The config setting `core.protectNTFS` is specifically designed to work
not only on Windows, but anywhere, to allow for repositories hosted on,
say, Linux servers to be protected against NTFS-specific attack vectors.
As a consequence, `is_ntfs_dotgit()` manually splits backslash-separated
paths (but does not do the same for paths separated by forward slashes),
under the assumption that the backslash might not be a valid directory
separator on the _current_ Operating System.
However, the two callers, `verify_path()` and `fsck_tree()`, are
supposed to feed only individual path segments to the `is_ntfs_dotgit()`
function.
This causes a lot of duplicate scanning (and very inefficient scanning,
too, as the inner loop of `is_ntfs_dotgit()` was optimized for
readability rather than for speed.
Let's simplify the design of `is_ntfs_dotgit()` by putting the burden of
splitting the paths by backslashes as directory separators on the
callers of said function.
Consequently, the `verify_path()` function, which already splits the
path by directory separators, now treats backslashes as directory
separators _explicitly_ when `core.protectNTFS` is turned on, even on
platforms where the backslash is _not_ a directory separator.
Note that we have to repeat some code in `verify_path()`: if the
backslash is not a directory separator on the current Operating System,
we want to allow file names like `\`, but we _do_ want to disallow paths
that are clearly intended to cause harm when the repository is cloned on
Windows.
The `fsck_tree()` function (the other caller of `is_ntfs_dotgit()`) now
needs to look for backslashes in tree entries' names specifically when
`core.protectNTFS` is turned on. While it would be tempting to
completely disallow backslashes in that case (much like `fsck` reports
names containing forward slashes as "full paths"), this would be
overzealous: when `core.protectNTFS` is turned on in a non-Windows
setup, backslashes are perfectly valid characters in file names while we
_still_ want to disallow tree entries that are clearly designed to
exploit NTFS-specific behavior.
This simplification will make subsequent changes easier to implement,
such as turning `core.protectNTFS` on by default (not only on Windows)
or protecting against attack vectors involving NTFS Alternate Data
Streams.
Incidentally, this change allows for catching malicious repositories
that contain tree entries of the form `dir\.gitmodules` already on the
server side rather than only on the client side (and previously only on
Windows): in contrast to `is_ntfs_dotgit()`, the
`is_ntfs_dotgitmodules()` function already expects the caller to split
the paths by directory separators.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
In preparation to flipping the default on `core.protectNTFS`, let's have
some way to measure the speed impact of this config setting reliably
(and for comparison, the `core.protectHFS` config setting).
For now, this is a manual performance benchmark:
./t/helper/test-path-utils protect_ntfs_hfs [arguments...]
where the arguments are an optional number of file names to test with,
optionally followed by minimum and maximum length of the random file
names. The default values are one million, 3 and 20, respectively.
Just like `sqrti()` in `bisect.c`, we introduce a very simple function
to approximation the square root of a given value, in order to avoid
having to introduce the first user of `<math.h>` in Git's source code.
Note: this is _not_ implemented as a Unix shell script in t/perf/
because we really care about _very_ precise timings here, and Unix shell
scripts are simply unsuited for precise and consistent benchmarking.
Signed-off-by: Garima Singh <garima.singh@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
This patch series fixes an issue where Git could formerly have been
tricked into creating a `.git` file with an unexpected (and therefore
unprotected) NTFS short name.
Incidentally, it also fixes an issue where a tree entry containing a
backslash could be tricked into following a symbolic link, i.e. Git
could be tricked into writing files outside the worktree.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
The `--export-marks` option of `git fast-import` is exposed also via the
in-stream command `feature export-marks=...` and it allows overwriting
arbitrary paths.
This topic branch prevents the in-stream version, to prevent arbitrary
file accesses by `git fast-import` streams coming from untrusted sources
(e.g. in remote helpers that are based on `git fast-import`).
This fixes CVE-2019-1348.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Previously, this function was completely undocumented. It is worth,
though, to explain what is going on, as it is not really obvious at all.
Suggested-by: Garima Singh <garima.singh@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
The backslash character is not a valid part of a file name on Windows.
Hence it is dangerous to allow writing files that were unpacked from
tree objects, when the stored file name contains a backslash character:
it will be misinterpreted as directory separator.
