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Merge branch 'jg/credential-cache-chdir-to-sockdir'

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The "credential-cache" daemon process used to run in whatever
directory it happened to start in, but this made umount(2)ing the
filesystem that houses the repository harder; now the process
chdir()s to the directory that house its own socket on startup.

* jg/credential-cache-chdir-to-sockdir:
  credential-cache--daemon: change to the socket dir on startup
  credential-cache--daemon: disallow relative socket path
  credential-cache--daemon: refactor check_socket_directory
This commit is contained in:
Junio C Hamano 2016-02-26 13:37:20 -08:00
commit 2a24444aae
2 changed files with 25 additions and 15 deletions
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2
Documentation/git-credential-cache.txt
View File

@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ OPTIONS
cache daemon if one is not started). Defaults to
`~/.git-credential-cache/socket`. If your home directory is on a
network-mounted filesystem, you may need to change this to a
local filesystem.
local filesystem. You must specify an absolute path.
CONTROLLING THE DAEMON
----------------------

38
credential-cache--daemon.c
View File

@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ static const char permissions_advice[] =
"users may be able to read your cached credentials. Consider running:\n"
"\n"
" chmod 0700 %s";
static void check_socket_directory(const char *path)
static void init_socket_directory(const char *path)
{
struct stat st;
char *path_copy = xstrdup(path);
@ -224,20 +224,27 @@ static void check_socket_directory(const char *path)
if (!stat(dir, &st)) {
if (st.st_mode & 077)
die(permissions_advice, dir);
free(path_copy);
return;
} else {
/*
* We must be sure to create the directory with the correct mode,
* not just chmod it after the fact; otherwise, there is a race
* condition in which somebody can chdir to it, sleep, then try to open
* our protected socket.
*/
if (safe_create_leading_directories_const(dir) < 0)
die_errno("unable to create directories for '%s'", dir);
if (mkdir(dir, 0700) < 0)
die_errno("unable to mkdir '%s'", dir);
}
/*
* We must be sure to create the directory with the correct mode,
* not just chmod it after the fact; otherwise, there is a race
* condition in which somebody can chdir to it, sleep, then try to open
* our protected socket.
*/
if (safe_create_leading_directories_const(dir) < 0)
die_errno("unable to create directories for '%s'", dir);
if (mkdir(dir, 0700) < 0)
die_errno("unable to mkdir '%s'", dir);
if (chdir(dir))
/*
* We don't actually care what our cwd is; we chdir here just to
* be a friendly daemon and avoid tying up our original cwd.
* If this fails, it's OK to just continue without that benefit.
*/
;
free(path_copy);
}
@ -264,7 +271,10 @@ int main(int argc, const char **argv)
if (!socket_path)
usage_with_options(usage, options);
check_socket_directory(socket_path);
if (!is_absolute_path(socket_path))
die("socket directory must be an absolute path");
init_socket_directory(socket_path);
register_tempfile(&socket_file, socket_path);
if (ignore_sighup)