git-commit-vandalism/index-pack.c

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#include "cache.h"
#include "delta.h"
#include "pack.h"
#include "csum-file.h"
#include "blob.h"
#include "commit.h"
#include "tag.h"
#include "tree.h"
#include "progress.h"
#include "fsck.h"
static const char index_pack_usage[] =
"git index-pack [-v] [-o <index-file>] [{ ---keep | --keep=<msg> }] [--strict] { <pack-file> | --stdin [--fix-thin] [<pack-file>] }";
struct object_entry
{
struct pack_idx_entry idx;
unsigned long size;
unsigned int hdr_size;
enum object_type type;
enum object_type real_type;
};
union delta_base {
unsigned char sha1[20];
off_t offset;
};
struct base_data {
struct base_data *base;
struct base_data *child;
struct object_entry *obj;
void *data;
unsigned long size;
};
/*
* Even if sizeof(union delta_base) == 24 on 64-bit archs, we really want
* to memcmp() only the first 20 bytes.
*/
#define UNION_BASE_SZ 20
#define FLAG_LINK (1u<<20)
#define FLAG_CHECKED (1u<<21)
struct delta_entry
{
union delta_base base;
int obj_no;
};
static struct object_entry *objects;
static struct delta_entry *deltas;
static struct base_data *base_cache;
static size_t base_cache_used;
static int nr_objects;
static int nr_deltas;
static int nr_resolved_deltas;
static int from_stdin;
static int strict;
static int verbose;
static struct progress *progress;
/* We always read in 4kB chunks. */
static unsigned char input_buffer[4096];
static unsigned int input_offset, input_len;
static off_t consumed_bytes;
fix openssl headers conflicting with custom SHA1 implementations On ARM I have the following compilation errors: CC fast-import.o In file included from cache.h:8, from builtin.h:6, from fast-import.c:142: arm/sha1.h:14: error: conflicting types for 'SHA_CTX' /usr/include/openssl/sha.h:105: error: previous declaration of 'SHA_CTX' was here arm/sha1.h:16: error: conflicting types for 'SHA1_Init' /usr/include/openssl/sha.h:115: error: previous declaration of 'SHA1_Init' was here arm/sha1.h:17: error: conflicting types for 'SHA1_Update' /usr/include/openssl/sha.h:116: error: previous declaration of 'SHA1_Update' was here arm/sha1.h:18: error: conflicting types for 'SHA1_Final' /usr/include/openssl/sha.h:117: error: previous declaration of 'SHA1_Final' was here make: *** [fast-import.o] Error 1 This is because openssl header files are always included in git-compat-util.h since commit 684ec6c63c whenever NO_OPENSSL is not set, which somehow brings in <openssl/sha1.h> clashing with the custom ARM version. Compilation of git is probably broken on PPC too for the same reason. Turns out that the only file requiring openssl/ssl.h and openssl/err.h is imap-send.c. But only moving those problematic includes there doesn't solve the issue as it also includes cache.h which brings in the conflicting local SHA1 header file. As suggested by Jeff King, the best solution is to rename our references to SHA1 functions and structure to something git specific, and define those according to the implementation used. Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@cam.org> Signed-off-by: Shawn O. Pearce <spearce@spearce.org>
2008-10-01 20:05:20 +02:00
static git_SHA_CTX input_ctx;
static uint32_t input_crc32;
static int input_fd, output_fd, pack_fd;
static int mark_link(struct object *obj, int type, void *data)
{
if (!obj)
return -1;
if (type != OBJ_ANY && obj->type != type)
die("object type mismatch at %s", sha1_to_hex(obj->sha1));
obj->flags |= FLAG_LINK;
return 0;
}
/* The content of each linked object must have been checked
or it must be already present in the object database */
static void check_object(struct object *obj)
{
if (!obj)
return;
if (!(obj->flags & FLAG_LINK))
return;
if (!(obj->flags & FLAG_CHECKED)) {
unsigned long size;
int type = sha1_object_info(obj->sha1, &size);
if (type != obj->type || type <= 0)
die("object of unexpected type");
obj->flags |= FLAG_CHECKED;
return;
}
}
static void check_objects(void)
{
unsigned i, max;
max = get_max_object_index();
for (i = 0; i < max; i++)
check_object(get_indexed_object(i));
}
/* Discard current buffer used content. */
static void flush(void)
{
if (input_offset) {
if (output_fd >= 0)
write_or_die(output_fd, input_buffer, input_offset);
fix openssl headers conflicting with custom SHA1 implementations On ARM I have the following compilation errors: CC fast-import.o In file included from cache.h:8, from builtin.h:6, from fast-import.c:142: arm/sha1.h:14: error: conflicting types for 'SHA_CTX' /usr/include/openssl/sha.h:105: error: previous declaration of 'SHA_CTX' was here arm/sha1.h:16: error: conflicting types for 'SHA1_Init' /usr/include/openssl/sha.h:115: error: previous declaration of 'SHA1_Init' was here arm/sha1.h:17: error: conflicting types for 'SHA1_Update' /usr/include/openssl/sha.h:116: error: previous declaration of 'SHA1_Update' was here arm/sha1.h:18: error: conflicting types for 'SHA1_Final' /usr/include/openssl/sha.h:117: error: previous declaration of 'SHA1_Final' was here make: *** [fast-import.o] Error 1 This is because openssl header files are always included in git-compat-util.h since commit 684ec6c63c whenever NO_OPENSSL is not set, which somehow brings in <openssl/sha1.h> clashing with the custom ARM version. Compilation of git is probably broken on PPC too for the same reason. Turns out that the only file requiring openssl/ssl.h and openssl/err.h is imap-send.c. But only moving those problematic includes there doesn't solve the issue as it also includes cache.h which brings in the conflicting local SHA1 header file. As suggested by Jeff King, the best solution is to rename our references to SHA1 functions and structure to something git specific, and define those according to the implementation used. Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@cam.org> Signed-off-by: Shawn O. Pearce <spearce@spearce.org>
2008-10-01 20:05:20 +02:00
git_SHA1_Update(&input_ctx, input_buffer, input_offset);
memmove(input_buffer, input_buffer + input_offset, input_len);
input_offset = 0;
}
}
/*
* Make sure at least "min" bytes are available in the buffer, and
* return the pointer to the buffer.
