Git config's tab completion does not yet know about the "include"
and "includeIf" sections, nor the related "path" variable.
Add a description for these two sections in
'Documentation/config/includeif.txt', which points to git-config's
documentation, specifically the "Includes" and "Conditional Includes"
subsections.
As a side effect, tab completion can successfully complete the
'include', 'includeIf', and 'include.add' expressions.
This effect is tested by two new ad-hoc tests.
Variable completion only works for "include" for now.
Credit for the ideas behind this patch goes to
Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason.
Helped-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Manuel Boni <ziosombrero@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
* maint-2.34:
Git 2.34.4
Git 2.33.4
Git 2.32.3
Git 2.31.4
Git 2.30.5
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
* maint-2.33:
Git 2.33.4
Git 2.32.3
Git 2.31.4
Git 2.30.5
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
* maint-2.32:
Git 2.32.3
Git 2.31.4
Git 2.30.5
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
* maint-2.31:
Git 2.31.4
Git 2.30.5
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
* maint-2.30:
Git 2.30.5
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
Previous changes introduced a regression which will prevent root for
accessing repositories owned by thyself if using sudo because SUDO_UID
takes precedence.
Loosen that restriction by allowing root to access repositories owned
by both uid by default and without having to add a safe.directory
exception.
A previous workaround that was documented in the tests is no longer
needed so it has been removed together with its specially crafted
prerequisite.
Helped-by: Johanness Schindelin <Johannes.Schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Add a support library that provides one function that can be used
to run a "scriplet" of commands through sudo and that helps invoking
sudo in the slightly awkward way that is required to ensure it doesn't
block the call (if shell was allowed as tested in the prerequisite)
and it doesn't run the command through a different shell than the one
we intended.
Add additional negative tests as suggested by Junio and that use a
new workspace that is owned by root.
Document a regression that was introduced by previous commits where
root won't be able anymore to access directories they own unless
SUDO_UID is removed from their environment.
The tests document additional ways that this new restriction could
be worked around and the documentation explains why it might be instead
considered a feature, but a "fix" is planned for a future change.
Helped-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Helped-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood123@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
bdc77d1d68 (Add a function to determine whether a path is owned by the
current user, 2022-03-02) checks for the effective uid of the running
process using geteuid() but didn't account for cases where that user was
root (because git was invoked through sudo or a compatible tool) and the
original uid that repository trusted for its config was no longer known,
therefore failing the following otherwise safe call:
guy@renard ~/Software/uncrustify $ sudo git describe --always --dirty
[sudo] password for guy:
fatal: unsafe repository ('/home/guy/Software/uncrustify' is owned by someone else)
Attempt to detect those cases by using the environment variables that
those tools create to keep track of the original user id, and do the
ownership check using that instead.
This assumes the environment the user is running on after going
privileged can't be tampered with, and also adds code to restrict that
the new behavior only applies if running as root, therefore keeping the
most common case, which runs unprivileged, from changing, but because of
that, it will miss cases where sudo (or an equivalent) was used to change
to another unprivileged user or where the equivalent tool used to raise
privileges didn't track the original id in a sudo compatible way.
Because of compatibility with sudo, the code assumes that uid_t is an
unsigned integer type (which is not required by the standard) but is used
that way in their codebase to generate SUDO_UID. In systems where uid_t
is signed, sudo might be also patched to NOT be unsigned and that might
be able to trigger an edge case and a bug (as described in the code), but
it is considered unlikely to happen and even if it does, the code would
just mostly fail safely, so there was no attempt either to detect it or
prevent it by the code, which is something that might change in the future,
based on expected user feedback.
Reported-by: Guy Maurel <guy.j@maurel.de>
Helped-by: SZEDER Gábor <szeder.dev@gmail.com>
Helped-by: Randall Becker <rsbecker@nexbridge.com>
Helped-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood123@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Johannes Schindelin <Johannes.Schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Originally reported after release of v2.35.2 (and other maint branches)
for CVE-2022-24765 and blocking otherwise harmless commands that were
done using sudo in a repository that was owned by the user.
