config doc: elaborate on fetch.fsckObjects security
Change the transfer.fsckObjects documentation to explicitly note the unique security and/or corruption issues fetch.fsckObjects suffers from, since it doesn't have a quarantine environment. This was already alluded to in the existing documentation, but let's spell it out so there's no confusion here, and give a concrete example of how to work around this limitation. Let's also prominently note that this is considered to be a limitation of the current implementation, rather than something that's intended and by design, since we might change this in the future. See https://public-inbox.org/git/20180531060259.GE17344@sigill.intra.peff.net/ for further details. Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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@ -3408,6 +3408,27 @@ On the receiving side, failing fsckObjects will make those objects
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unreachable, see "QUARANTINE ENVIRONMENT" in
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unreachable, see "QUARANTINE ENVIRONMENT" in
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linkgit:git-receive-pack[1]. On the fetch side, malformed objects will
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linkgit:git-receive-pack[1]. On the fetch side, malformed objects will
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instead be left unreferenced in the repository.
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instead be left unreferenced in the repository.
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Due to the non-quarantine nature of the `fetch.fsckObjects`
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implementation it can not be relied upon to leave the object store
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clean like `receive.fsckObjects` can.
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+
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As objects are unpacked they're written to the object store, so there
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can be cases where malicious objects get introduced even though the
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"fetch" failed, only to have a subsequent "fetch" succeed because only
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new incoming objects are checked, not those that have already been
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written to the object store. That difference in behavior should not be
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relied upon. In the future, such objects may be quarantined for
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"fetch" as well.
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+
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For now, the paranoid need to find some way to emulate the quarantine
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environment if they'd like the same protection as "push". E.g. in the
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case of an internal mirror do the mirroring in two steps, one to fetch
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the untrusted objects, and then do a second "push" (which will use the
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quarantine) to another internal repo, and have internal clients
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consume this pushed-to repository, or embargo internal fetches and
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only allow them once a full "fsck" has run (and no new fetches have
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happened in the meantime).
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transfer.hideRefs::
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transfer.hideRefs::
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String(s) `receive-pack` and `upload-pack` use to decide which
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String(s) `receive-pack` and `upload-pack` use to decide which
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