From 58325b93c5b6212697b088371809e9948fee8052 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Taylor Blau Date: Tue, 24 Jan 2023 19:43:45 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 1/8] t5619: demonstrate clone_local() with ambiguous transport When cloning a repository, Git must determine (a) what transport mechanism to use, and (b) whether or not the clone is local. Since f38aa83f9a (use local cloning if insteadOf makes a local URL, 2014-07-17), the latter check happens after the remote has been initialized, and references the remote's URL instead of the local path. This is done to make it possible for a `url..insteadOf` rule to convert a remote URL into a local one, in which case the `clone_local()` mechanism should be used. However, with a specially crafted repository, Git can be tricked into using a non-local transport while still setting `is_local` to "1" and using the `clone_local()` optimization. The below test case demonstrates such an instance, and shows that it can be used to include arbitrary (known) paths in the working copy of a cloned repository on a victim's machine[^1], even if local file clones are forbidden by `protocol.file.allow`. This happens in a few parts: 1. We first call `get_repo_path()` to see if the remote is a local path. If it is, we replace the repo name with its absolute path. 2. We then call `transport_get()` on the repo name and decide how to access it. If it was turned into an absolute path in the previous step, then we should always treat it like a file. 3. We use `get_repo_path()` again, and set `is_local` as appropriate. But it's already too late to rewrite the repo name as an absolute path, since we've already fed it to the transport code. The attack works by including a submodule whose URL corresponds to a path on disk. In the below example, the repository "sub" is reachable via the dumb HTTP protocol at (something like): http://127.0.0.1:NNNN/dumb/sub.git However, the path "http:/127.0.0.1:NNNN/dumb" (that is, a top-level directory called "http:", then nested directories "127.0.0.1:NNNN", and "dumb") exists within the repository, too. To determine this, it first picks the appropriate transport, which is dumb HTTP. It then uses the remote's URL in order to determine whether the repository exists locally on disk. However, the malicious repository also contains an embedded stub repository which is the target of a symbolic link at the local path corresponding to the "sub" repository on disk (i.e., there is a symbolic link at "http:/127.0.0.1/dumb/sub.git", pointing to the stub repository via ".git/modules/sub/../../../repo"). This stub repository fools Git into thinking that a local repository exists at that URL and thus can be cloned locally. The affected call is in `get_repo_path()`, which in turn calls `get_repo_path_1()`, which locates a valid repository at that target. This then causes Git to set the `is_local` variable to "1", and in turn instructs Git to clone the repository using its local clone optimization via the `clone_local()` function. The exploit comes into play because the stub repository's top-level "$GIT_DIR/objects" directory is a symbolic link which can point to an arbitrary path on the victim's machine. `clone_local()` resolves the top-level "objects" directory through a `stat(2)` call, meaning that we read through the symbolic link and copy or hardlink the directory contents at the destination of the link. In other words, we can get steps (1) and (3) to disagree by leveraging the dangling symlink to pick a non-local transport in the first step, and then set is_local to "1" in the third step when cloning with `--separate-git-dir`, which makes the symlink non-dangling. This can result in data-exfiltration on the victim's machine when sensitive data is at a known path (e.g., "/home/$USER/.ssh"). The appropriate fix is two-fold: - Resolve the transport later on (to avoid using the local clone optimization with a non-local transport). - Avoid reading through the top-level "objects" directory when (correctly) using