git-commit-vandalism/builtin-tag.c

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/*
* Builtin "git tag"
*
* Copyright (c) 2007 Kristian Høgsberg <krh@redhat.com>,
* Carlos Rica <jasampler@gmail.com>
* Based on git-tag.sh and mktag.c by Linus Torvalds.
*/
#include "cache.h"
#include "builtin.h"
#include "refs.h"
#include "tag.h"
#include "run-command.h"
static const char builtin_tag_usage[] =
"git-tag [-n [<num>]] -l [<pattern>] | [-a | -s | -u <key-id>] [-f | -d | -v] [-m <msg> | -F <file>] <tagname> [<head>]";
static char signingkey[1000];
static void launch_editor(const char *path, struct strbuf *buffer)
{
const char *editor, *terminal;
struct child_process child;
const char *args[3];
editor = getenv("GIT_EDITOR");
if (!editor && editor_program)
editor = editor_program;
if (!editor)
editor = getenv("VISUAL");
if (!editor)
editor = getenv("EDITOR");
terminal = getenv("TERM");
if (!editor && (!terminal || !strcmp(terminal, "dumb"))) {
fprintf(stderr,
"Terminal is dumb but no VISUAL nor EDITOR defined.\n"
"Please supply the message using either -m or -F option.\n");
exit(1);
}
if (!editor)
editor = "vi";
memset(&child, 0, sizeof(child));
child.argv = args;
args[0] = editor;
args[1] = path;
args[2] = NULL;
if (run_command(&child))
die("There was a problem with the editor %s.", editor);
if (strbuf_read_file(buffer, path, 0) < 0)
die("could not read message file '%s': %s",
path, strerror(errno));
}
struct tag_filter {
const char *pattern;
int lines;
};
#define PGP_SIGNATURE "-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----"
static int show_reference(const char *refname, const unsigned char *sha1,
int flag, void *cb_data)
{
struct tag_filter *filter = cb_data;
if (!fnmatch(filter->pattern, refname, 0)) {
int i;
unsigned long size;
enum object_type type;
char *buf, *sp, *eol;
size_t len;
if (!filter->lines) {
printf("%s\n", refname);
return 0;
}
printf("%-15s ", refname);
sp = buf = read_sha1_file(sha1, &type, &size);
if (!buf)
return 0;
if (!size) {
free(buf);
return 0;
}
/* skip header */
while (sp + 1 < buf + size &&
!(sp[0] == '\n' && sp[1] == '\n'))
sp++;
/* only take up to "lines" lines, and strip the signature */
for (i = 0, sp += 2;
i < filter->lines && sp < buf + size &&
prefixcmp(sp, PGP_SIGNATURE "\n");
i++) {
if (i)
printf("\n ");
eol = memchr(sp, '\n', size - (sp - buf));
len = eol ? eol - sp : size - (sp - buf);
fwrite(sp, len, 1, stdout);
if (!eol)
break;
sp = eol + 1;
}
putchar('\n');
free(buf);
}
return 0;
}
static int list_tags(const char *pattern, int lines)
{
struct tag_filter filter;
if (pattern == NULL)
pattern = "*";
filter.pattern = pattern;
filter.lines = lines;
for_each_tag_ref(show_reference, (void *) &filter);
return 0;
}
typedef int (*each_tag_name_fn)(const char *name, const char *ref,
const unsigned char *sha1);
static int for_each_tag_name(const char **argv, each_tag_name_fn fn)
{
const char **p;
char ref[PATH_MAX];
int had_error = 0;
unsigned char sha1[20];
for (p = argv; *p; p++) {
if (snprintf(ref, sizeof(ref), "refs/tags/%s", *p)
>= sizeof(ref)) {
error("tag name too long: %.*s...", 50, *p);
had_error = 1;
continue;
}
if (!resolve_ref(ref, sha1, 1, NULL)) {
error("tag '%s' not found.", *p);
had_error = 1;
continue;
}
if (fn(*p, ref, sha1))
had_error = 1;
}
return had_error;
}
static int delete_tag(const char *name, const char *ref,
const unsigned char *sha1)
{
if (delete_ref(ref, sha1))
return 1;
printf("Deleted tag '%s'\n", name);
return 0;
}
static int verify_tag(const char *name, const char *ref,
const unsigned char *sha1)
{
const char *argv_verify_tag[] = {"git-verify-tag",
"-v", "SHA1_HEX", NULL};
argv_verify_tag[2] = sha1_to_hex(sha1);
if (run_command_v_opt(argv_verify_tag, 0))
return error("could not verify the tag '%s'", name);
