compatible way. But if we bump the size of buffer the readers can handle, eventually older versions of git will be obsolete enough that we can justify bumping the writers, as well. We don't have plans to do this anytime soon, but there is no reason not to start the clock ticking now. Just bumping all of the reading bufs to LARGE_PACKET_MAX would waste memory. Instead, since most readers just read into a temporary buffer anyway, let's provide a single static buffer that all callers can use. We can further wrap this detail away by having the packet_read_line wrapper just use the buffer transparently and return a pointer to the static storage. That covers most of the cases, and the remaining ones already read into their own LARGE_PACKET_MAX buffers. Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2013-02-20 21:02:57 +01:00
char *line;
int len, linelen;
pkt-line: provide a LARGE_PACKET_MAX static buffer Most of the callers of packet_read_line just read into a static 1000-byte buffer (callers which handle arbitrary binary data already use LARGE_PACKET_MAX). This works fine in practice, because: 1. The only variable-sized data in these lines is a ref name, and refs tend to be a lot shorter than 1000 characters. 2. When sending ref lines, git-core always limits itself to 1000 byte packets. However, the only limit given in the protocol specification in Documentation/technical/protocol-common.txt is LARGE_PACKET_MAX; the 1000 byte limit is mentioned only in pack-protocol.txt, and then only describing what we write, not as a specific limit for readers. This patch lets us bump the 1000-byte limit to LARGE_PACKET_MAX. Even though git-core will never write a packet where this makes a difference, there are two good reasons to do this: 1. Other git implementations may have followed protocol-common.txt and used a larger maximum size. We don't bump into it in practice because it would involve very long ref names. 2. We may want to increase the 1000-byte limit one day. Since packets are transferred before any capabilities, it's difficult to do this in a backwards-compatible way. But if we bump the size of buffer the readers can handle, eventually older versions of git will be obsolete enough that we can justify bumping the writers, as well. We don't have plans to do this anytime soon, but there is no reason not to start the clock ticking now. Just bumping all of the reading bufs to LARGE_PACKET_MAX would waste memory. Instead, since most readers just read into a temporary buffer anyway, let's provide a single static buffer that all callers can use. We can further wrap this detail away by having the packet_read_line wrapper just use the buffer transparently and return a pointer to the static storage. That covers most of the cases, and the remaining ones already read into their own LARGE_PACKET_MAX buffers. Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2013-02-20 21:02:57 +01:00
line = packet_read_line(0, &len);
if (!line)
break;
if (len == 48 && starts_with(line, "shallow ")) {
unsigned char sha1[20];
if (get_sha1_hex(line + 8, sha1))
die("protocol error: expected shallow sha, got '%s'",
line + 8);
sha1_array_append(shallow, sha1);
continue;
}
linelen = strlen(line);
if (linelen < len) {
const char *feature_list = line + linelen + 1;
if (parse_feature_request(feature_list, "report-status"))
report_status = 1;
if (parse_feature_request(feature_list, "side-band-64k"))
use_sideband = LARGE_PACKET_MAX;
if (parse_feature_request(feature_list, "quiet"))
quiet = 1;
if (advertise_atomic_push
&& parse_feature_request(feature_list, "atomic"))
use_atomic = 1;
}
push: the beginning of "git push --signed" While signed tags and commits assert that the objects thusly signed came from you, who signed these objects, there is not a good way to assert that you wanted to have a particular object at the tip of a particular branch. My signing v2.0.1 tag only means I want to call the version v2.0.1, and it does not mean I want to push it out to my 'master' branch---it is likely that I only want it in 'maint', so the signature on the object alone is insufficient. The only assurance to you that 'maint' points at what I wanted to place there comes from your trust on the hosting site and my authentication with it, which cannot easily audited later. Introduce a mechanism that allows you to sign a "push certificate" (for the lack of better name) every time you push, asserting that what object you are pushing to update which ref that used to point at what other object. Think of it as a cryptographic protection for ref updates, similar to signed tags/commits but working on an orthogonal axis. The basic flow based on this mechanism goes like this: 1. You push out your work with "git push --signed". 