the clone_local() optimization. This patch merely demonstrates the issue. The following two patches will implement each part of the above fix, respectively. [^1]: Provided that any target directory does not contain symbolic links, in which case the changes from 6f054f9fb3 (builtin/clone.c: disallow `--local` clones with symlinks, 2022-07-28) will abort the clone. Reported-by: yvvdwf Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano --- t/t5619-clone-local-ambiguous-transport.sh | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 63 insertions(+) create mode 100755 t/t5619-clone-local-ambiguous-transport.sh diff --git a/t/t5619-clone-local-ambiguous-transport.sh b/t/t5619-clone-local-ambiguous-transport.sh new file mode 100755 index 0000000000..7ebd31a150 --- /dev/null +++ b/t/t5619-clone-local-ambiguous-transport.sh @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +#!/bin/sh + +test_description='test local clone with ambiguous transport' + +. ./test-lib.sh +. "$TEST_DIRECTORY/lib-httpd.sh" + +if ! test_have_prereq SYMLINKS +then + skip_all='skipping test, symlink support unavailable' + test_done +fi + +start_httpd + +REPO="$HTTPD_DOCUMENT_ROOT_PATH/sub.git" +URI="$HTTPD_URL/dumb/sub.git" + +test_expect_success 'setup' ' + mkdir -p sensitive && + echo "secret" >sensitive/secret && + + git init --bare "$REPO" && + test_commit_bulk -C "$REPO" --ref=main 1 && + + git -C "$REPO" update-ref HEAD main && + git -C "$REPO" update-server-info && + + git init malicious && + ( + cd malicious && + + git submodule add "$URI" && + + mkdir -p repo/refs && + touch repo/refs/.gitkeep && + printf "ref: refs/heads/a" >repo/HEAD && + ln -s "$(cd .. && pwd)/sensitive" repo/objects && + + mkdir -p "$HTTPD_URL/dumb" && + ln -s "../../../.git/modules/sub/../../../repo/" "$URI" && + + git add . && + git commit -m "initial commit" + ) && + + # Delete all of the references in our malicious submodule to + # avoid the client attempting to checkout any objects (which + # will be missing, and thus will cause the clone to fail before + # we can trigger the exploit). + git -C "$REPO" for-each-ref --format="delete %(refname)" >in && + git -C "$REPO" update-ref --stdin Date: Tue, 24 Jan 2023 19:43:48 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 2/8] clone: delay picking a transport until after get_repo_path() In the previous commit, t5619 demonstrates an issue where two calls to `get_repo_path()` could trick Git into using its local clone mechanism in conjunction with a non-local transport. That sequence is: - the starting state is that the local path https:/example.com/foo is a symlink that points to ../../../.git/modules/foo. So it's dangling. - get_repo_path() sees that no such path exists (because it's dangling), and thus we do not canonicalize it into an absolute path - because we're using --separate-git-dir, we create .git/modules/foo. Now our symlink is no longer dangling! - we pass the url to transport_get(), which sees it as an https URL. - we call get_repo_path() again, on the url. This second call was introduced by f38aa83f9a (use local cloning if insteadOf makes a local URL, 2014-07-17). The idea is that we want to pull the url fresh from the remote.c API, because it will apply any aliases. And of course now it sees that there is a local file, which is a mismatch with the transport we already selected. The issue in the above sequence is calling `transport_get()` before deciding whether or not the repository is indeed local, and not passing in an absolute path if it is local. This is reminiscent of a similar bug report in [1], where it was suggested to perform the `insteadOf` lookup earlier. Taking that approach may not be as straightforward, since the intent is to store the original URL in the config, but to actually fetch from the insteadOf one, so conflating the two early on is a non-starter. Note: we pass the path returned by `get_repo_path(remote->url[0])`, which should be the same as `repo_name` (aside from any `insteadOf` rewrites). We *could* pass `absolute_pathdup()` of the same argument, which 86521acaca (Bring local clone's origin URL in line with that of a remote clone, 2008-09-01) indicates may differ depending on the presence of ".git/" for a non-bare repo. That matters for forming relative submodule paths, but doesn't matter for the second call, since we're just feeding it to the transport code, which is fine either way. