doc hash-function-transition: clarify what SHAttered means
Attempt to clarify what the SHAttered attack means in practice for Git. The previous version of the text made no mention whatsoever of Git already having a mitigation for this specific attack, which the SHAttered researchers claim will detect cryptanalytic collision attacks. I may have gotten some of the nuances wrong, but as far as I know this new text accurately summarizes the current situation with SHA-1 in git. I.e. git doesn't really use SHA-1 anymore, it uses Hardened-SHA-1 (they just so happen to produce the same outputs 99.99999999999...% of the time). Thus the previous text was incorrect in asserting that: [...]As a result [of SHAttered], SHA-1 cannot be considered cryptographically secure any more[...] That's not the case. We have a mitigation against SHAttered, *however* we consider it prudent to move to work towards a NewHash should future vulnerabilities in either SHA-1 or Hardened-SHA-1 emerge. Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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@ -28,11 +28,30 @@ advantages:
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address stored content.
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Over time some flaws in SHA-1 have been discovered by security
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researchers. https://shattered.io demonstrated a practical SHA-1 hash
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collision. As a result, SHA-1 cannot be considered cryptographically
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secure any more. This impacts the communication of hash values because
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we cannot trust that a given hash value represents the known good
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version of content that the speaker intended.
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researchers. On 23 February 2017 the SHAttered attack
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(https://shattered.io) demonstrated a practical SHA-1 hash collision.
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Git v2.13.0 and later subsequently moved to a hardened SHA-1
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implementation by default, which isn't vulnerable to the SHAttered
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attack.
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Thus Git has in effect already migrated to a new hash that isn't SHA-1
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and doesn't share its vulnerabilities, its new hash function just
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happens to produce exactly the same output for all known inputs,
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except two PDFs published by the SHAttered researchers, and the new
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implementation (written by those researchers) claims to detect future
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cryptanalytic collision attacks.
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Regardless, it's considered prudent to move past any variant of SHA-1
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to a new hash. There's no guarantee that future attacks on SHA-1 won't
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be published in the future, and those attacks may not have viable
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mitigations.
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If SHA-1 and its variants were to be truly broken, Git's hash function
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could not be considered cryptographically secure any more. This would
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impact the communication of hash values because we could not trust
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that a given hash value represented the known good version of content
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that the speaker intended.
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SHA-1 still possesses the other properties such as fast object lookup
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and safe error checking, but other hash functions are equally suitable
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