2. The sending side learns where the remote refs are as usual, together with what protocol extension the receiving end supports. If the receiving end does not advertise the protocol extension "push-cert", an attempt to "git push --signed" fails. Otherwise, a text file, that looks like the following, is prepared in core: certificate version 0.1 pusher Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> 1315427886 -0700 7339ca65... 21580ecb... refs/heads/master 3793ac56... 12850bec... refs/heads/next The file begins with a few header lines, which may grow as we gain more experience. The 'pusher' header records the name of the signer (the value of user.signingkey configuration variable, falling back to GIT_COMMITTER_{NAME|EMAIL}) and the time of the certificate generation. After the header, a blank line follows, followed by a copy of the protocol message lines. Each line shows the old and the new object name at the tip of the ref this push tries to update, in the way identical to how the underlying "git push" protocol exchange tells the ref updates to the receiving end (by recording the "old" object name, the push certificate also protects against replaying). It is expected that new command packet types other than the old-new-refname kind will be included in push certificate in the same way as would appear in the plain vanilla command packets in unsigned pushes. The user then is asked to sign this push certificate using GPG, formatted in a way similar to how signed tag objects are signed, and the result is sent to the other side (i.e. receive-pack). In the protocol exchange, this step comes immediately before the sender tells what the result of the push should be, which in turn comes before it sends the pack data. 3. When the receiving end sees a push certificate, the certificate is written out as a blob. The pre-receive hook can learn about the certificate by checking GIT_PUSH_CERT environment variable, which, if present, tells the object name of this blob, and make the decision to allow or reject this push. Additionally, the post-receive hook can also look at the certificate, which may be a good place to log all the received certificates for later audits. Because a push certificate carry the same information as the usual command packets in the protocol exchange, we can omit the latter when a push certificate is in use and reduce the protocol overhead. This however is not included in this patch to make it easier to review (in other words, the series at this step should never be released without the remainder of the series, as it implements an interim protocol that will be incompatible with the final one). As such, the documentation update for the protocol is left out of this step. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2014-09-12 20:17:07 +02:00
if (!strcmp(line, "push-cert")) {
int true_flush = 0;
char certbuf[1024];
for (;;) {
len = packet_read(0, NULL, NULL,
certbuf, sizeof(certbuf), 0);
if (!len) {
true_flush = 1;
break;
}
if (!strcmp(certbuf, "push-cert-end\n"))
break; /* end of cert */
strbuf_addstr(&push_cert, certbuf);
}
if (true_flush)
break;
continue;
}
p = queue_command(p, line, linelen);
}
if (push_cert.len)
queue_commands_from_cert(p, &push_cert);
return commands;
}
static const char *parse_pack_header(struct pack_header *hdr)
{
switch (read_pack_header(0, hdr)) {
case PH_ERROR_EOF:
return "eof before pack header was fully read";
case PH_ERROR_PACK_SIGNATURE:
return "protocol error (pack signature mismatch detected)";
case PH_ERROR_PROTOCOL:
return "protocol error (pack version unsupported)";
default:
return "unknown error in parse_pack_header";
case 0:
return NULL;
}
}
static const char *pack_lockfile;
static const char *unpack(int err_fd, struct shallow_info *si)
{
struct pack_header hdr;
const char *hdr_err;
int status;
char hdr_arg[38];
struct child_process child = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT;
int fsck_objects = (receive_fsck_objects >= 0
? receive_fsck_objects
: transfer_fsck_objects >= 0
? transfer_fsck_objects
: 0);
hdr_err = parse_pack_header(&hdr);
if (hdr_err) {
if (err_fd > 0)
close(err_fd);
return hdr_err;
}
snprintf(hdr_arg, sizeof(hdr_arg),
"--pack_header=%"PRIu32",%"PRIu32,
ntohl(hdr.hdr_version), ntohl(hdr.hdr_entries));
if (si->nr_ours || si->nr_theirs) {
alt_shallow_file = setup_temporary_shallow(si->shallow);
argv_array_push(&child.args, "--shallow-file");
argv_array_push(&child.args, alt_shallow_file);
}
if (ntohl(hdr.hdr_entries) < unpack_limit) {
argv_array_pushl(&child.args, "unpack-objects", hdr_arg, NULL);
if (quiet)
argv_array_push(&child.args, "-q");
if (fsck_objects)
argv_array_pushf(&child.args, "--strict%s",
fsck_msg_types.buf);
child.no_stdout = 1;