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/git/CAMoD=Bi41mB3QRn3JdZL-FGHs4w3C2jGpnJB-CqSndO7FMtfzA@mail.gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Jeff King Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano --- builtin/clone.c | 8 ++++---- t/t5619-clone-local-ambiguous-transport.sh | 13 ++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/builtin/clone.c b/builtin/clone.c index e626073b1f..c042b2e256 100644 --- a/builtin/clone.c +++ b/builtin/clone.c @@ -1201,10 +1201,6 @@ int cmd_clone(int argc, const char **argv, const char *prefix) refspec_appendf(&remote->fetch, "+%s*:%s*", src_ref_prefix, branch_top.buf); - transport = transport_get(remote, remote->url[0]); - transport_set_verbosity(transport, option_verbosity, option_progress); - transport->family = family; - path = get_repo_path(remote->url[0], &is_bundle); is_local = option_local != 0 && path && !is_bundle; if (is_local) { @@ -1224,6 +1220,10 @@ int cmd_clone(int argc, const char **argv, const char *prefix) } if (option_local > 0 && !is_local) warning(_("--local is ignored")); + + transport = transport_get(remote, path ? path : remote->url[0]); + transport_set_verbosity(transport, option_verbosity, option_progress); + transport->family = family; transport->cloning = 1; transport_set_option(transport, TRANS_OPT_KEEP, "yes"); diff --git a/t/t5619-clone-local-ambiguous-transport.sh b/t/t5619-clone-local-ambiguous-transport.sh index 7ebd31a150..cce62bf78d 100755 --- a/t/t5619-clone-local-ambiguous-transport.sh +++ b/t/t5619-clone-local-ambiguous-transport.sh @@ -53,11 +53,18 @@ test_expect_success 'setup' ' git -C "$REPO" update-server-info ' -test_expect_failure 'ambiguous transport does not lead to arbitrary file-inclusion' ' +test_expect_success 'ambiguous transport does not lead to arbitrary file-inclusion' ' git clone malicious clone && - git -C clone submodule update --init && + test_must_fail git -C clone submodule update --init 2>err && - test_path_is_missing clone/.git/modules/sub/objects/secret + test_path_is_missing clone/.git/modules/sub/objects/secret && + # We would actually expect "transport .file. not allowed" here, + # but due to quirks of the URL detection in Git, we mis-parse + # the absolute path as a bogus URL and die before that step. + # + # This works for now, and if we ever fix the URL detection, it + # is OK to change this to detect the transport error. + grep "protocol .* is not supported" err ' test_done From bffc762f87ae8d18c6001bf0044a76004245754c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Taylor Blau Date: Tue, 24 Jan 2023 19:43:51 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 3/8] dir-iterator: prevent top-level symlinks without FOLLOW_SYMLINKS When using the dir_iterator API, we first stat(2) the base path, and then use that as a starting point to enumerate the directory's contents. If the directory contains symbolic links, we will immediately die() upon encountering them without the `FOLLOW_SYMLINKS` flag. The same is not true when resolving the top-level directory, though. As explained in a previous commit, this oversight in 6f054f9fb3 (builtin/clone.c: disallow `--local` clones with symlinks, 2022-07-28) can be used as an attack vector to include arbitrary files on a victim's filesystem from outside of the repository. Prevent resolving top-level symlinks unless the FOLLOW_SYMLINKS flag is given, which will cause clones of a repository with a symlink'd "$GIT_DIR/objects" directory to fail. Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano --- dir-iterator.c | 13 +++++++++---- dir-iterator.h | 5 +++++ t/t0066-dir-iterator.sh | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++- t/t5604-clone-reference.sh | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/dir-iterator.c b/dir-iterator.c index b17e9f970a..3764dd81a1 100644 --- a/dir-iterator.c +++ b/dir-iterator.c @@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ struct dir_iterator *dir_iterator_begin(const char *path, unsigned int flags) { struct dir_iterator_int *iter = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*iter)); struct dir_iterator *dir_iterator = &iter->base; - int saved_errno; + int saved_errno, err; strbuf_init(&iter->base.path, PATH_MAX); strbuf_addstr(&iter->base.path, path); @@ -213,10 +213,15 @@ struct dir_iterator *dir_iterator_begin(const char *path, unsigned int flags) iter->flags = flags; /* - * Note: stat already checks for NULL or empty strings and - * inexistent paths. + * Note: stat/lstat already checks for NULL or empty strings and + * nonexistent paths. */ - if (stat(iter->base.path.buf, &iter->base.st) < 0) { + if (iter->flags & DIR_ITERATOR_FOLLOW_SYMLINKS) + err = stat(iter->base.path.buf, &iter->base.st); + else + err = lstat(iter->base.path.buf, &iter->base.st); + + if (err < 0) { saved_errno = errno; goto error_out; } diff --git a/dir-iterator.h b/dir-iterator.h index 08229157c6..e3b6ff2800 100644 --- a/dir-iterator.h +++ b/dir-iterator.h @@ -61,6 +61,11 @@ * not the symlinks themselves, which is the default behavior. Broken * symlinks are ignored. * + * Note: setting DIR_ITERATOR_FOLLOW_SYMLINKS affects resolving the + * starting path as well (e.g., attempting to iterate starting at a + * symbolic link pointing to a directory without FOLLOW_SYMLINKS will + * result in an error). + * * Warning: circular symlinks are also followed when * DIR_ITERATOR_FOLLOW_SYMLINKS is set. The iteration may end up with * an ELOOP if they happen and DIR_ITERATOR_PEDANTIC is set. diff --git a/t/t0066-dir-iterator.sh b/t/t0066-dir-iterator.sh index 92910e4e6c..c826f60f6d 100755 --- a/t/t0066-dir-iterator.sh +++ b/t/t0066-dir-iterator.sh @@ -109,7 +109,9 @@ test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'setup dirs with symlinks' ' mkdir -p dir5/a/c && ln -s ../c dir5/a/b/d && ln -s ../ dir5/a/b/e && - ln -s ../../ dir5/a/b/f + ln -s ../../ dir5/a/b/f && + + ln -s dir4 dir6 ' test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'dir-iterator should not follow symlinks by default' ' @@ -145,4 +147,27 @@ test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'dir-iterator should follow symlinks w/ follow flag test_cmp expected-follow-sorted-output actual-follow-sorted-output ' +test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'dir-iterator does not resolve top-level symlinks' ' + test_must_fail test-tool dir-iterator ./dir6 >out && + + grep "ENOTDIR" out +' + +test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'dir-iterator resolves top-level symlinks w/ follow flag' ' + cat >expected-follow-sorted-output <<-EOF && + [d] (a) [a] ./dir6/a + [d] (a/f) [f] ./dir6/a/f + [d] (a/f/c) [c] ./dir6/a/f/c + [d] (b) [b] ./dir6/b + [d] (b/c) [c] ./dir6/b/c + [f] (a/d) [d] ./dir6/a/d + [f] (a/e) [e] ./dir6/a/e + EOF + + test-tool dir-iterator --follow-symlinks ./dir6 >out && + sort out >actual-follow-sorted-output && + + test_cmp expected-follow-sorted-output actual-follow-sorted-output +' + test_done diff --git a/t/t5604-clone-reference.sh b/t/t5604-clone-reference.sh index 9d32f1c4a4..4ff21d7ccf 100755 --- a/t/t5604-clone-reference.sh +++ b/t/t5604-clone-reference.sh @@ -341,4 +341,20 @@ test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'clone repo with symlinked or unknown files at obje test_must_be_empty T--shared.objects-symlinks.raw ' +test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'clone repo with symlinked objects directory' ' + test_when_finished "rm -fr sensitive malicious" && + + mkdir -p sensitive && + echo "secret" >sensitive/file && + + git init malicious && + rm -fr malicious/.git/objects && + ln -s "$(pwd)/sensitive" ./malicious/.git/objects && + + test_must_fail git clone --local malicious clone 2>err && + + test_path_is_missing