config doc: elaborate on fetch.fsckObjects security

Change the transfer.fsckObjects documentation to explicitly note the
unique security and/or corruption issues fetch.fsckObjects suffers
from, since it doesn't have a quarantine environment.

This was already alluded to in the existing documentation, but let's
spell it out so there's no confusion here, and give a concrete example
of how to work around this limitation.

Let's also prominently note that this is considered to be a limitation
of the current implementation, rather than something that's intended
and by design, since we might change this in the future.

See
https://public-inbox.org/git/20180531060259.GE17344@sigill.intra.peff.net/
for further details.

Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
This commit is contained in:
Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason 2018-07-27 14:37:15 +00:00 committed by Junio C Hamano
parent 456bab87b2
commit 720dae5a19

View File

@ -3408,6 +3408,27 @@ On the receiving side, failing fsckObjects will make those objects
unreachable, see "QUARANTINE ENVIRONMENT" in unreachable, see "QUARANTINE ENVIRONMENT" in
linkgit:git-receive-pack[1]. On the fetch side, malformed objects will linkgit:git-receive-pack[1]. On the fetch side, malformed objects will
instead be left unreferenced in the repository. instead be left unreferenced in the repository.
+
Due to the non-quarantine nature of the `fetch.fsckObjects`
implementation it can not be relied upon to leave the object store
clean like `receive.fsckObjects` can.
+
As objects are unpacked they're written to the object store, so there
can be cases where malicious objects get introduced even though the
"fetch" failed, only to have a subsequent "fetch" succeed because only
new incoming objects are checked, not those that have already been
written to the object store. That difference in behavior should not be
relied upon. In the future, such objects may be quarantined for
"fetch" as well.
+
For now, the paranoid need to find some way to emulate the quarantine
environment if they'd like the same protection as "push". E.g. in the
case of an internal mirror do the mirroring in two steps, one to fetch
the untrusted objects, and then do a second "push" (which will use the
quarantine) to another internal repo, and have internal clients
consume this pushed-to repository, or embargo internal fetches and
only allow them once a full "fsck" has run (and no new fetches have
happened in the meantime).
transfer.hideRefs:: transfer.hideRefs::
String(s) `receive-pack` and `upload-pack` use to decide which String(s) `receive-pack` and `upload-pack` use to decide which