*/
static void *fill(int min)
{
if (min <= input_len)
return input_buffer + input_offset;
if (min > sizeof(input_buffer))
die("cannot fill %d bytes", min);
flush();
do {
ssize_t ret = xread(input_fd, input_buffer + input_len,
sizeof(input_buffer) - input_len);
if (ret <= 0) {
if (!ret)
die("early EOF");
die("read error on input: %s", strerror(errno));
}
input_len += ret;
if (from_stdin)
display_throughput(progress, consumed_bytes + input_len);
} while (input_len < min);
return input_buffer;
}
static void use(int bytes)
{
if (bytes > input_len)
die("used more bytes than were available");
input_crc32 = crc32(input_crc32, input_buffer + input_offset, bytes);
input_len -= bytes;
input_offset += bytes;
/* make sure off_t is sufficiently large not to wrap */
if (consumed_bytes > consumed_bytes + bytes)
die("pack too large for current definition of off_t");
consumed_bytes += bytes;
}
static char *open_pack_file(char *pack_name)
{
if (from_stdin) {
input_fd = 0;
if (!pack_name) {
static char tmpfile[PATH_MAX];
snprintf(tmpfile, sizeof(tmpfile),
"%s/pack/tmp_pack_XXXXXX", get_object_directory());
output_fd = xmkstemp(tmpfile);
pack_name = xstrdup(tmpfile);
} else
output_fd = open(pack_name, O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_RDWR, 0600);
if (output_fd < 0)
die("unable to create %s: %s", pack_name, strerror(errno));
pack_fd = output_fd;
} else {
input_fd = open(pack_name, O_RDONLY);
if (input_fd < 0)
die("cannot open packfile '%s': %s",
pack_name, strerror(errno));
output_fd = -1;
pack_fd = input_fd;
}
fix openssl headers conflicting with custom SHA1 implementations On ARM I have the following compilation errors: CC fast-import.o In file included from cache.h:8, from builtin.h:6, from fast-import.c:142: arm/sha1.h:14: error: conflicting types for 'SHA_CTX' /usr/include/openssl/sha.h:105: error: previous declaration of 'SHA_CTX' was here arm/sha1.h:16: error: conflicting types for 'SHA1_Init' /usr/include/openssl/sha.h:115: error: previous declaration of 'SHA1_Init' was here arm/sha1.h:17: error: conflicting types for 'SHA1_Update' /usr/include/openssl/sha.h:116: error: previous declaration of 'SHA1_Update' was here arm/sha1.h:18: error: conflicting types for 'SHA1_Final' /usr/include/openssl/sha.h:117: error: previous declaration of 'SHA1_Final' was here make: *** [fast-import.o] Error 1 This is because openssl header files are always included in git-compat-util.h since commit 684ec6c63c whenever NO_OPENSSL is not set, which somehow brings in <openssl/sha1.h> clashing with the custom ARM version. Compilation of git is probably broken on PPC too for the same reason. Turns out that the only file requiring openssl/ssl.h and openssl/err.h is imap-send.c. But only moving those problematic includes there doesn't solve the issue as it also includes cache.h which brings in the conflicting local SHA1 header file. As suggested by Jeff King, the best solution is to rename our references to SHA1 functions and structure to something git specific, and define those according to the implementation used. Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@cam.org> Signed-off-by: Shawn O. Pearce <spearce@spearce.org>
2008-10-01 20:05:20 +02:00
git_SHA1_Init(&input_ctx);
return pack_name;
}
static void parse_pack_header(void)
{
struct pack_header *hdr = fill(sizeof(struct pack_header));
/* Header consistency check */
if (hdr->hdr_signature != htonl(PACK_SIGNATURE))
die("pack signature mismatch");
if (!pack_version_ok(hdr->hdr_version))
die("pack version %"PRIu32" unsupported",
ntohl(hdr->hdr_version));
nr_objects = ntohl(hdr->hdr_entries);
use(sizeof(struct pack_header));
}
static void bad_object(unsigned long offset, const char *format,
...) NORETURN __attribute__((format (printf, 2, 3)));
static void bad_object(unsigned long offset, const char *format, ...)