Add a new test script with very basic support to allow running git
commands through sudo, so a reproduction could be implemented and that
uses only `git status` as a proxy of the issue reported.
Note that because of the way sudo interacts with the system, a much
more complete integration with the test framework will require a lot
more work and that was therefore intentionally punted for now.
The current implementation requires the execution of a special cleanup
function which should always be kept as the last "test" or otherwise
the standard cleanup functions will fail because they can't remove
the root owned directories that are used. This also means that if
failures are found while running, the specifics of the failure might
not be kept for further debugging and if the test was interrupted, it
will be necessary to clean the working directory manually before
restarting by running:
$ sudo rm -rf trash\ directory.t0034-root-safe-directory/
The test file also uses at least one initial "setup" test that creates
a parallel execution directory under the "root" sub directory, which
should be used as top level directory for all repositories that are
used in this test file. Unlike all other tests the repository provided
by the test framework should go unused.
Special care should be taken when invoking commands through sudo, since
the environment is otherwise independent from what the test framework
setup and might have changed the values for HOME, SHELL and dropped
several relevant environment variables for your test. Indeed `git status`
was used as a proxy because it doesn't even require commits in the
repository to work and usually doesn't require much from the environment
to run, but a future patch will add calls to `git init` and that will
fail to honor the default branch name, unless that setting is NOT
provided through an environment variable (which means even a CI run
could fail that test if enabled incorrectly).
A new SUDO prerequisite is provided that does some sanity checking
to make sure the sudo command that will be used allows for passwordless
execution as root without restrictions and doesn't mess with git's
execution path. This matches what is provided by the macOS agents that
are used as part of GitHub actions and probably nowhere else.
Most of those characteristics make this test mostly only suitable for
CI, but it might be executed locally if special care is taken to provide
for all of them in the local configuration and maybe making use of the
sudo credential cache by first invoking sudo, entering your password if
needed, and then invoking the test with:
$ GIT_TEST_ALLOW_SUDO=YES ./t0034-root-safe-directory.sh
If it fails to run, then it means your local setup wouldn't work for the
test because of the configuration sudo has or other system settings, and
things that might help are to comment out sudo's secure_path config, and
make sure that the account you are using has no restrictions on the
commands it can run through sudo, just like is provided for the user in
the CI.
For example (assuming a username of marta for you) something probably
similar to the following entry in your /etc/sudoers (or equivalent) file:
marta ALL=(ALL:ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL
Reported-by: SZEDER Gábor <szeder.dev@gmail.com>
Helped-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood123@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
With the addition of the safe.directory in 8959555ce
(setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level directory,
2022-03-02) released in v2.35.2, we are receiving feedback from a
variety of users about the feature.
Some users have a very large list of shared repositories and find it
cumbersome to add this config for every one of them.
In a more difficult case, certain workflows involve running Git commands
within containers. The container boundary prevents any global or system
config from communicating `safe.directory` values from the host into the
container. Further, the container almost always runs as a different user
than the owner of the directory in the host.
To simplify the reactions necessary for these users, extend the
definition of the safe.directory config value to include a possible '*'
value. This value implies that all directories are safe, providing a
single setting to opt-out of this protection.
Note that an empty assignment of safe.directory clears all previous
values, and this is already the case with the "if (!value || !*value)"
condition.
Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <derrickstolee@github.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
It seems that nothing is ever checking to make sure the safe directories
in the configs actually have the key safe.directory, so some unrelated
config that has a value with a certain directory would also make it a
safe directory.
Signed-off-by: Matheus Valadares <me@m28.io>
Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <derrickstolee@github.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
It is difficult to change the ownership on a directory in our test
suite, so insert a new GIT_TEST_ASSUME_DIFFERENT_OWNER environment
variable to trick Git into thinking we are in a differently-owned
directory. This allows us to test that the config is parsed correctly.
Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <derrickstolee@github.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
* maint-2.34:
Git 2.34.2
Git 2.33.2
Git 2.32.1
Git 2.31.2
GIT-VERSION-GEN: bump to v2.33.1
Git 2.30.3
setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level directory
Add a function to determine whether a path is owned by the current user
* maint-2.33:
Git 2.33.2
Git 2.32.1
Git 2.31.2
GIT-VERSION-GEN: bump to v2.33.1
Git 2.30.3
setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level directory
Add a function to determine whether a path is owned by the current user
* maint-2.32:
Git 2.32.1
Git 2.31.2
Git 2.30.3
setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level directory
Add a function to determine whether a path is owned by the current user
* maint-2.31:
Git 2.31.2
Git 2.30.3
setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level directory
Add a function to determine whether a path is owned by the current user
* maint-2.30:
Git 2.30.3
setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level directory
Add a function to determine whether a path is owned by the current user
When determining the length of the longest ancestor of a given path with
respect to to e.g. `GIT_CEILING_DIRECTORIES`, we special-case the root
directory by returning 0 (i.e. we pretend that the path `/` does not end
in a slash by virtually stripping it).
That is the correct behavior because when normalizing paths, the root
directory is special: all other directory paths have their trailing
slash stripped, but not the root directory's path (because it would
become the empty string, which is not a legal path).
However, this special-casing of the root directory in
`longest_ancestor_length()` completely forgets about Windows-style root
directories, e.g. `C:\`. These _also_ get normalized with a trailing
slash (because `C:` would actually refer to the current directory on
that drive, not necessarily to its root directory).
In fc56c7b34b (mingw: accomodate t0060-path-utils for MSYS2,
2016-01-27), we almost got it right. We noticed that
`longest_ancestor_length()` expects a slash _after_ the matched prefix,
and if the prefix already ends in a slash, the normalized path won't
ever match and -1 is returned.
But then that commit went astray: The correct fix is not to adjust the
_tests_ to expect an incorrect -1 when that function is fed a prefix
that ends in a slash, but instead to treat such a prefix as if the
trailing slash had been removed.
Likewise, that function needs to handle the case where it is fed a path
that ends in a slash (not only a prefix that ends in a slash): if it
matches the prefix (plus trailing slash), we still need to verify that
the path does not end there, otherwise the prefix is not actually an
ancestor of the path but identical to it (and we need to return -1 in
that case).
With these two adjustments, we no longer need to play games in t0060
where we only add `$rootoff` if the passed prefix is different from the
MSYS2 pseudo root, instead we also add it for the MSYS2 pseudo root
itself. We do have to be careful to skip that logic entirely for Windows
paths, though, because they do are not subject to that MSYS2 pseudo root
treatment.
This patch fixes the scenario where a user has set
`GIT_CEILING_DIRECTORIES=C:\`, which would be ignored otherwise.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Fix a regression in 2.35 that roke the use of "rebase" and "stash"
in a secondary worktree.
* en/keep-cwd:
sequencer, stash: fix running from worktree subdir
In commits bc3ae46b42 ("rebase: do not attempt to remove
startup_info->original_cwd", 2021-12-09) and 0fce211ccc ("stash: do not
attempt to remove startup_info->original_cwd", 2021-12-09), we wanted to
allow the subprocess to know which directory the parent process was
running from, so that the subprocess could protect it. However...
When run from a non-main worktree, setup_git_directory() will note
that the discovered git directory
(/PATH/TO/.git/worktree/non-main-worktree) does not match
DEFAULT_GIT_DIR_ENVIRONMENT (see setup_discovered_git_dir()), and
decide to set GIT_DIR in the environment. This matters because...
Whenever git is run with the GIT_DIR environment variable set, and
GIT_WORK_TREE not set, it presumes that '.' is the working tree. So...
This combination results in the subcommand being very confused about
the working tree. Fix it by also setting the GIT_WORK_TREE environment
variable along with setting cmd.dir.
A possibly more involved fix we could consider for later would be to
make setup.c set GIT_WORK_TREE whenever (a) it discovers both the git
directory and the working tree and (b) it decides to set GIT_DIR in the
environment. I did not attempt that here as such would be too big of a
change for a 2.35.1 release.
Test-case-by: Glen Choo <chooglen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Elijah Newren <newren@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
We added an unrelated sanity checking that leads to a BUG() while
plugging a leak, which triggered in a repository with symrefs in
the local branch namespace that point at a ref outside. Partially
revert the change to avoid triggering the BUG().