receive-pack: send pack-processing stderr over sideband Receive-pack invokes either unpack-objects or index-pack to handle the incoming pack. However, we do not redirect the stderr of the sub-processes at all, so it is never seen by the client. From the initial thread adding sideband support, which is here: http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.version-control.git/139471 it is clear that some messages are specifically kept off the sideband (with the assumption that they are of interest only to an administrator, not the client). The stderr of the subprocesses is mentioned in the thread, but it's unclear if they are included in that group, or were simply forgotten. However, there are a few good reasons to show them to the client: 1. In many cases, they are directly about the incoming packfile (e.g., fsck warnings with --strict, corruption in the packfile, etc). Without these messages, the client just gets "unpacker error" with no extra useful diagnosis. 2. No matter what the cause, we are probably better off showing the errors to the client. If the client and the server admin are not the same entity, it is probably much easier for the client to cut-and-paste the errors they see than for the admin to try to dig them out of a log and correlate them with a particular session. 3. Users of the ssh transport typically already see these stderr messages, as the remote's stderr is copied literally by ssh. This brings other transports (http, and push-over-git if you are crazy enough to enable it) more in line with ssh. As a bonus for ssh users, because the messages are now fed through the sideband and printed by the local git, they will have "remote:" prepended and be properly interleaved with any local output to stderr. Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2012-09-21 07:34:55 +02:00
child.err = err_fd;
child.git_cmd = 1;
status = run_command(&child);
if (status)
return "unpack-objects abnormal exit";
} else {
char hostname[256];
argv_array_pushl(&child.args, "index-pack",
"--stdin", hdr_arg, NULL);
if (gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)))
xsnprintf(hostname, sizeof(hostname), "localhost");
argv_array_pushf(&child.args,
"--keep=receive-pack %"PRIuMAX" on %s",
(uintmax_t)getpid(),
hostname);
if (fsck_objects)
argv_array_pushf(&child.args, "--strict%s",
fsck_msg_types.buf);
if (fix_thin)
argv_array_push(&child.args, "--fix-thin");
child.out = -1;
child.err = err_fd;
child.git_cmd = 1;
status = start_command(&child);
if (status)
return "index-pack fork failed";
pack_lockfile = index_pack_lockfile(child.out);
close(child.out);
status = finish_command(&child);
if (status)
return "index-pack abnormal exit";
reprepare_packed_git();
}
return NULL;
}
static const char *unpack_with_sideband(struct shallow_info *si)
receive-pack: send pack-processing stderr over sideband Receive-pack invokes either unpack-objects or index-pack to handle the incoming pack. However, we do not redirect the stderr of the sub-processes at all, so it is never seen by the client. From the initial thread adding sideband support, which is here: http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.version-control.git/139471 it is clear that some messages are specifically kept off the sideband (with the assumption that they are of interest only to an administrator, not the client). The stderr of the subprocesses is mentioned in the thread, but it's unclear if they are included in that group, or were simply forgotten. However, there are a few good reasons to show them to the client: 1. In many cases, they are directly about the incoming packfile (e.g., fsck warnings with --strict, corruption in the packfile, etc). Without these messages, the client just gets "unpacker error" with no extra useful diagnosis. 2. No matter what the cause, we are probably better off showing the errors to the client. If the client and the server admin are not the same entity, it is probably much easier for the client to cut-and-paste the errors they see than for the admin to try to dig them out of a log and correlate them with a particular session. 3. Users of the ssh transport typically already see these stderr messages, as the remote's stderr is copied literally by ssh. This brings other transports (http, and push-over-git if you are crazy enough to enable it) more in line with ssh. As a bonus for ssh users, because the messages are now fed through the sideband and printed by the local git, they will have "remote:" prepended and be properly interleaved with any local output to stderr. Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2012-09-21 07:34:55 +02:00
{
struct async muxer;
const char *ret;
if (!use_sideband)
return unpack(0, si);