clone && + grep "failed to start iterator over" err +' + test_done From fade728df1221598f42d391cf377e9e84a32053f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Patrick Steinhardt Date: Thu, 2 Feb 2023 11:54:34 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 4/8] apply: fix writing behind newly created symbolic links When writing files git-apply(1) initially makes sure that none of the files it is about to create are behind a symlink: ``` $ git init repo Initialized empty Git repository in /tmp/repo/.git/ $ cd repo/ $ ln -s dir symlink $ git apply - < Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano --- apply.c | 27 ++++++++++++++ t/t4115-apply-symlink.sh | 81 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 108 insertions(+) diff --git a/apply.c b/apply.c index 668b16e989..d80382c940 100644 --- a/apply.c +++ b/apply.c @@ -4400,6 +4400,33 @@ static int create_one_file(struct apply_state *state, if (state->cached) return 0; + /* + * We already try to detect whether files are beyond a symlink in our + * up-front checks. But in the case where symlinks are created by any + * of the intermediate hunks it can happen that our up-front checks + * didn't yet see the symlink, but at the point of arriving here there + * in fact is one. We thus repeat the check for symlinks here. + * + * Note that this does not make the up-front check obsolete as the + * failure mode is different: + * + * - The up-front checks cause us to abort before we have written + * anything into the working directory. So when we exit this way the + * working directory remains clean. + * + * - The checks here happen in the middle of the action where we have + * already started to apply the patch. The end result will be a dirty + * working directory. + * + * Ideally, we should update the up-front checks to catch what would + * happen when we apply the patch before we damage the working tree. + * We have all the information necessary to do so. But for now, as a + * part of embargoed security work, having this check would serve as a + * reasonable first step. + */ + if (path_is_beyond_symlink(state, path)) + return error(_("affected file '%s' is beyond a symbolic link"), path); + res = try_create_file(state, path, mode, buf, size); if (res < 0) return -1; diff --git a/t/t4115-apply-symlink.sh b/t/t4115-apply-symlink.sh index 872fcda6cb..1acb7b2582 100755 --- a/t/t4115-apply-symlink.sh +++ b/t/t4115-apply-symlink.sh @@ -44,4 +44,85 @@ test_expect_success 'apply --index symlink patch' ' ' +test_expect_success 'symlink setup' ' + ln -s .git symlink && + git add symlink && + git commit -m "add symlink" +' + +test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'symlink escape when creating new files' ' + test_when_finished "git reset --hard && git clean -dfx" && + + cat >patch <<-EOF && + diff --git a/symlink b/renamed-symlink + similarity index 100% + rename from symlink + rename to renamed-symlink + -- + diff --git /dev/null b/renamed-symlink/create-me + new file mode 100644 + index 0000000..039727e + --- /dev/null + +++ b/renamed-symlink/create-me + @@ -0,0 +1,1 @@ + +busted + EOF + + test_must_fail git apply patch 2>stderr && + cat >expected_stderr <<-EOF && + error: affected file ${SQ}renamed-symlink/create-me${SQ} is beyond a symbolic link + EOF + test_cmp expected_stderr stderr && + ! test_path_exists .git/create-me +' + +test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'symlink escape when modifying file' ' + test_when_finished "git reset --hard && git clean -dfx" && + touch .git/modify-me && + + cat >patch <<-EOF && + diff --git a/symlink b/renamed-symlink + similarity index 100% + rename from symlink + rename to renamed-symlink + -- + diff --git a/renamed-symlink/modify-me b/renamed-symlink/modify-me + index 1111111..2222222 100644 + --- a/renamed-symlink/modify-me + +++ b/renamed-symlink/modify-me + @@ -0,0 +1,1 @@ + +busted + EOF + + test_must_fail git apply patch 2>stderr && + cat >expected_stderr <<-EOF && + error: renamed-symlink/modify-me: No such file or directory + EOF + test_cmp expected_stderr stderr && + test_must_be_empty .git/modify-me +' + +test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'symlink escape when deleting file' ' + test_when_finished "git reset --hard && git clean -dfx && rm .git/delete-me" && + touch .git/delete-me && + + cat >patch <<-EOF && + diff --git a/symlink b/renamed-symlink + similarity index 100% + rename from symlink + rename to renamed-symlink + -- + diff --git a/renamed-symlink/delete-me b/renamed-symlink/delete-me + deleted file mode 100644 + index 1111111..0000000 100644 + EOF + + test_must_fail git apply patch 2>stderr && + cat >expected_stderr <<-EOF && + error: renamed-symlink/delete-me: No such file or directory + EOF + test_cmp expected_stderr stderr && + test_path_is_file .git/delete-me +' + test_done From 394a759d2b5f0a1a1908c820cf142f45cb78718c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Junio C Hamano Date: Fri, 3 Feb 2023 14:58:10 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 5/8] Git 2.30.8 Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano --- Documentation/RelNotes/2.30.8.txt | 52 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ GIT-VERSION-GEN | 2 +- RelNotes | 2 +- 3 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/RelNotes/2.30.8.txt diff --git a/Documentation/RelNotes/2.30.8.txt b/Documentation/RelNotes/2.30.8.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..38c23e0345 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/RelNotes/2.30.8.txt @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +Git v2.30.8 Release Notes +========================= + +This release addresses the security issues CVE-2023-22490 and +CVE-2023-23946. + + +Fixes since v2.30.7 +------------------- + + * CVE-2023-22490: + + Using a specially-crafted repository, Git can be tricked into using + its local clone optimization even when using a non-local transport. + Though Git will abort local clones whose source $GIT_DIR/objects + directory contains symbolic links (c.f., CVE-2022-39253), the objects + directory itself may still be a symbolic link. + + These two may be combined to include arbitrary files based on known + paths on the victim's filesystem within the malicious repository's + working copy, allowing for data exfiltration in a similar manner as + CVE-2022-39253. + + * CVE-2023-23946: + + By feeding a crafted input to "git apply", a path outside the + working tree can be overwritten as the user who is running "git + apply". + + * A mismatched type in `attr.c::read_attr_from_index()` which could + cause Git to errantly reject attributes on Windows and 32-bit Linux + has been corrected. + +Credit for finding CVE-2023-22490 goes to yvvdwf, and the fix was +developed by Taylor Blau, with additional help from others on the +Git security mailing list. + +Credit for finding CVE-2023-23946 goes to Joern Schneeweisz, and the +fix was developed by Patrick Steinhardt. + + +Johannes Schindelin (1): + attr: adjust a mismatched data type + +Patrick Steinhardt (1): + apply: fix writing behind newly created symbolic links + +Taylor Blau (3): + t5619: demonstrate clone_local() with ambiguous transport + clone: delay picking a transport until after get_repo_path() + dir-iterator: prevent top-level symlinks without FOLLOW_SYMLINKS + diff --git a/GIT-VERSION-GEN b/GIT-VERSION-GEN index 9ab3517e29..2a52946afc 100755 --- a/GIT-VERSION-GEN +++ b/GIT-VERSION-GEN @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ #!/bin/sh GVF=GIT-VERSION-FILE -DEF_VER=v2.30.7 +DEF_VER=v2.30.8 LF=' ' diff --git a/RelNotes b/RelNotes index 253d84ff9d..9f25ba7139 120000 --- a/RelNotes +++ b/RelNotes @@ -1 +1 @@ -Documentation/RelNotes/2.30.7.txt \ No newline at end of file +Documentation/RelNotes/2.30.8.txt \ No newline at end of file From 0bbcf951943eefbbfee2a7e08b7150bef5b60562 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johannes Schindelin Date: Mon, 6 Feb 2023 09:24:07 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 6/8] Git 2.31.7 Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin --- Documentation/RelNotes/2.31.7.txt | 6 ++++++ GIT-VERSION-GEN | 2 +- RelNotes | 2 +- 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/RelNotes/2.31.7.txt diff --git a/Documentation/RelNotes/2.31.7.txt b/Documentation/RelNotes/2.31.7.