* ab/checkout-branch-info-leakfix:
checkout: avoid BUG() when hitting a broken repository
When 9081a421 (checkout: fix "branch info" memory leaks, 2021-11-16)
cleaned up existing memory leaks, we added an unrelated sanity check
to ensure that a local branch is truly local and not a symref to
elsewhere that dies with BUG() otherwise. This was misguided in two
ways. First of all, such a tightening did not belong to a leak-fix
patch. And the condition it detected was *not* a bug in our program
but a problem in user data, where warning() or die() would have been
more appropriate.
As the condition is not fatal (the result of computing the local
branch name in the code that is involved in the faulty check is only
used as a textual label for the commit), let's revert the code to
the original state, i.e. strip "refs/heads/" to compute the local
branch name if possible, and otherwise leave it NULL. The consumer
of the information in merge_working_tree() is prepared to see NULL
in there and act accordingly.
cf. https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2042920
Reported-by: Petr Šplíchal <psplicha@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Todd Zullinger <tmz@pobox.com>
Helped-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
A test case wants to append stuff to a loose object file to ensure
that this kind of corruption is detected. To make a read-only loose
object file writable with chmod, it is not necessary to also make
it executable. Replace the bitmask 755 with the instruction +w to
request only the write bit and to also heed the umask. And get rid
of a POSIXPERM prerequisite, which is unnecessary for the test.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Sixt <j6t@kdbg.org>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
"git merge $signed_tag" started to drop the tag message from the
default merge message it uses by accident, which has been corrected.
* fs/ssh-signing-key-lifetime:
fmt-merge-msg: prevent use-after-free with signed tags
To test for a key that is completely unknown to the keyring we need one
to sign the commit with. This was done by generating a new key and not
add it into the keyring. To avoid the key generation overhead and
problems where GPG did hang in CI during it, switch GNUPGHOME to the
empty $GNUPGHOME_NOT_USED instead, therefore making all used keys unknown
for this single `verify-commit` call.
Reported-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <fs@gigacodes.de>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
When merging a signed tag, fmt_merge_msg_sigs() is responsible for
populating the body of the merge message with the names of the signed
tags, their signatures, and the validity of those signatures.
In 02769437e1 (ssh signing: use sigc struct to pass payload,
2021-12-09), check_signature() was taught to pass the object payload via
the sigc struct instead of passing the payload buffer separately.
In effect, 02769437e1 causes buf, and sigc.payload to point at the same
region in memory. This causes a problem for fmt_tag_signature(), which
wants to read from this location, since it is freed beforehand by
signature_check_clear() (which frees it via sigc's `payload` member).
That makes the subsequent use in fmt_tag_signature() a use-after-free.
As a result, merge messages did not contain the body of any signed tags.
Luckily, they tend not to contain garbage, either, since the result of
strstr()-ing the object buffer in fmt_tag_signature() is guarded:
const char *tag_body = strstr(buf, "\n\n");
if (tag_body) {
tag_body += 2;
strbuf_add(tagbuf, tag_body, buf + len - tag_body);
}
Unfortunately, the tests in t6200 did not catch this at the time because
they do not search for the body of signed tags in fmt-merge-msg's
output.
Resolve this by waiting to call signature_check_clear() until after its
contents can be safely discarded. Harden ourselves against any future
regressions in this area by making sure we can find signed tag messages
in the output of fmt-merge-msg, too.
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
"git stash apply" forgot to attempt restoring untracked files when
it failed to restore changes to tracked ones.
* en/stash-df-fix:
stash: do not return before restoring untracked files
Similar message templates have been consolidated so that
translators need to work on fewer number of messages.
* ja/i18n-similar-messages:
i18n: turn even more messages into "cannot be used together" ones
i18n: ref-filter: factorize "%(foo) atom used without %(bar) atom"
i18n: factorize "--foo outside a repository"
i18n: refactor "unrecognized %(foo) argument" strings
i18n: factorize "no directory given for --foo"
i18n: factorize "--foo requires --bar" and the like
i18n: tag.c factorize i18n strings
i18n: standardize "cannot open" and "cannot read"
i18n: turn "options are incompatible" into "cannot be used together"
i18n: refactor "%s, %s and %s are mutually exclusive"
i18n: refactor "foo and bar are mutually exclusive"
A corner case bug in the ort merge strategy has been corrected.