{
va_list params;
char buf[1024];
va_start(params, format);
vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), format, params);
va_end(params);
die("pack has bad object at offset %lu: %s", offset, buf);
}
static void free_base_data(struct base_data *c)
{
if (c->data) {
free(c->data);
c->data = NULL;
base_cache_used -= c->size;
}
}
static void prune_base_data(struct base_data *retain)
{
struct base_data *b = base_cache;
for (b = base_cache;
base_cache_used > delta_base_cache_limit && b;
b = b->child) {
if (b->data && b != retain)
free_base_data(b);
}
}
static void link_base_data(struct base_data *base, struct base_data *c)
{
if (base)
base->child = c;
else
base_cache = c;
c->base = base;
c->child = NULL;
if (c->data)
base_cache_used += c->size;
prune_base_data(c);
}
static void unlink_base_data(struct base_data *c)
{
struct base_data *base = c->base;
if (base)
base->child = NULL;
else
base_cache = NULL;
free_base_data(c);
}
static void *unpack_entry_data(unsigned long offset, unsigned long size)
{
z_stream stream;
void *buf = xmalloc(size);
memset(&stream, 0, sizeof(stream));
stream.next_out = buf;
stream.avail_out = size;
stream.next_in = fill(1);
stream.avail_in = input_len;
inflateInit(&stream);
for (;;) {
int ret = inflate(&stream, 0);
use(input_len - stream.avail_in);
if (stream.total_out == size && ret == Z_STREAM_END)
break;
if (ret != Z_OK)
bad_object(offset, "inflate returned %d", ret);
stream.next_in = fill(1);
stream.avail_in = input_len;
}
inflateEnd(&stream);
return buf;
}
static void *unpack_raw_entry(struct object_entry *obj, union delta_base *delta_base)
{
unsigned char *p, c;
unsigned long size;
off_t base_offset;
unsigned shift;
void *data;
obj->idx.offset = consumed_bytes;
input_crc32 = crc32(0, Z_NULL, 0);
p = fill(1);
c = *p;
use(1);
obj->type = (c >> 4) & 7;
size = (c & 15);
shift = 4;
while (c & 0x80) {
p = fill(1);
c = *p;
use(1);
size += (c & 0x7fUL) << shift;
shift += 7;
}
obj->size = size;
switch (obj->type) {
case OBJ_REF_DELTA:
hashcpy(delta_base->sha1, fill(20));
use(20);
break;
case OBJ_OFS_DELTA:
memset(delta_base, 0, sizeof(*delta_base));
p = fill(1);
c = *p;
use(1);
base_offset = c & 127;
while (c & 128) {
base_offset += 1;
if (!base_offset || MSB(base_offset, 7))
bad_object(obj->idx.offset, "offset value overflow for delta base object");
p = fill(1);
c = *p;
use(1);
base_offset = (base_offset << 7) + (c & 127);
}
delta_base->offset = obj->idx.offset - base_offset;
if (delta_base->offset <= 0 || delta_base->offset >= obj->idx.offset)
bad_object(obj->idx.offset, "delta base offset is out of bound");
break;
case OBJ_COMMIT:
case OBJ_TREE:
case OBJ_BLOB:
case OBJ_TAG:
break;
default:
bad_object(obj->idx.offset, "unknown object type %d", obj->type);
}
obj->hdr_size = consumed_bytes - obj->idx.offset;
data = unpack_entry_data(obj->idx.offset, obj->size);
obj->idx.crc32 = input_crc32;
return data;
}
static void *get_data_from_pack(struct object_entry *obj)
{
off_t from = obj[0].idx.offset + obj[0].hdr_size;
unsigned long len = obj[1].idx.offset - from;
unsigned long rdy = 0;
unsigned char *src, *data;
z_stream stream;
int st;
src = xmalloc(len);
data = src;
do {
ssize_t n = pread(pack_fd, data + rdy, len - rdy, from + rdy);
if (n < 0)
die("cannot pread pack file: %s", strerror(errno));
if (!n)
die("premature end of pack file, %lu bytes missing",
len - rdy);
rdy += n;
} while (rdy < len);
data = xmalloc(obj->size);
memset(&stream, 0, sizeof(stream));
stream.next_out = data;
stream.avail_out = obj->size;
stream.next_in = src;
stream.avail_in = len;
inflateInit(&stream);
while ((st = inflate(&stream, Z_FINISH)) == Z_OK);
inflateEnd(&stream);
if (st != Z_STREAM_END || stream.total_out != obj->size)
die("serious inflate inconsistency");
free(src);
return data;
}
static int find_delta(const union delta_base *base)
{
int first = 0, last = nr_deltas;
while (first < last) {
int next = (first + last) / 2;
struct delta_entry *delta = &deltas[next];
int cmp;
cmp = memcmp(base, &delta->base, UNION_BASE_SZ);
if (!cmp)
return next;
if (cmp < 0) {
last = next;
continue;
}
first = next+1;
}
return -first-1;
}
static void find_delta_children(const union delta_base *base,
int *first_index, int *last_index)
{
int first = find_delta(base);
int last = first;
int end = nr_deltas - 1;
if (first < 0) {
*first_index = 0;
*last_index = -1;
return;
}
while (first > 0 && !memcmp(&deltas[first - 1].base, base, UNION_BASE_SZ))
--first;
while (last < end && !memcmp(&deltas[last + 1].base, base, UNION_BASE_SZ))
++last;
*first_index = first;