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..dd44d5bc62 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/RelNotes/2.31.7.txt @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +Git v2.31.7 Release Notes +========================= + +This release merges up the fixes that appear in v2.30.8 to +address the security issues CVE-2023-22490 and CVE-2023-23946; +see the release notes for that version for details. diff --git a/GIT-VERSION-GEN b/GIT-VERSION-GEN index 7e159104b2..c2fe910925 100755 --- a/GIT-VERSION-GEN +++ b/GIT-VERSION-GEN @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ #!/bin/sh GVF=GIT-VERSION-FILE -DEF_VER=v2.31.6 +DEF_VER=v2.31.7 LF=' ' diff --git a/RelNotes b/RelNotes index e25264ca35..139721637d 120000 --- a/RelNotes +++ b/RelNotes @@ -1 +1 @@ -Documentation/RelNotes/2.31.6.txt \ No newline at end of file +Documentation/RelNotes/2.31.7.txt \ No newline at end of file From 2aedeff35fde779b03b57125b1f50f6c528bfbea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johannes Schindelin Date: Mon, 6 Feb 2023 09:25:09 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 7/8] Git 2.32.6 Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin --- Documentation/RelNotes/2.32.6.txt | 6 ++++++ GIT-VERSION-GEN | 2 +- RelNotes | 2 +- 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/RelNotes/2.32.6.txt diff --git a/Documentation/RelNotes/2.32.6.txt b/Documentation/RelNotes/2.32.6.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fd659612e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/RelNotes/2.32.6.txt @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +Git v2.32.6 Release Notes +========================= + +This release merges up the fixes that appear in v2.30.8 and v2.31.7 +to address the security issues CVE-2023-22490 and CVE-2023-23946; +see the release notes for these versions for details. diff --git a/GIT-VERSION-GEN b/GIT-VERSION-GEN index 3d2538de85..b989f81d5e 100755 --- a/GIT-VERSION-GEN +++ b/GIT-VERSION-GEN @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ #!/bin/sh GVF=GIT-VERSION-FILE -DEF_VER=v2.32.5 +DEF_VER=v2.32.6 LF=' ' diff --git a/RelNotes b/RelNotes index e60115fd82..a9cfb103cc 120000 --- a/RelNotes +++ b/RelNotes @@ -1 +1 @@ -Documentation/RelNotes/2.32.5.txt \ No newline at end of file +Documentation/RelNotes/2.32.6.txt \ No newline at end of file From ed4404af3c936d87ac2c6ff12cc3da495511bec9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johannes Schindelin Date: Mon, 6 Feb 2023 09:25:58 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 8/8] Git 2.33.7 Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin --- Documentation/RelNotes/2.33.7.txt | 7 +++++++ GIT-VERSION-GEN | 2 +- RelNotes | 2 +- 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/RelNotes/2.33.7.txt diff --git a/Documentation/RelNotes/2.33.7.txt b/Documentation/RelNotes/2.33.7.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..078a837cb4 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/RelNotes/2.33.7.txt @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +Git v2.33.7 Release Notes +========================= + +This release merges up the fixes that appear in v2.30.8, v2.31.7 +and v2.32.6 to address the security issues CVE-2023-22490 and +CVE-2023-23946; see the release notes for these versions for +details. diff --git a/GIT-VERSION-GEN b/GIT-VERSION-GEN index 08677a66f5..19d4d618cf 100755 --- a/GIT-VERSION-GEN +++ b/GIT-VERSION-GEN @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ #!/bin/sh GVF=GIT-VERSION-FILE -DEF_VER=v2.33.6 +DEF_VER=v2.33.7 LF=' ' diff --git a/RelNotes b/RelNotes index f0458d7556..f89efbeae6 120000 --- a/RelNotes +++ b/RelNotes @@ -1 +1 @@ -Documentation/RelNotes/2.33.6.txt \ No newline at end of file +Documentation/RelNotes/2.33.7.txt \ No newline at end of file