undef/git-commit-vandalism
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

daemon: further tweaks.

Browse Source 
- Do validation only on canonicalized paths
 - Run upload-pack with "." as repository argument

Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
This commit is contained in:
Junio C Hamano 2005-11-21 01:21:18 -08:00
parent 4dbd135279
commit ce335fe04f
2 changed files with 14 additions and 18 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

4
Documentation/git-daemon.txt
View File

@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ git-daemon - A really simple server for git repositories.
SYNOPSIS
--------
'git-daemon' [--verbose] [--syslog] [--inetd | --port=n] [--export-all]
[--timeout=n] [--init-timeout=n] [directory...]
[--timeout=n] [--init-timeout=n] [--strict-paths] [directory...]
DESCRIPTION
-----------
@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ This is ideally suited for read-only updates, ie pulling from git repositories.
OPTIONS
-------
+--strict-paths::
--strict-paths::
Match paths exactly (i.e. don't allow "/foo/repo" when the real path is
"/foo/repo.git" or "/foo/repo/.git") and don't do user-relative paths.
git-daemon will refuse to start when this option is enabled and no

28
daemon.c
View File

@ -92,25 +92,21 @@ static char *path_ok(char *dir)
}
if ( ok_paths && *ok_paths ) {
char **pp = NULL;
int dirlen = strlen(dir);
char **pp;
int pathlen = strlen(path);
/* The validation is done on the paths after enter_repo
* canonicalization, so whitelist should be written in
* terms of real pathnames (i.e. after ~user is expanded
* and symlinks resolved).
*/
for ( pp = ok_paths ; *pp ; pp++ ) {
int len = strlen(*pp);
/* because of symlinks we must match both what the
* user passed and the canonicalized path, otherwise
* the user can send a string matching either a whitelist
* entry or an actual directory exactly and still not
* get through */
if (len <= pathlen && !memcmp(*pp, path, len)) {
if (path[len] == '\0' || (!strict_paths && path[len] == '/'))
return path;
}
if (len <= dirlen && !memcmp(*pp, dir, len)) {
if (dir[len] == '\0' || (!strict_paths && dir[len] == '/'))
return path;
}
if (len <= pathlen &&
!memcmp(*pp, path, len) &&
(path[len] == '\0' ||
(!strict_paths && path[len] == '/')))
return path;
}
}
else {
@ -160,7 +156,7 @@ static int upload(char *dir)
snprintf(timeout_buf, sizeof timeout_buf, "--timeout=%u", timeout);
/* git-upload-pack only ever reads stuff, so this is safe */
execlp("git-upload-pack", "git-upload-pack", "--strict", timeout_buf, path, NULL);
execlp("git-upload-pack", "git-upload-pack", "--strict", timeout_buf, ".", NULL);
return -1;
}