receive-pack: send pack-processing stderr over sideband Receive-pack invokes either unpack-objects or index-pack to handle the incoming pack. However, we do not redirect the stderr of the sub-processes at all, so it is never seen by the client. From the initial thread adding sideband support, which is here: http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.version-control.git/139471 it is clear that some messages are specifically kept off the sideband (with the assumption that they are of interest only to an administrator, not the client). The stderr of the subprocesses is mentioned in the thread, but it's unclear if they are included in that group, or were simply forgotten. However, there are a few good reasons to show them to the client: 1. In many cases, they are directly about the incoming packfile (e.g., fsck warnings with --strict, corruption in the packfile, etc). Without these messages, the client just gets "unpacker error" with no extra useful diagnosis. 2. No matter what the cause, we are probably better off showing the errors to the client. If the client and the server admin are not the same entity, it is probably much easier for the client to cut-and-paste the errors they see than for the admin to try to dig them out of a log and correlate them with a particular session. 3. Users of the ssh transport typically already see these stderr messages, as the remote's stderr is copied literally by ssh. This brings other transports (http, and push-over-git if you are crazy enough to enable it) more in line with ssh. As a bonus for ssh users, because the messages are now fed through the sideband and printed by the local git, they will have "remote:" prepended and be properly interleaved with any local output to stderr. Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2012-09-21 07:34:55 +02:00
memset(&muxer, 0, sizeof(muxer));
muxer.proc = copy_to_sideband;
muxer.in = -1;
if (start_async(&muxer))
return NULL;
ret = unpack(muxer.in, si);
receive-pack: send pack-processing stderr over sideband Receive-pack invokes either unpack-objects or index-pack to handle the incoming pack. However, we do not redirect the stderr of the sub-processes at all, so it is never seen by the client. From the initial thread adding sideband support, which is here: http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.version-control.git/139471 it is clear that some messages are specifically kept off the sideband (with the assumption that they are of interest only to an administrator, not the client). The stderr of the subprocesses is mentioned in the thread, but it's unclear if they are included in that group, or were simply forgotten. However, there are a few good reasons to show them to the client: 1. In many cases, they are directly about the incoming packfile (e.g., fsck warnings with --strict, corruption in the packfile, etc). Without these messages, the client just gets "unpacker error" with no extra useful diagnosis. 2. No matter what the cause, we are probably better off showing the errors to the client. If the client and the server admin are not the same entity, it is probably much easier for the client to cut-and-paste the errors they see than for the admin to try to dig them out of a log and correlate them with a particular session. 3. Users of the ssh transport typically already see these stderr messages, as the remote's stderr is copied literally by ssh. This brings other transports (http, and push-over-git if you are crazy enough to enable it) more in line with ssh. As a bonus for ssh users, because the messages are now fed through the sideband and printed by the local git, they will have "remote:" prepended and be properly interleaved with any local output to stderr. Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2012-09-21 07:34:55 +02:00
finish_async(&muxer);
return ret;
}
static void prepare_shallow_update(struct command *commands,
struct shallow_info *si)
{
int i, j, k, bitmap_size = (si->ref->nr + 31) / 32;
si->used_shallow = xmalloc(sizeof(*si->used_shallow) *
si->shallow->nr);
assign_shallow_commits_to_refs(si, si->used_shallow, NULL);
si->need_reachability_test =
xcalloc(si->shallow->nr, sizeof(*si->need_reachability_test));
si->reachable =
xcalloc(si->shallow->nr, sizeof(*si->reachable));
si->shallow_ref = xcalloc(si->ref->nr, sizeof(*si->shallow_ref));
for (i = 0; i < si->nr_ours; i++)
si->need_reachability_test[si->ours[i]] = 1;
for (i = 0; i < si->shallow->nr; i++) {
if (!si->used_shallow[i])
continue;
for (j = 0; j < bitmap_size; j++) {
if (!si->used_shallow[i][j])
continue;
si->need_reachability_test[i]++;
for (k = 0; k < 32; k++)
if (si->used_shallow[i][j] & (1U << k))
si->shallow_ref[j * 32 + k]++;
}
/*
* true for those associated with some refs and belong
* in "ours" list aka "step 7 not done yet"
*/
si->need_reachability_test[i] =
si->need_reachability_test[i] > 1;
}
/*
* keep hooks happy by forcing a temporary shallow file via
* env variable because we can't add --shallow-file to every
* command. check_everything_connected() will be done with
* true .git/shallow though.