*last_index = last;
}
static void sha1_object(const void *data, unsigned long size,
enum object_type type, unsigned char *sha1)
{
hash_sha1_file(data, size, typename(type), sha1);
if (has_sha1_file(sha1)) {
don't ever allow SHA1 collisions to exist by fetching a pack Waaaaaaay back Git was considered to be secure as it never overwrote an object it already had. This was ensured by always unpacking the packfile received over the network (both in fetch and receive-pack) and our already existing logic to not create a loose object for an object we already have. Lately however we keep "large-ish" packfiles on both fetch and push by running them through index-pack instead of unpack-objects. This would let an attacker perform a birthday attack. How? Assume the attacker knows a SHA-1 that has two different data streams. He knows the client is likely to have the "good" one. So he sends the "evil" variant to the other end as part of a "large-ish" packfile. The recipient keeps that packfile, and indexes it. Now since this is a birthday attack there is a SHA-1 collision; two objects exist in the repository with the same SHA-1. They have *very* different data streams. One of them is "evil". Currently the poor recipient cannot tell the two objects apart, short of by examining the timestamp of the packfiles. But lets say the recipient repacks before he realizes he's been attacked. We may wind up packing the "evil" version of the object, and deleting the "good" one. This is made *even more likely* by Junio's recent rearrange_packed_git patch (b867092f). It is extremely unlikely for a SHA1 collisions to occur, but if it ever happens with a remote (hence untrusted) object we simply must not let the fetch succeed. Normally received packs should not contain objects we already have. But when they do we must ensure duplicated objects with the same SHA1 actually contain the same data. Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@cam.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2007-03-20 20:32:35 +01:00
void *has_data;
enum object_type has_type;
unsigned long has_size;
has_data = read_sha1_file(sha1, &has_type, &has_size);
if (!has_data)
die("cannot read existing object %s", sha1_to_hex(sha1));
if (size != has_size || type != has_type ||
memcmp(data, has_data, size) != 0)
die("SHA1 COLLISION FOUND WITH %s !", sha1_to_hex(sha1));
free(has_data);
don't ever allow SHA1 collisions to exist by fetching a pack Waaaaaaay back Git was considered to be secure as it never overwrote an object it already had. This was ensured by always unpacking the packfile received over the network (both in fetch and receive-pack) and our already existing logic to not create a loose object for an object we already have. Lately however we keep "large-ish" packfiles on both fetch and push by running them through index-pack instead of unpack-objects. This would let an attacker perform a birthday attack. How? Assume the attacker knows a SHA-1 that has two different data streams. He knows the client is likely to have the "good" one. So he sends the "evil" variant to the other end as part of a "large-ish" packfile. The recipient keeps that packfile, and indexes it. Now since this is a birthday attack there is a SHA-1 collision; two objects exist in the repository with the same SHA-1. They have *very* different data streams. One of them is "evil". Currently the poor recipient cannot tell the two objects apart, short of by examining the timestamp of the packfiles. But lets say the recipient repacks before he realizes he's been attacked. We may wind up packing the "evil" version of the object, and deleting the "good" one. This is made *even more likely* by Junio's recent rearrange_packed_git patch (b867092f). It is extremely unlikely for a SHA1 collisions to occur, but if it ever happens with a remote (hence untrusted) object we simply must not let the fetch succeed. Normally received packs should not contain objects we already have. But when they do we must ensure duplicated objects with the same SHA1 actually contain the same data. Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@cam.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
2007-03-20 20:32:35 +01:00
}
if (strict) {
if (type == OBJ_BLOB) {
struct blob *blob = lookup_blob(sha1);
if (blob)
blob->object.flags |= FLAG_CHECKED;
else
die("invalid blob object %s", sha1_to_hex(sha1));
} else {
struct object *obj;
int eaten;
void *buf = (void *) data;
/*
* we do not need to free the memory here, as the
* buf is deleted by the caller.