return 0;
}
static int do_sign(struct strbuf *buffer)
{
struct child_process gpg;
const char *args[4];
char *bracket;
int len;
if (!*signingkey) {
if (strlcpy(signingkey, git_committer_info(1),
sizeof(signingkey)) > sizeof(signingkey) - 1)
return error("committer info too long.");
bracket = strchr(signingkey, '>');
if (bracket)
bracket[1] = '\0';
}
git-tag -s must fail if gpg cannot sign the tag. Most of this patch code and message was written by Shawn O. Pearce. I made some tests to know what the problem was, and then I changed the code related with the SIGPIPE signal. If the user has misconfigured `user.signingkey` in their .git/config or just doesn't have any secret keys on their keyring and they ask for a signed tag with `git tag -s` we better make sure the resulting tag was actually signed by gpg. Prior versions of builtin git-tag allowed this failure to slip by without error as they were not checking the return value of the finish_command() so they did not notice when gpg exited with an error exit status. They also did not fail if gpg produced an empty output or if read_in_full received an error from the read system call while trying to read the pipe back from gpg. Finally, we did not actually honor any return value from the do_sign function as it returns ssize_t but was being stored into an unsigned long. This caused the compiler to optimize out the die condition, allowing git-tag to continue along and create the tag object. However, when gpg gets a wrong username, it exits before any read was done and then the writing process receives SIGPIPE and program is terminated. By ignoring this signal, anyway, the function write_or_die gets EPIPE from write_in_full and exits returning 0 to the system without a message. Here we better call to write_in_full directly so we can fail printing a message and return safely to the caller. With these issues fixed `git-tag -s` will now fail to create the tag and will report a non-zero exit status to its caller, thereby allowing automated helper scripts to detect (and recover from) failure if gpg is not working properly. Proposed-by: Shawn O. Pearce <spearce@spearce.org> Signed-off-by: Carlos Rica <jasampler@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2007-09-09 02:39:29 +02:00
/* When the username signingkey is bad, program could be terminated
* because gpg exits without reading and then write gets SIGPIPE. */
signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
memset(&gpg, 0, sizeof(gpg));
gpg.argv = args;
gpg.in = -1;
gpg.out = -1;
args[0] = "gpg";
args[1] = "-bsau";
args[2] = signingkey;
args[3] = NULL;
if (start_command(&gpg))
return error("could not run gpg.");
if (write_in_full(gpg.in, buffer->buf, buffer->len) != buffer->len) {
git-tag -s must fail if gpg cannot sign the tag. Most of this patch code and message was written by Shawn O. Pearce. I made some tests to know what the problem was, and then I changed the code related with the SIGPIPE signal. If the user has misconfigured `user.signingkey` in their .git/config or just doesn't have any secret keys on their keyring and they ask for a signed tag with `git tag -s` we better make sure the resulting tag was actually signed by gpg. Prior versions of builtin git-tag allowed this failure to slip by without error as they were not checking the return value of the finish_command() so they did not notice when gpg exited with an error exit status. They also did not fail if gpg produced an empty output or if read_in_full received an error from the read system call while trying to read the pipe back from gpg. Finally, we did not actually honor any return value from the do_sign function as it returns ssize_t but was being stored into an unsigned long. This