undef/git-commit-vandalism
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revised^2: git-daemon extra paranoia, and path DWIM

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This patch adds some extra paranoia to the git-daemon filename test.  In
particular, it now rejects pathnames containing //; it also adds a
redundant test for pathname absoluteness (belts and suspenders.)

A single / at the end of the path is still permitted, however, and the
.git and /.git append DWIM stuff is now handled in an integrated manner,
which means the resulting path will always be subjected to pathname checks.

[jc: backported to 0.99.8 maintenance branch]

Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
This commit is contained in:
H. Peter Anvin 2005-10-19 00:01:01 -07:00 committed by Junio C Hamano
parent 844ac7f818
commit e51fd86ab3
1 changed files with 57 additions and 21 deletions
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76
daemon.c
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@ -79,17 +79,30 @@ static int path_ok(const char *dir)
{
const char *p = dir;
char **pp;
int sl = 1, ndot = 0;
int sl, ndot;
/* The pathname here should be an absolute path. */
if ( *p++ != '/' )
return 0;
sl = 1; ndot = 0;
for (;;) {
if ( *p == '.' ) {
ndot++;
} else if ( *p == '/' || *p == '\0' ) {
} else if ( *p == '\0' ) {
/* Reject "." and ".." at the end of the path */
if ( sl && ndot > 0 && ndot < 3 )
return 0; /* . or .. in path */
return 0;
/* Otherwise OK */
break;
} else if ( *p == '/' ) {
/* Refuse "", "." or ".." */
if ( sl && ndot < 3 )
return 0;
sl = 1;
if ( *p == '\0' )
break; /* End of string and all is good */
ndot = 0;
} else {
sl = ndot = 0;
}
@ -98,7 +111,7 @@ static int path_ok(const char *dir)
if ( ok_paths && *ok_paths ) {
int ok = 0;
int dirlen = strlen(dir); /* read_packet_line can return embedded \0 */
int dirlen = strlen(dir);
for ( pp = ok_paths ; *pp ; pp++ ) {
int len = strlen(*pp);
@ -117,21 +130,15 @@ static int path_ok(const char *dir)
return 1; /* Path acceptable */
}
static int upload(char *dir, int dirlen)
static int set_dir(const char *dir)
{
loginfo("Request for '%s'", dir);
if (!path_ok(dir)) {
logerror("Forbidden directory: %s\n", dir);
errno = EACCES;
return -1;
}
if (chdir(dir) < 0) {
logerror("Cannot chdir('%s'): %s", dir, strerror(errno));
if ( chdir(dir) )
return -1;
}
chdir(".git");
/*
* Security on the cheap.
@ -140,10 +147,39 @@ static int upload(char *dir, int dirlen)
* a "git-daemon-export-ok" flag that says that the other side
* is ok with us doing this.
*/
if ((!export_all_trees && access("git-daemon-export-ok", F_OK)) ||
access("objects/00", X_OK) ||
access("HEAD", R_OK)) {
logerror("Not a valid git-daemon-enabled repository: '%s'", dir);
if (!export_all_trees && access("git-daemon-export-ok", F_OK)) {
errno = EACCES;
return -1;
}
if (access("objects/", X_OK) || access("HEAD", R_OK)) {
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}
/* If all this passed, we're OK */
return 0;
}
static int upload(char *dir)
{
/* Try paths in this order */
static const char *paths[] = { "%s", "%s/.git", "%s.git", "%s.git/.git", NULL };
const char **pp;
/* Enough for the longest path above including final null */
int buflen = strlen(dir)+10;
char *dirbuf = xmalloc(buflen);
loginfo("Request for '%s'", dir);
for ( pp = paths ; *pp ; pp++ ) {
snprintf(dirbuf, buflen, *pp, dir);
if ( !set_dir(dirbuf) )
break;
}
if ( !*pp ) {
logerror("Cannot set directory '%s': %s", dir, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
@ -169,7 +205,7 @@ static int execute(void)
line[--len] = 0;
if (!strncmp("git-upload-pack /", line, 17))
return upload(line + 16, len - 16);
return upload(line+16);
logerror("Protocol error: '%s'", line);
return -1;