*/
obj = parse_object_buffer(sha1, type, size, buf, &eaten);
if (!obj)
die("invalid %s", typename(type));
if (fsck_object(obj, 1, fsck_error_function))
die("Error in object");
if (fsck_walk(obj, mark_link, 0))
die("Not all child objects of %s are reachable", sha1_to_hex(obj->sha1));
if (obj->type == OBJ_TREE) {
struct tree *item = (struct tree *) obj;
item->buffer = NULL;
}
if (obj->type == OBJ_COMMIT) {
struct commit *commit = (struct commit *) obj;
commit->buffer = NULL;
}
obj->flags |= FLAG_CHECKED;
}
}
}
static void *get_base_data(struct base_data *c)
{
if (!c->data) {
struct object_entry *obj = c->obj;
if (obj->type == OBJ_REF_DELTA || obj->type == OBJ_OFS_DELTA) {
void *base = get_base_data(c->base);
void *raw = get_data_from_pack(obj);
c->data = patch_delta(
base, c->base->size,
raw, obj->size,
&c->size);
free(raw);
if (!c->data)
bad_object(obj->idx.offset, "failed to apply delta");
} else {
c->data = get_data_from_pack(obj);
c->size = obj->size;
}
base_cache_used += c->size;
prune_base_data(c);
}
return c->data;
}
static void resolve_delta(struct object_entry *delta_obj,
struct base_data *base, struct base_data *result)
{
void *base_data, *delta_data;
delta_obj->real_type = base->obj->real_type;
delta_data = get_data_from_pack(delta_obj);
base_data = get_base_data(base);
result->obj = delta_obj;
result->data = patch_delta(base_data, base->size,
delta_data, delta_obj->size, &result->size);
free(delta_data);
if (!result->data)
bad_object(delta_obj->idx.offset, "failed to apply delta");
sha1_object(result->data, result->size, delta_obj->real_type,
delta_obj->idx.sha1);
nr_resolved_deltas++;
}
static void find_unresolved_deltas(struct base_data *base,
struct base_data *prev_base)
{
int i, ref_first, ref_last, ofs_first, ofs_last;
/*
* This is a recursive function. Those brackets should help reducing
* stack usage by limiting the scope of the delta_base union.
*/
{
union delta_base base_spec;
hashcpy(base_spec.sha1, base->obj->idx.sha1);
find_delta_children(&base_spec, &ref_first, &ref_last);
memset(&base_spec, 0, sizeof(base_spec));
base_spec.offset = base->obj->idx.offset;
find_delta_children(&base_spec, &ofs_first, &ofs_last);
}
if (ref_last == -1 && ofs_last == -1) {
free(base->data);
return;
}
link_base_data(prev_base, base);
for (i = ref_first; i <= ref_last; i++) {
struct object_entry *child = objects + deltas[i].obj_no;
if (child->real_type == OBJ_REF_DELTA) {
struct base_data result;
resolve_delta(child, base, &result);
if (i == ref_last && ofs_last == -1)
free_base_data(base);
find_unresolved_deltas(&result, base);
}
}
for (i = ofs_first; i <= ofs_last; i++) {
struct object_entry *child = objects + deltas[i].obj_no;
if (child->real_type == OBJ_OFS_DELTA) {
struct base_data result;
resolve_delta(child, base, &result);
if (i == ofs_last)
free_base_data(base);
find_unresolved_deltas(&result, base);
}
}
unlink_base_data(base);
}
static int compare_delta_entry(const void *a, const void *b)
{
const struct delta_entry *delta_a = a;
const struct delta_entry *delta_b = b;
return memcmp(&delta_a->base, &delta_b->base, UNION_BASE_SZ);
}
/* Parse all objects and return the pack content SHA1 hash */
static void parse_pack_objects(unsigned char *sha1)
{
int i;
struct delta_entry *delta = deltas;
struct stat st;
/*
* First pass:
* - find locations of all objects;
* - calculate SHA1 of all non-delta objects;
* - remember base (SHA1 or offset) for all deltas.