caused the compiler to optimize out the die condition, allowing git-tag to continue along and create the tag object. However, when gpg gets a wrong username, it exits before any read was done and then the writing process receives SIGPIPE and program is terminated. By ignoring this signal, anyway, the function write_or_die gets EPIPE from write_in_full and exits returning 0 to the system without a message. Here we better call to write_in_full directly so we can fail printing a message and return safely to the caller. With these issues fixed `git-tag -s` will now fail to create the tag and will report a non-zero exit status to its caller, thereby allowing automated helper scripts to detect (and recover from) failure if gpg is not working properly. Proposed-by: Shawn O. Pearce <spearce@spearce.org> Signed-off-by: Carlos Rica <jasampler@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2007-09-09 02:39:29 +02:00
close(gpg.in);
finish_command(&gpg);
return error("gpg did not accept the tag data");
}
close(gpg.in);
gpg.close_in = 0;
len = strbuf_read(buffer, gpg.out, 1024);
git-tag -s must fail if gpg cannot sign the tag. Most of this patch code and message was written by Shawn O. Pearce. I made some tests to know what the problem was, and then I changed the code related with the SIGPIPE signal. If the user has misconfigured `user.signingkey` in their .git/config or just doesn't have any secret keys on their keyring and they ask for a signed tag with `git tag -s` we better make sure the resulting tag was actually signed by gpg. Prior versions of builtin git-tag allowed this failure to slip by without error as they were not checking the return value of the finish_command() so they did not notice when gpg exited with an error exit status. They also did not fail if gpg produced an empty output or if read_in_full received an error from the read system call while trying to read the pipe back from gpg. Finally, we did not actually honor any return value from the do_sign function as it returns ssize_t but was being stored into an unsigned long. This caused the compiler to optimize out the die condition, allowing git-tag to continue along and create the tag object. However, when gpg gets a wrong username, it exits before any read was done and then the writing process receives SIGPIPE and program is terminated. By ignoring this signal, anyway, the function write_or_die gets EPIPE from write_in_full and exits returning 0 to the system without a message. Here we better call to write_in_full directly so we can fail printing a message and return safely to the caller. With these issues fixed `git-tag -s` will now fail to create the tag and will report a non-zero exit status to its caller, thereby allowing automated helper scripts to detect (and recover from) failure if gpg is not working properly. Proposed-by: Shawn O. Pearce <spearce@spearce.org> Signed-off-by: Carlos Rica <jasampler@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2007-09-09 02:39:29 +02:00
if (finish_command(&gpg) || !len || len < 0)
return error("gpg failed to sign the tag");
if (len < 0)
return error("could not read the entire signature from gpg.");
return 0;
}
static const char tag_template[] =
"\n"
"#\n"
"# Write a tag message\n"
"#\n";
static int git_tag_config(const char *var, const char *value)
{
if (!strcmp(var, "user.signingkey")) {
if (!value)
die("user.signingkey without value");
if (strlcpy(signingkey, value, sizeof(signingkey))
>= sizeof(signingkey))
die("user.signingkey value too long");
return 0;
}
return git_default_config(var, value);
}
static void create_tag(const unsigned char *object, const char *tag,
struct strbuf *buf, int message, int sign,
unsigned char *result)
{
enum object_type type;