*/
setenv(GIT_SHALLOW_FILE_ENVIRONMENT, alt_shallow_file, 1);
}
static void update_shallow_info(struct command *commands,
struct shallow_info *si,
struct sha1_array *ref)
{
struct command *cmd;
int *ref_status;
remove_nonexistent_theirs_shallow(si);
if (!si->nr_ours && !si->nr_theirs) {
shallow_update = 0;
return;
}
for (cmd = commands; cmd; cmd = cmd->next) {
if (is_null_sha1(cmd->new_sha1))
continue;
sha1_array_append(ref, cmd->new_sha1);
cmd->index = ref->nr - 1;
}
si->ref = ref;
if (shallow_update) {
prepare_shallow_update(commands, si);
return;
}
ref_status = xmalloc(sizeof(*ref_status) * ref->nr);
assign_shallow_commits_to_refs(si, NULL, ref_status);
for (cmd = commands; cmd; cmd = cmd->next) {
if (is_null_sha1(cmd->new_sha1))
continue;
if (ref_status[cmd->index]) {
cmd->error_string = "shallow update not allowed";
cmd->skip_update = 1;
}
}
free(ref_status);
}
static void report(struct command *commands, const char *unpack_status)
{
struct command *cmd;
struct strbuf buf = STRBUF_INIT;
packet_buf_write(&buf, "unpack %s\n",
unpack_status ? unpack_status : "ok");
for (cmd = commands; cmd; cmd = cmd->next) {
if (!cmd->error_string)
packet_buf_write(&buf, "ok %s\n",
cmd->ref_name);
else
packet_buf_write(&buf, "ng %s %s\n",
cmd->ref_name, cmd->error_string);
}
packet_buf_flush(&buf);
if (use_sideband)
send_sideband(1, 1, buf.buf, buf.len, use_sideband);
else
write_or_die(1, buf.buf, buf.len);
strbuf_release(&buf);
}
static int delete_only(struct command *commands)
{
struct command *cmd;
for (cmd = commands; cmd; cmd = cmd->next) {
if (!is_null_sha1(cmd->new_sha1))
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int cmd_receive_pack(int argc, const char **argv, const char *prefix)
{
int advertise_refs = 0;
int i;
struct command *commands;
struct sha1_array shallow = SHA1_ARRAY_INIT;
struct sha1_array ref = SHA1_ARRAY_INIT;
struct shallow_info si;
packet_trace_identity("receive-pack");
argv++;
for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) {
const char *arg = *argv++;
if (*arg == '-') {
if (!strcmp(arg, "--quiet")) {
quiet = 1;
continue;
}
if (!strcmp(arg, "--advertise-refs")) {
advertise_refs = 1;
continue;
}
if (!strcmp(arg, "--stateless-rpc")) {
stateless_rpc = 1;
continue;
}
if (!strcmp(arg, "--reject-thin-pack-for-testing")) {
fix_thin = 0;
continue;
}
usage(receive_pack_usage);
}
signed push: allow stale nonce in stateless mode When operating with the stateless RPC mode, we will receive a nonce issued by another instance of us that advertised our capability and refs some time ago. Update the logic to check received nonce to detect this case, compute how much time has passed since the nonce was issued and report the status with a new environment variable GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_SLOP to the hooks. GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_STATUS will report "SLOP" in such a case. The hooks are free to decide how large a slop it is willing to accept. Strictly speaking, the "nonce" is not really a "nonce" anymore in the stateless RPC mode, as it will happily take any "nonce" issued by it (which is protected by HMAC and its secret key) as long as it is fresh enough. The degree of this security degradation, relative to the native protocol, is about the same as the "we make sure that the 'git push' decided to update our refs with new objects based on the freshest observation of our refs by making sure the values they claim the original value of the refs they ask us to update exactly match the current state" security is loosened to accomodate the stateless RPC mode in the existing code without this series, so there is no need for those who are already using smart HTTP to push to their repositories to be alarmed any more than they already are. In addition, the server operator can set receive.certnonceslop configuration variable to specify how stale a nonce can be (in seconds). When this variable is set, and if the nonce received in the certificate that passes the HMAC check was less than that many seconds old, hooks are given "OK" in GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_STATUS (instead of "SLOP") and the received nonce value is given in GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE, which makes it easier for a simple-minded hook to check if the certificate we received is recent enough. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2014-09-05 19:46:04 +02:00
if (service_dir)
usage(receive_pack_usage);