*/
if (verbose)
progress = start_progress(
from_stdin ? "Receiving objects" : "Indexing objects",
nr_objects);
for (i = 0; i < nr_objects; i++) {
struct object_entry *obj = &objects[i];
void *data = unpack_raw_entry(obj, &delta->base);
obj->real_type = obj->type;
if (obj->type == OBJ_REF_DELTA || obj->type == OBJ_OFS_DELTA) {
nr_deltas++;
delta->obj_no = i;
delta++;
} else
sha1_object(data, obj->size, obj->type, obj->idx.sha1);
free(data);
display_progress(progress, i+1);
}
objects[i].idx.offset = consumed_bytes;
stop_progress(&progress);
/* Check pack integrity */
flush();
fix openssl headers conflicting with custom SHA1 implementations On ARM I have the following compilation errors: CC fast-import.o In file included from cache.h:8, from builtin.h:6, from fast-import.c:142: arm/sha1.h:14: error: conflicting types for 'SHA_CTX' /usr/include/openssl/sha.h:105: error: previous declaration of 'SHA_CTX' was here arm/sha1.h:16: error: conflicting types for 'SHA1_Init' /usr/include/openssl/sha.h:115: error: previous declaration of 'SHA1_Init' was here arm/sha1.h:17: error: conflicting types for 'SHA1_Update' /usr/include/openssl/sha.h:116: error: previous declaration of 'SHA1_Update' was here arm/sha1.h:18: error: conflicting types for 'SHA1_Final' /usr/include/openssl/sha.h:117: error: previous declaration of 'SHA1_Final' was here make: *** [fast-import.o] Error 1 This is because openssl header files are always included in git-compat-util.h since commit 684ec6c63c whenever NO_OPENSSL is not set, which somehow brings in <openssl/sha1.h> clashing with the custom ARM version. Compilation of git is probably broken on PPC too for the same reason. Turns out that the only file requiring openssl/ssl.h and openssl/err.h is imap-send.c. But only moving those problematic includes there doesn't solve the issue as it also includes cache.h which brings in the conflicting local SHA1 header file. As suggested by Jeff King, the best solution is to rename our references to SHA1 functions and structure to something git specific, and define those according to the implementation used. Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@cam.org> Signed-off-by: Shawn O. Pearce <spearce@spearce.org>
2008-10-01 20:05:20 +02:00
git_SHA1_Final(sha1, &input_ctx);
if (hashcmp(fill(20), sha1))
die("pack is corrupted (SHA1 mismatch)");
use(20);
/* If input_fd is a file, we should have reached its end now. */
if (fstat(input_fd, &st))
die("cannot fstat packfile: %s", strerror(errno));
if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) &&
lseek(input_fd, 0, SEEK_CUR) - input_len != st.st_size)
die("pack has junk at the end");
if (!nr_deltas)
return;
/* Sort deltas by base SHA1/offset for fast searching */
qsort(deltas, nr_deltas, sizeof(struct delta_entry),
compare_delta_entry);
/*
* Second pass:
* - for all non-delta objects, look if it is used as a base for
* deltas;
* - if used as a base, uncompress the object and apply all deltas,
* recursively checking if the resulting object is used as a base
* for some more deltas.
*/
if (verbose)
progress = start_progress("Resolving deltas", nr_deltas);
for (i = 0; i < nr_objects; i++) {
struct object_entry *obj = &objects[i];
struct base_data base_obj;
if (obj->type == OBJ_REF_DELTA || obj->type == OBJ_OFS_DELTA)
continue;
base_obj.obj = obj;
base_obj.data = NULL;
find_unresolved_deltas(&base_obj, NULL);
display_progress(progress, nr_resolved_deltas);
}
}
static int write_compressed(struct sha1file *f, void *in, unsigned int size)
{
z_stream stream;
unsigned long maxsize;
void *out;
memset(&stream, 0, sizeof(stream));
deflateInit(&stream, zlib_compression_level);
maxsize = deflateBound(&stream, size);
out = xmalloc(maxsize);
/* Compress it */
stream.next_in = in;
stream.avail_in = size;
stream.next_out = out;
stream.avail_out = maxsize;
while (deflate(&stream, Z_FINISH) == Z_OK);
deflateEnd(&stream);
size = stream.total_out;
sha1write(f, out, size);
free(out);
return size;
}
static struct object_entry *append_obj_to_pack(struct sha1file *f,
const unsigned char *sha1, void *buf,
unsigned long size, enum object_type type)
{
struct object_entry *obj = &objects[nr_objects++];
unsigned char header[10];
unsigned long s = size;
int n = 0;
unsigned char c = (type << 4) | (s & 15);
s >>= 4;
while (s) {
header[n++] = c | 0x80;
c = s & 0x7f;
s >>= 7;
}
header[n++] = c;
crc32_begin(f);
sha1write(f, header, n);
obj[0].size = size;
obj[0].hdr_size = n;
obj[0].type = type;
obj[0].real_type = type;
obj[1].idx.offset = obj[0].idx.offset + n;
obj[1].idx.offset += write_compressed(f, buf, size);
obj[0].idx.crc32 = crc32_end(f);
sha1flush(f);
hashcpy(obj->idx.sha1, sha1);
return obj;
}
static int delta_pos_compare(const void *_a, const void *_b)
{
struct delta_entry *a = *(struct delta_entry **)_a;
struct delta_entry *b = *(struct delta_entry **)_b;
return a->obj_no - b->obj_no;
}
static void fix_unresolved_deltas(struct sha1file *f, int nr_unresolved)
{
struct delta_entry **sorted_by_pos;
int i, n = 0;
/*
* Since many unresolved deltas may well be themselves base objects
* for more unresolved deltas, we really want to include the
* smallest number of base objects that would cover as much delta
* as possible by picking the
* trunc deltas first, allowing for other deltas to resolve without
* additional base objects. Since most base objects are to be found
* before deltas depending on them, a good heuristic is to start
* resolving deltas in the same order as their position in the pack.