This not only causes ambiguity when a tree contains a blob `a\b` and a
tree `a` that contains a blob `b`, but it also can be used as part of an
attack vector to side-step the careful protections against writing into
the `.git/` directory during a clone of a maliciously-crafted
repository.
Let's prevent that, addressing CVE-2019-1354.
Note: we guard against backslash characters in tree objects' file names
_only_ on Windows (because on other platforms, even on those where NTFS
volumes can be mounted, the backslash character is _not_ a directory
separator), and _only_ when `core.protectNTFS = true` (because users
might need to generate tree objects for other platforms, of course
without touching the worktree, e.g. using `git update-index
--cacheinfo`).
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
In addition to preventing `.git` from being tracked by Git, on Windows
we also have to prevent `git~1` from being tracked, as the default NTFS
short name (also known as the "8.3 filename") for the file name `.git`
is `git~1`, otherwise it would be possible for malicious repositories to
write directly into the `.git/` directory, e.g. a `post-checkout` hook
that would then be executed _during_ a recursive clone.
When we implemented appropriate protections in 2b4c6efc82 (read-cache:
optionally disallow NTFS .git variants, 2014-12-16), we had analyzed
carefully that the `.git` directory or file would be guaranteed to be
the first directory entry to be written. Otherwise it would be possible
e.g. for a file named `..git` to be assigned the short name `git~1` and
subsequently, the short name generated for `.git` would be `git~2`. Or
`git~3`. Or even `~9999999` (for a detailed explanation of the lengths
we have to go to protect `.gitmodules`, see the commit message of
e7cb0b4455 (is_ntfs_dotgit: match other .git files, 2018-05-11)).
However, by exploiting two issues (that will be addressed in a related
patch series close by), it is currently possible to clone a submodule
into a non-empty directory:
- On Windows, file names cannot end in a space or a period (for
historical reasons: the period separating the base name from the file
extension was not actually written to disk, and the base name/file
extension was space-padded to the full 8/3 characters, respectively).
Helpfully, when creating a directory under the name, say, `sub.`, that
trailing period is trimmed automatically and the actual name on disk
is `sub`.
This means that while Git thinks that the submodule names `sub` and
`sub.` are different, they both access `.git/modules/sub/`.
- While the backslash character is a valid file name character on Linux,
it is not so on Windows. As Git tries to be cross-platform, it
therefore allows backslash characters in the file names stored in tree
objects.
Which means that it is totally possible that a submodule `c` sits next
to a file `c\..git`, and on Windows, during recursive clone a file
called `..git` will be written into `c/`, of course _before_ the
submodule is cloned.
Note that the actual exploit is not quite as simple as having a
submodule `c` next to a file `c\..git`, as we have to make sure that the
directory `.git/modules/b` already exists when the submodule is checked
out, otherwise a different code path is taken in `module_clone()` that
does _not_ allow a non-empty submodule directory to exist already.
Even if we will address both issues nearby (the next commit will
disallow backslash characters in tree entries' file names on Windows,
and another patch will disallow creating directories/files with trailing
spaces or periods), it is a wise idea to defend in depth against this
sort of attack vector: when submodules are cloned recursively, we now
_require_ the directory to be empty, addressing CVE-2019-1349.
Note: the code path we patch is shared with the code path of `git
submodule update --init`, which must not expect, in general, that the
directory is empty. Hence we have to introduce the new option
`--force-init` and hand it all the way down from `git submodule` to the
actual `git submodule--helper` process that performs the initial clone.
Reported-by: Nicolas Joly <Nicolas.Joly@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
As with export-marks in the previous commit, import-marks can access the
filesystem. This is significantly less dangerous than export-marks
because it only involves reading from arbitrary paths, rather than
writing them. However, it could still be surprising and have security
implications (e.g., exfiltrating data from a service that accepts
fast-import streams).
Let's lump it (and its "if-exists" counterpart) in with export-marks,
and enable the in-stream version only if --allow-unsafe-features is set.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
The fast-import stream command "feature export-marks=<path>" lets the
stream write marks to an arbitrary path. This may be surprising if you
are running fast-import against an untrusted input (which otherwise
cannot do anything except update Git objects and refs).
Let's disallow the use of this feature by default, and provide a
command-line option to re-enable it (you can always just use the
command-line --export-marks as well, but the in-stream version provides
an easy way for exporters to control the process).