* en/merge-ort-renorm-with-rename-delete-conflict-fix:
merge-ort: fix bug with renormalization and rename/delete conflicts
"git -c branch.autosetupmerge=inherit branch new old" makes "new"
to have the same upstream as the "old" branch, instead of marking
"old" itself as its upstream.
* js/branch-track-inherit:
config: require lowercase for branch.*.autosetupmerge
branch: add flags and config to inherit tracking
branch: accept multiple upstream branches for tracking
"git apply --3way" bypasses the attempt to do a three-way
application in more cases to address the regression caused by the
recent change to use direct application as a fallback.
* jz/apply-3-corner-cases:
git-apply: skip threeway in add / rename cases
"git stash" by default triggers its "push" action, but its
implementation also made "git stash -h" to show short help only for
"git stash push", which has been corrected.
* ab/do-not-limit-stash-help-to-push:
stash: don't show "git stash push" usage on bad "git stash" usage
"git fetch" and "git pull" are now declared sparse-index clean.
Also "git ls-files" learns the "--sparse" option to help debugging.
* ds/fetch-pull-with-sparse-index:
test-read-cache: remove --table, --expand options
t1091/t3705: remove 'test-tool read-cache --table'
t1092: replace 'read-cache --table' with 'ls-files --sparse'
ls-files: add --sparse option
fetch/pull: use the sparse index
Test updates.
* hn/ref-api-tests-update:
t7004: use "test-tool ref-store" for reflog inspection
t7004: create separate tags for different tests
t5550: require REFFILES
t5540: require REFFILES
Perf tests were run with end-user's shell, but it has been
corrected to use the shell specified by $TEST_SHELL_PATH.
* ja/perf-use-specified-shell:
t/perf: do not run tests in user's $SHELL
Use of certain "git rev-list" options with "git fast-export"
created nonsense results (the worst two of which being "--reverse"
and "--invert-grep --grep=<foo>"). The use of "--first-parent" is
made to behave a bit more sensible than before.
* ws/fast-export-with-revision-options:
fast-export: fix surprising behavior with --first-parent
Certain sparse-checkout patterns that are valid in non-cone mode
led to segfault in cone mode, which has been corrected.
* ds/sparse-checkout-malformed-pattern-fix:
sparse-checkout: refuse to add to bad patterns
sparse-checkout: fix OOM error with mixed patterns
sparse-checkout: fix segfault on malformed patterns
Christoph Reiter reported on the Git for Windows issue tracker[1], that
mingw_strftime() imports strftime() from ucrtbase.dll with the wrong
calling convention. It should be __cdecl instead of WINAPI, which we
always use in DECLARE_PROC_ADDR().
The MSYS2 project encountered cmake sefaults on x86 Windows caused by
the same issue in the cmake source. [2] There are no known git crashes
that where caused by this, yet, but we should try to prevent them.
We import two other non-WINAPI functions via DECLARE_PROC_ADDR(), too.
* NtSetSystemInformation() (NTAPI)
* GetUserNameExW() (SEC_ENTRY)
NTAPI, SEC_ENTRY and WINAPI are all ususally defined as __stdcall,
but there are circumstances where they're defined differently.
Teach DECLARE_PROC_ADDR() about calling conventions and be explicit
about when we want to use which calling convention.
Import winnt.h for the definition of NTAPI and sspi.h for SEC_ENTRY
near their respective only users.
[1] https://github.com/git-for-windows/git/issues/3560
[2] https://github.com/msys2/MINGW-packages/issues/10152
Reported-By: Christoph Reiter <reiter.christoph@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthias Aßhauer <mha1993@live.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
"git grep --perl-regexp" failed to match UTF-8 characters with
wildcard when the pattern consists only of ASCII letters, which has
been corrected.
* rs/pcre2-utf:
grep/pcre2: factor out literal variable
grep/pcre2: use PCRE2_UTF even with ASCII patterns