*/
sorted_by_pos = xmalloc(nr_unresolved * sizeof(*sorted_by_pos));
for (i = 0; i < nr_deltas; i++) {
if (objects[deltas[i].obj_no].real_type != OBJ_REF_DELTA)
continue;
sorted_by_pos[n++] = &deltas[i];
}
qsort(sorted_by_pos, n, sizeof(*sorted_by_pos), delta_pos_compare);
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
struct delta_entry *d = sorted_by_pos[i];
enum object_type type;
struct base_data base_obj;
if (objects[d->obj_no].real_type != OBJ_REF_DELTA)
continue;
base_obj.data = read_sha1_file(d->base.sha1, &type, &base_obj.size);
if (!base_obj.data)
continue;
if (check_sha1_signature(d->base.sha1, base_obj.data,
base_obj.size, typename(type)))
die("local object %s is corrupt", sha1_to_hex(d->base.sha1));
base_obj.obj = append_obj_to_pack(f, d->base.sha1,
base_obj.data, base_obj.size, type);
find_unresolved_deltas(&base_obj, NULL);
display_progress(progress, nr_resolved_deltas);
}
free(sorted_by_pos);
}
static void final(const char *final_pack_name, const char *curr_pack_name,
const char *final_index_name, const char *curr_index_name,
const char *keep_name, const char *keep_msg,
unsigned char *sha1)
{
const char *report = "pack";
char name[PATH_MAX];
int err;
if (!from_stdin) {
close(input_fd);
} else {
fsync_or_die(output_fd, curr_pack_name);
err = close(output_fd);
if (err)
die("error while closing pack file: %s", strerror(errno));
}
if (keep_msg) {
int keep_fd, keep_msg_len = strlen(keep_msg);
if (!keep_name) {
snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%s/pack/pack-%s.keep",
get_object_directory(), sha1_to_hex(sha1));
keep_name = name;
}
keep_fd = open(keep_name, O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0600);
if (keep_fd < 0) {
if (errno != EEXIST)
die("cannot write keep file");
} else {
if (keep_msg_len > 0) {
write_or_die(keep_fd, keep_msg, keep_msg_len);
write_or_die(keep_fd, "\n", 1);
}
if (close(keep_fd) != 0)
die("cannot write keep file");
report = "keep";
}
}
if (final_pack_name != curr_pack_name) {
if (!final_pack_name) {
snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%s/pack/pack-%s.pack",
get_object_directory(), sha1_to_hex(sha1));
final_pack_name = name;
}
if (move_temp_to_file(curr_pack_name, final_pack_name))
die("cannot store pack file");
}
if (from_stdin)
chmod(final_pack_name, 0444);
if (final_index_name != curr_index_name) {
if (!final_index_name) {
snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%s/pack/pack-%s.idx",
get_object_directory(), sha1_to_hex(sha1));
final_index_name = name;
}
if (move_temp_to_file(curr_index_name, final_index_name))
die("cannot store index file");
}
chmod(final_index_name, 0444);
if (!from_stdin) {
printf("%s\n", sha1_to_hex(sha1));
} else {
char buf[48];
int len = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s\t%s\n",
report, sha1_to_hex(sha1));
write_or_die(1, buf, len);
/*
* Let's just mimic git-unpack-objects here and write
* the last part of the input buffer to stdout.
*/
while (input_len) {
err = xwrite(1, input_buffer + input_offset, input_len);
if (err <= 0)
break;
input_len -= err;
input_offset += err;
}
}
}
static int git_index_pack_config(const char *k, const char *v, void *cb)
{
if (!strcmp(k, "pack.indexversion")) {
pack_idx_default_version = git_config_int(k, v);
if (pack_idx_default_version > 2)
die("bad pack.indexversion=%"PRIu32,
pack_idx_default_version);
return 0;
}
return git_default_config(k, v, cb);
}
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int i, fix_thin_pack = 0;
char *curr_pack, *pack_name = NULL;
char *curr_index, *index_name = NULL;
const char *keep_name = NULL, *keep_msg = NULL;
char *index_name_buf = NULL, *keep_name_buf = NULL;
struct pack_idx_entry **idx_objects;
unsigned char pack_sha1[20];
/*
* We wish to read the repository's config file if any, and
* for that it is necessary to call setup_git_directory_gently().
* However if the cwd was inside .git/objects/pack/ then we need
* to go back there or all the pack name arguments will be wrong.
* And in that case we cannot rely on any prefix returned by
* setup_git_directory_gently() either.