This is a backwards-incompatible change, since the default is flipping
to the new, safer behavior. However, since the main users of the
in-stream versions would be import/export-based remote helpers, and
since we trust remote helpers already (which are already running
arbitrary code), we'll pass the new option by default when reading a
remote helper's stream. This should minimize the impact.
Note that the implementation isn't totally simple, as we have to work
around the fact that fast-import doesn't parse its command-line options
until after it has read any "feature" lines from the stream. This is how
it lets command-line options override in-stream. But in our case, it's
important to parse the new --allow-unsafe-features first.
There are three options for resolving this:
1. Do a separate "early" pass over the options. This is easy for us to
do because there are no command-line options that allow the
"unstuck" form (so there's no chance of us mistaking an argument
for an option), though it does introduce a risk of incorrect
parsing later (e.g,. if we convert to parse-options).
2. Move the option parsing phase back to the start of the program, but
teach the stream-reading code never to override an existing value.
This is tricky, because stream "feature" lines override each other
(meaning we'd have to start tracking the source for every option).
3. Accept that we might parse a "feature export-marks" line that is
forbidden, as long we don't _act_ on it until after we've parsed
the command line options.
This would, in fact, work with the current code, but only because
the previous patch fixed the export-marks parser to avoid touching
the filesystem.
So while it works, it does carry risk of somebody getting it wrong
in the future in a rather subtle and unsafe way.
I've gone with option (1) here as simple, safe, and unlikely to cause
regressions.
This fixes CVE-2019-1348.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
When we parse the --export-marks option, we don't immediately open the
file, but we do create any leading directories. This can be especially
confusing when a command-line option overrides an in-stream one, in
which case we'd create the leading directory for the in-stream file,
even though we never actually write the file.
Let's instead create the directories just before opening the file, which
means we'll create only useful directories. Note that this could change
the handling of relative paths if we chdir() in between, but we don't
actually do so; the only permanent chdir is from setup_git_directory()
which runs before either code path (potentially we should take the
pre-setup dir into account to avoid surprising the user, but that's an
orthogonal change).
The test just adapts the existing "override" test to use paths with
leading directories. This checks both that the correct directory is
created (which worked before but was not tested), and that the
overridden one is not (our new fix here).
While we're here, let's also check the error result of
safe_create_leading_directories(). We'd presumably notice any failure
immediately after when we try to open the file itself, but we can give a
more specific error message in this case.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
When asked to import marks from "subdir/file.marks", we create the
leading directory "subdir" if it doesn't exist. This makes no sense for
importing marks, where we only ever open the path for reading.
Most of the time this would be a noop, since if the marks file exists,
then the leading directories exist, too. But if it doesn't (e.g.,
because --import-marks-if-exists was used), then we'd create the useless
directory.
This dates back to 580d5f83e7 (fast-import: always create marks_file
directories, 2010-03-29). Even then it was useless, so it seems to have
been added in error alongside the --export-marks case (which _is_
helpful).
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
We parse options like "--max-pack-size=" using skip_prefix(), which
makes sense to get at the bytes after the "=". However, we also parse
"--quiet" and "--stats" with skip_prefix(), which allows things like
"--quiet-nonsense" to behave like "--quiet".
This was a mistaken conversion in 0f6927c229 (fast-import: put option
parsing code in separate functions, 2009-12-04). Let's tighten this to
an exact match, which was the original intent.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Our tests confirm that providing two "import-marks" options in a
fast-import stream is an error. However, the invoked command would fail
even without covering this case, because the marks files themselves do
not actually exist. Let's create the files to make sure we fail for the
right reason (we actually do, because the option parsing happens before
we open anything, but this future-proofs our test).
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
My IEE 'home for life' email service is being withdrawn on 30 Sept 2019.
Replace with my new email domain.
I also have a secondary (backup) 'home for life' through
<philipoakley@dunelm.org.uk>.
Signed-off-by: Philip Oakley <philipoakley@iee.email>
Signed-off-by: Philip Oakley <philipoakley@iee.org>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Compilation fix.
* cb/xdiff-no-system-includes-in-dot-c:
xdiff: remove duplicate headers from xpatience.c
xdiff: remove duplicate headers from xhistogram.c
xdiff: drop system includes in xutils.c
The internal diff machinery can be made to read out of bounds while
looking for --funcion-context line in a corner case, which has been
corrected.