signed push: allow stale nonce in stateless mode When operating with the stateless RPC mode, we will receive a nonce issued by another instance of us that advertised our capability and refs some time ago. Update the logic to check received nonce to detect this case, compute how much time has passed since the nonce was issued and report the status with a new environment variable GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_SLOP to the hooks. GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_STATUS will report "SLOP" in such a case. The hooks are free to decide how large a slop it is willing to accept. Strictly speaking, the "nonce" is not really a "nonce" anymore in the stateless RPC mode, as it will happily take any "nonce" issued by it (which is protected by HMAC and its secret key) as long as it is fresh enough. The degree of this security degradation, relative to the native protocol, is about the same as the "we make sure that the 'git push' decided to update our refs with new objects based on the freshest observation of our refs by making sure the values they claim the original value of the refs they ask us to update exactly match the current state" security is loosened to accomodate the stateless RPC mode in the existing code without this series, so there is no need for those who are already using smart HTTP to push to their repositories to be alarmed any more than they already are. In addition, the server operator can set receive.certnonceslop configuration variable to specify how stale a nonce can be (in seconds). When this variable is set, and if the nonce received in the certificate that passes the HMAC check was less than that many seconds old, hooks are given "OK" in GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_STATUS (instead of "SLOP") and the received nonce value is given in GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE, which makes it easier for a simple-minded hook to check if the certificate we received is recent enough. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2014-09-05 19:46:04 +02:00
service_dir = arg;
}
signed push: allow stale nonce in stateless mode When operating with the stateless RPC mode, we will receive a nonce issued by another instance of us that advertised our capability and refs some time ago. Update the logic to check received nonce to detect this case, compute how much time has passed since the nonce was issued and report the status with a new environment variable GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_SLOP to the hooks. GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_STATUS will report "SLOP" in such a case. The hooks are free to decide how large a slop it is willing to accept. Strictly speaking, the "nonce" is not really a "nonce" anymore in the stateless RPC mode, as it will happily take any "nonce" issued by it (which is protected by HMAC and its secret key) as long as it is fresh enough. The degree of this security degradation, relative to the native protocol, is about the same as the "we make sure that the 'git push' decided to update our refs with new objects based on the freshest observation of our refs by making sure the values they claim the original value of the refs they ask us to update exactly match the current state" security is loosened to accomodate the stateless RPC mode in the existing code without this series, so there is no need for those who are already using smart HTTP to push to their repositories to be alarmed any more than they already are. In addition, the server operator can set receive.certnonceslop configuration variable to specify how stale a nonce can be (in seconds). When this variable is set, and if the nonce received in the certificate that passes the HMAC check was less than that many seconds old, hooks are given "OK" in GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_STATUS (instead of "SLOP") and the received nonce value is given in GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE, which makes it easier for a simple-minded hook to check if the certificate we received is recent enough. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2014-09-05 19:46:04 +02:00
if (!service_dir)
usage(receive_pack_usage);
setup_path();
signed push: allow stale nonce in stateless mode When operating with the stateless RPC mode, we will receive a nonce issued by another instance of us that advertised our capability and refs some time ago. Update the logic to check received nonce to detect this case, compute how much time has passed since the nonce was issued and report the status with a new environment variable GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_SLOP to the hooks. GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_STATUS will report "SLOP" in such a case. The hooks are free to decide how large a slop it is willing to accept. Strictly speaking, the "nonce" is not really a "nonce" anymore in the stateless RPC mode, as it will happily take any "nonce" issued by it (which is protected by HMAC and its