*/
{
char cwd[PATH_MAX+1];
int nongit;
if (!getcwd(cwd, sizeof(cwd)-1))
die("Unable to get current working directory");
setup_git_directory_gently(&nongit);
git_config(git_index_pack_config, NULL);
if (chdir(cwd))
die("Cannot come back to cwd");
}
for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) {
char *arg = argv[i];
if (*arg == '-') {
if (!strcmp(arg, "--stdin")) {
from_stdin = 1;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "--fix-thin")) {
fix_thin_pack = 1;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "--strict")) {
strict = 1;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "--keep")) {
keep_msg = "";
} else if (!prefixcmp(arg, "--keep=")) {
keep_msg = arg + 7;
} else if (!prefixcmp(arg, "--pack_header=")) {
struct pack_header *hdr;
char *c;
hdr = (struct pack_header *)input_buffer;
hdr->hdr_signature = htonl(PACK_SIGNATURE);
hdr->hdr_version = htonl(strtoul(arg + 14, &c, 10));
if (*c != ',')
die("bad %s", arg);
hdr->hdr_entries = htonl(strtoul(c + 1, &c, 10));
if (*c)
die("bad %s", arg);
input_len = sizeof(*hdr);
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-v")) {
verbose = 1;
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "-o")) {
if (index_name || (i+1) >= argc)
usage(index_pack_usage);
index_name = argv[++i];
} else if (!prefixcmp(arg, "--index-version=")) {
char *c;
pack_idx_default_version = strtoul(arg + 16, &c, 10);
if (pack_idx_default_version > 2)
die("bad %s", arg);
if (*c == ',')
pack_idx_off32_limit = strtoul(c+1, &c, 0);
if (*c || pack_idx_off32_limit & 0x80000000)
die("bad %s", arg);
} else
usage(index_pack_usage);
continue;
}
if (pack_name)
usage(index_pack_usage);
pack_name = arg;
}
if (!pack_name && !from_stdin)
usage(index_pack_usage);
if (fix_thin_pack && !from_stdin)
die("--fix-thin cannot be used without --stdin");
if (!index_name && pack_name) {
int len = strlen(pack_name);
if (!has_extension(pack_name, ".pack"))
die("packfile name '%s' does not end with '.pack'",
pack_name);
index_name_buf = xmalloc(len);
memcpy(index_name_buf, pack_name, len - 5);
strcpy(index_name_buf + len - 5, ".idx");
index_name = index_name_buf;
}
if (keep_msg && !keep_name && pack_name) {
int len = strlen(pack_name);
if (!has_extension(pack_name, ".pack"))
die("packfile name '%s' does not end with '.pack'",
pack_name);
keep_name_buf = xmalloc(len);
memcpy(keep_name_buf, pack_name, len - 5);
strcpy(keep_name_buf + len - 5, ".keep");
keep_name = keep_name_buf;
}
curr_pack = open_pack_file(pack_name);
parse_pack_header();
objects = xmalloc((nr_objects + 1) * sizeof(struct object_entry));
deltas = xmalloc(nr_objects * sizeof(struct delta_entry));
parse_pack_objects(pack_sha1);
if (nr_deltas == nr_resolved_deltas) {
stop_progress(&progress);
/* Flush remaining pack final 20-byte SHA1. */
flush();
} else {
if (fix_thin_pack) {
struct sha1file *f;
unsigned char read_sha1[20], tail_sha1[20];
char msg[48];
int nr_unresolved = nr_deltas - nr_resolved_deltas;
int nr_objects_initial = nr_objects;
if (nr_unresolved <= 0)
die("confusion beyond insanity");
objects = xrealloc(objects,
(nr_objects + nr_unresolved + 1)
* sizeof(*objects));
f = sha1fd(output_fd, curr_pack);
fix_unresolved_deltas(f, nr_unresolved);
sprintf(msg, "completed with %d local objects",
nr_objects - nr_objects_initial);
stop_progress_msg(&progress, msg);
sha1close(f, tail_sha1, 0);
hashcpy(read_sha1, pack_sha1);
fixup_pack_header_footer(output_fd, pack_sha1,
curr_pack, nr_objects,
read_sha1, consumed_bytes-20);
if (hashcmp(read_sha1, tail_sha1) != 0)
die("Unexpected tail checksum for %s "
"(disk corruption?)", curr_pack);
}
if (nr_deltas != nr_resolved_deltas)
die("pack has %d unresolved deltas",
nr_deltas - nr_resolved_deltas);
}
free(deltas);
if (strict)
check_objects();
idx_objects = xmalloc((nr_objects) * sizeof(struct pack_idx_entry *));
for (i = 0; i < nr_objects; i++)
idx_objects[i] = &objects[i].idx;
curr_index = write_idx_file(index_name, idx_objects, nr_objects, pack_sha1);
free(idx_objects);
final(pack_name, curr_pack,
index_name, curr_index,
keep_name, keep_msg,
pack_sha1);
free(objects);
free(index_name_buf);
free(keep_name_buf);
if (pack_name == NULL)
free(curr_pack);
if (index_name == NULL)
free(curr_index);
return 0;
}