Git 2.14.1

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Merge tag 'v2.14.1'
This commit is contained in:
Junio C Hamano 2017-08-04 12:45:17 -07:00
commit 4274c698f4
16 changed files with 135 additions and 3 deletions

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@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
Git v2.10.4 Release Notes
=========================
This release forward-ports the fix for "ssh://..." URL from Git v2.7.6

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Git v2.11.3 Release Notes
=========================
This release forward-ports the fix for "ssh://..." URL from Git v2.7.6

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Git v2.12.4 Release Notes
=========================
This release forward-ports the fix for "ssh://..." URL from Git v2.7.6

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Git v2.13.5 Release Notes
=========================
This release forward-ports the fix for "ssh://..." URL from Git v2.7.6

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Git v2.14.1 Release Notes
=========================
This release forward-ports the fix for "ssh://..." URL from Git v2.7.6

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@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
Git v2.7.6 Release Notes
========================
Fixes since v2.7.5
------------------
* A "ssh://..." URL can result in a "ssh" command line with a
hostname that begins with a dash "-", which would cause the "ssh"
command to instead (mis)treat it as an option. This is now
prevented by forbidding such a hostname (which will not be
necessary in the real world).
* Similarly, when GIT_PROXY_COMMAND is configured, the command is
run with host and port that are parsed out from "ssh://..." URL;
a poorly written GIT_PROXY_COMMAND could be tricked into treating
a string that begins with a dash "-". This is now prevented by
forbidding such a hostname and port number (again, which will not
be necessary in the real world).
* In the same spirit, a repository name that begins with a dash "-"
is also forbidden now.
Credits go to Brian Neel at GitLab, Joern Schneeweisz of Recurity
Labs and Jeff King at GitHub.

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Git v2.8.6 Release Notes
========================
This release forward-ports the fix for "ssh://..." URL from Git v2.7.6

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Git v2.9.5 Release Notes
========================
This release forward-ports the fix for "ssh://..." URL from Git v2.7.6

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@ -1 +1 @@
Documentation/RelNotes/2.14.0.txt
Documentation/RelNotes/2.14.1.txt

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@ -1146,6 +1146,14 @@ char *strip_path_suffix(const char *path, const char *suffix);
int daemon_avoid_alias(const char *path);
extern int is_ntfs_dotgit(const char *name);
/*
* Returns true iff "str" could be confused as a command-line option when
* passed to a sub-program like "ssh". Note that this has nothing to do with
* shell-quoting, which should be handled separately; we're assuming here that
* the string makes it verbatim to the sub-program.
*/
int looks_like_command_line_option(const char *str);
/**
* Return a newly allocated string with the evaluation of
* "$XDG_CONFIG_HOME/git/$filename" if $XDG_CONFIG_HOME is non-empty, otherwise

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@ -578,6 +578,11 @@ static struct child_process *git_proxy_connect(int fd[2], char *host)
get_host_and_port(&host, &port);
if (looks_like_command_line_option(host))
die("strange hostname '%s' blocked", host);
if (looks_like_command_line_option(port))
die("strange port '%s' blocked", port);
proxy = xmalloc(sizeof(*proxy));
child_process_init(proxy);
argv_array_push(&proxy->args, git_proxy_command);
@ -824,6 +829,9 @@ struct child_process *git_connect(int fd[2], const char *url,
conn = xmalloc(sizeof(*conn));
child_process_init(conn);
if (looks_like_command_line_option(path))
die("strange pathname '%s' blocked", path);
strbuf_addstr(&cmd, prog);
strbuf_addch(&cmd, ' ');
sq_quote_buf(&cmd, path);
@ -857,6 +865,9 @@ struct child_process *git_connect(int fd[2], const char *url,
return NULL;
}
if (looks_like_command_line_option(ssh_host))
die("strange hostname '%s' blocked", ssh_host);
ssh = get_ssh_command();
if (ssh)
handle_ssh_variant(ssh, 1, &port_option,

5
path.c
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@ -1321,6 +1321,11 @@ int is_ntfs_dotgit(const char *name)
}
}
int looks_like_command_line_option(const char *str)
{
return str && str[0] == '-';
}
char *xdg_config_home(const char *filename)
{
const char *home, *config_home;

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@ -147,29 +147,33 @@ test_config () {
# Test clone/fetch/push with protocol.allow user defined default
test_expect_success "clone $desc (enabled)" '
rm -rf tmp.git &&
git config --global protocol.allow always &&
test_config_global protocol.allow always &&
git clone --bare "$url" tmp.git
'
test_expect_success "fetch $desc (enabled)" '
test_config_global protocol.allow always &&
git -C tmp.git fetch
'
test_expect_success "push $desc (enabled)" '
test_config_global protocol.allow always &&
git -C tmp.git push origin HEAD:pushed
'
test_expect_success "push $desc (disabled)" '
git config --global protocol.allow never &&
test_config_global protocol.allow never &&
test_must_fail git -C tmp.git push origin HEAD:pushed
'
test_expect_success "fetch $desc (disabled)" '
test_config_global protocol.allow never &&
test_must_fail git -C tmp.git fetch
'
test_expect_success "clone $desc (disabled)" '
rm -rf tmp.git &&
test_config_global protocol.allow never &&
test_must_fail git clone --bare "$url" tmp.git
'
}

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@ -43,4 +43,9 @@ test_expect_success 'fetch through proxy works' '
test_cmp expect actual
'
test_expect_success 'funny hostnames are rejected before running proxy' '
test_must_fail git fetch git://-remote/repo.git 2>stderr &&
! grep "proxying for" stderr
'
test_done

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@ -11,4 +11,27 @@ test_expect_success 'setup repository to clone' '
test_proto "file://" file "file://$PWD"
test_proto "path" file .
test_expect_success 'setup repo with dash' '
git init --bare repo.git &&
git push repo.git HEAD &&
mv repo.git "$PWD/-repo.git"
'
# This will fail even without our rejection because upload-pack will
# complain about the bogus option. So let's make sure that GIT_TRACE
# doesn't show us even running upload-pack.
#
# We must also be sure to use "fetch" and not "clone" here, as the latter
# actually canonicalizes our input into an absolute path (which is fine
# to allow).
test_expect_success 'repo names starting with dash are rejected' '
rm -f trace.out &&
test_must_fail env GIT_TRACE="$PWD/trace.out" git fetch -- -repo.git &&
! grep upload-pack trace.out
'
test_expect_success 'full paths still work' '
git fetch "$PWD/-repo.git"
'
test_done

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@ -17,4 +17,27 @@ test_proto "host:path" ssh "remote:repo.git"
test_proto "ssh://" ssh "ssh://remote$PWD/remote/repo.git"
test_proto "git+ssh://" ssh "git+ssh://remote$PWD/remote/repo.git"
# Don't even bother setting up a "-remote" directory, as ssh would generally
# complain about the bogus option rather than completing our request. Our
# fake wrapper actually _can_ handle this case, but it's more robust to
# simply confirm from its output that it did not run at all.
test_expect_success 'hostnames starting with dash are rejected' '
test_must_fail git clone ssh://-remote/repo.git dash-host 2>stderr &&
! grep ^ssh: stderr
'
test_expect_success 'setup repo with dash' '
git init --bare remote/-repo.git &&
git push remote/-repo.git HEAD
'
test_expect_success 'repo names starting with dash are rejected' '
test_must_fail git clone remote:-repo.git dash-path 2>stderr &&
! grep ^ssh: stderr
'
test_expect_success 'full paths still work' '
git clone "remote:$PWD/remote/-repo.git" dash-path
'
test_done