char header_buf[1024];
int header_len;
type = sha1_object_info(object, NULL);
if (type <= OBJ_NONE)
die("bad object type.");
header_len = snprintf(header_buf, sizeof(header_buf),
"object %s\n"
"type %s\n"
"tag %s\n"
"tagger %s\n\n",
sha1_to_hex(object),
typename(type),
tag,
git_committer_info(1));
if (header_len > sizeof(header_buf) - 1)
die("tag header too big.");
if (!message) {
char *path;
int fd;
/* write the template message before editing: */
path = xstrdup(git_path("TAG_EDITMSG"));
fd = open(path, O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_WRONLY, 0600);
if (fd < 0)
die("could not create file '%s': %s",
path, strerror(errno));
write_or_die(fd, tag_template, strlen(tag_template));
close(fd);
launch_editor(path, buf);
unlink(path);
free(path);
}
stripspace(buf, 1);
if (!message && !buf->len)
die("no tag message?");
strbuf_insert(buf, 0, header_buf, header_len);
if (sign && do_sign(buf) < 0)
die("unable to sign the tag");
if (write_sha1_file(buf->buf, buf->len, tag_type, result) < 0)
die("unable to write tag file");
}
int cmd_tag(int argc, const char **argv, const char *prefix)
{
struct strbuf buf;
unsigned char object[20], prev[20];
int annotate = 0, sign = 0, force = 0, lines = 0, message = 0;
char ref[PATH_MAX];
const char *object_ref, *tag;
int i;
struct ref_lock *lock;
git_config(git_tag_config);
strbuf_init(&buf, 0);
for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) {
const char *arg = argv[i];
if (arg[0] != '-')
break;
if (!strcmp(arg, "-a")) {
annotate = 1;
continue;
}
if (!strcmp(arg, "-s")) {
annotate = 1;
sign = 1;
continue;
}
if (!strcmp(arg, "-f")) {
force = 1;
continue;
}
if (!strcmp(arg, "-n")) {
if (i + 1 == argc || *argv[i + 1] == '-')
/* no argument */
lines = 1;
else
lines = isdigit(*argv[++i]) ?
atoi(argv[i]) : 1;
continue;
}
if (!strcmp(arg, "-m")) {
annotate = 1;
i++;
if (i == argc)
die("option -m needs an argument.");
if (message)
die("only one -F or -m option is allowed.");
strbuf_addstr(&buf, argv[i]);
message = 1;
continue;
}
if (!strcmp(arg, "-F")) {
annotate = 1;
i++;
if (i == argc)
die("option -F needs an argument.");
if (message)
die("only one -F or -m option is allowed.");
if (!strcmp(argv[i], "-")) {
if (strbuf_read(&buf, 0, 1024) < 0)
die("cannot read %s", argv[i]);
} else {
if (strbuf_read_file(&buf, argv[i], 1024) < 0)
die("could not open or read '%s': %s",
argv[i], strerror(errno));
}
message = 1;
continue;
}
if (!strcmp(arg, "-u")) {
annotate = 1;
sign = 1;
i++;
if (i == argc)
die("option -u needs an argument.");
if (strlcpy(signingkey, argv[i], sizeof(signingkey))
>= sizeof(signingkey))
die("argument to option -u too long");
continue;
}
if (!strcmp(arg, "-l"))
return list_tags(argv[i + 1], lines);
if (!strcmp(arg, "-d"))
return for_each_tag_name(argv + i + 1, delete_tag);
if (!strcmp(arg, "-v"))
return for_each_tag_name(argv + i + 1, verify_tag);
usage(builtin_tag_usage);
}
if (i == argc) {
if (annotate)
usage(builtin_tag_usage);
return list_tags(NULL, lines);
}
tag = argv[i++];
object_ref = i < argc ? argv[i] : "HEAD";
if (i + 1 < argc)
die("too many params");
if (get_sha1(object_ref, object))
die("Failed to resolve '%s' as a valid ref.", object_ref);
if (snprintf(ref, sizeof(ref), "refs/tags/%s", tag) > sizeof(ref) - 1)
die("tag name too long: %.*s...", 50, tag);
if (check_ref_format(ref))
die("'%s' is not a valid tag name.", tag);
if (!resolve_ref(ref, prev, 1, NULL))
hashclr(prev);
else if (!force)
die("tag '%s' already exists", tag);
if (annotate)
create_tag(object, tag, &buf, message, sign, object);
lock = lock_any_ref_for_update(ref, prev, 0);
if (!lock)
die("%s: cannot lock the ref", ref);
if (write_ref_sha1(lock, object, NULL) < 0)
die("%s: cannot update the ref", ref);
strbuf_release(&buf);
return 0;
}