secret key) as long as it is fresh enough. The degree of this security degradation, relative to the native protocol, is about the same as the "we make sure that the 'git push' decided to update our refs with new objects based on the freshest observation of our refs by making sure the values they claim the original value of the refs they ask us to update exactly match the current state" security is loosened to accomodate the stateless RPC mode in the existing code without this series, so there is no need for those who are already using smart HTTP to push to their repositories to be alarmed any more than they already are. In addition, the server operator can set receive.certnonceslop configuration variable to specify how stale a nonce can be (in seconds). When this variable is set, and if the nonce received in the certificate that passes the HMAC check was less than that many seconds old, hooks are given "OK" in GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_STATUS (instead of "SLOP") and the received nonce value is given in GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE, which makes it easier for a simple-minded hook to check if the certificate we received is recent enough. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2014-09-05 19:46:04 +02:00
if (!enter_repo(service_dir, 0))
die("'%s' does not appear to be a git repository", service_dir);
git_config(receive_pack_config, NULL);
if (cert_nonce_seed)
signed push: allow stale nonce in stateless mode When operating with the stateless RPC mode, we will receive a nonce issued by another instance of us that advertised our capability and refs some time ago. Update the logic to check received nonce to detect this case, compute how much time has passed since the nonce was issued and report the status with a new environment variable GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_SLOP to the hooks. GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_STATUS will report "SLOP" in such a case. The hooks are free to decide how large a slop it is willing to accept. Strictly speaking, the "nonce" is not really a "nonce" anymore in the stateless RPC mode, as it will happily take any "nonce" issued by it (which is protected by HMAC and its secret key) as long as it is fresh enough. The degree of this security degradation, relative to the native protocol, is about the same as the "we make sure that the 'git push' decided to update our refs with new objects based on the freshest observation of our refs by making sure the values they claim the original value of the refs they ask us to update exactly match the current state" security is loosened to accomodate the stateless RPC mode in the existing code without this series, so there is no need for those who are already using smart HTTP to push to their repositories to be alarmed any more than they already are. In addition, the server operator can set receive.certnonceslop configuration variable to specify how stale a nonce can be (in seconds). When this variable is set, and if the nonce received in the certificate that passes the HMAC check was less than that many seconds old, hooks are given "OK" in GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_STATUS (instead of "SLOP") and the received nonce value is given in GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE, which makes it easier for a simple-minded hook to check if the certificate we received is recent enough. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2014-09-05 19:46:04 +02:00
push_cert_nonce = prepare_push_cert_nonce(service_dir, time(NULL));
if (0 <= transfer_unpack_limit)
unpack_limit = transfer_unpack_limit;
else if (0 <= receive_unpack_limit)
unpack_limit = receive_unpack_limit;
if (advertise_refs || !stateless_rpc) {
write_head_info();
}
if (advertise_refs)
return 0;
if ((commands = read_head_info(&shallow)) != NULL) {
const char *unpack_status = NULL;
prepare_shallow_info(&si, &shallow);
if (!si.nr_ours && !si.nr_theirs)
shallow_update = 0;
if (!delete_only(commands)) {
unpack_status = unpack_with_sideband(&si);
update_shallow_info(commands, &si, &ref);
}
execute_commands(commands, unpack_status, &si);
if (pack_lockfile)
unlink_or_warn(pack_lockfile);
if (report_status)
report(commands, unpack_status);
run_receive_hook(commands, "post-receive", 1);
run_update_post_hook(commands);
if (auto_gc) {
const char *argv_gc_auto[] = {
"gc", "--auto", "--quiet", NULL,
};
int opt = RUN_GIT_CMD | RUN_COMMAND_STDOUT_TO_STDERR;
close_all_packs();
run_command_v_opt(argv_gc_auto, opt);
}
if (auto_update_server_info)
update_server_info(0);
clear_shallow_info(&si);
}
if (use_sideband)
packet_flush(1);
sha1_array_clear(&shallow);
sha1_array_clear(&ref);
free((void *)push_cert_nonce);
return 0;
}