* jk/xdiff-clamp-funcname-context-index:
xdiff: clamp function context indices in post-image
We have been trying out a few language features outside c89; the
coding guidelines document did not talk about them and instead had
a blanket ban against them.
* jc/post-c89-rules-doc:
CodingGuidelines: spell out post-C89 rules
Code restructuring during 2.20 period broke fetching tags via
"import" based transports.
* fc/fetch-with-import-fix:
fetch: fix regression with transport helpers
fetch: make the code more understandable
fetch: trivial cleanup
t5801 (remote-helpers): add test to fetch tags
t5801 (remote-helpers): cleanup refspec stuff
The commit-graph file is now part of the "files that the runtime
may keep open file descriptors on, all of which would need to be
closed when done with the object store", and the file descriptor to
an existing commit-graph file now is closed before "gc" finalizes a
new instance to replace it.
* ds/close-object-store:
packfile: rename close_all_packs to close_object_store
packfile: close commit-graph in close_all_packs
commit-graph: use raw_object_store when closing
commit-graph: extract write_commit_graph_file()
commit-graph: extract copy_oids_to_commits()
commit-graph: extract count_distinct_commits()
commit-graph: extract fill_oids_from_all_packs()
commit-graph: extract fill_oids_from_commit_hex()
commit-graph: extract fill_oids_from_packs()
commit-graph: create write_commit_graph_context
commit-graph: remove Future Work section
commit-graph: collapse parameters into flags
commit-graph: return with errors during write
commit-graph: fix the_repository reference
"git checkout -p" needs to selectively apply a patch in reverse,
which did not work well.
* pw/add-p-recount:
add -p: fix checkout -p with pathological context
Code clean-up to avoid signed integer overlaps during binary search.
* rs/avoid-overflow-in-midpoint-computation:
cleanup: fix possible overflow errors in binary search, part 2
"git interpret-trailers" always treated '#' as the comment
character, regardless of core.commentChar setting, which has been
corrected.
* jk/trailers-use-config:
interpret-trailers: load default config
"git stash show 23" used to work, but no more after getting
rewritten in C; this regression has been corrected.
* tg/stash-ref-by-index-fix:
stash: fix show referencing stash index
"git rebase --abort" used to leave refs/rewritten/ when concluding
"git rebase -r", which has been corrected.
* pw/rebase-abort-clean-rewritten:
rebase --abort/--quit: cleanup refs/rewritten
sequencer: return errors from sequencer_remove_state()
rebase: warn if state directory cannot be removed
rebase: fix a memory leak
An incorrect list of options was cached after command line
completion failed (e.g. trying to complete a command that requires
a repository outside one), which has been corrected.
* nd/completion-no-cache-failure:
completion: do not cache if --git-completion-helper fails
The code to parse scaled numbers out of configuration files has
been made more robust and also easier to follow.
* rs/config-unit-parsing:
config: simplify parsing of unit factors
config: don't multiply in parse_unit_factor()
config: use unsigned_mult_overflows to check for overflows
The codepath to compute delta islands used to spew progress output
without giving the callers any way to squelch it, which has been
fixed.
* jk/delta-islands-progress-fix:
delta-islands: respect progress flag
Use "Erase in Line" CSI sequence that is already used in the editor
support to clear cruft in the progress output.
* sg/rebase-progress:
progress: use term_clear_line()
rebase: fix garbled progress display with '-x'
pager: add a helper function to clear the last line in the terminal
t3404: make the 'rebase.missingCommitsCheck=ignore' test more focused
t3404: modernize here doc style
"git submodule foreach" did not protect command line options passed
to the command to be run in each submodule correctly, when the
"--recursive" option was in use.
* ms/submodule-foreach-fix:
submodule foreach: fix recursion of options
The configuration variable rebase.rescheduleFailedExec should be
effective only while running an interactive rebase and should not
affect anything when running an non-interactive one, which was not
the case. This has been corrected.
* js/rebase-reschedule-applies-only-to-interactive:
rebase --am: ignore rebase.rescheduleFailedExec
The "git clone" documentation refers to command line options in its
description in the short form; they have been replaced with long
forms to make them more recognisable.
* qn/clone-doc-use-long-form:
docs: git-clone: list short form of options first
docs: git-clone: refer to long form of options
"git rm" to resolve a conflicted path leaked an internal message
"needs merge" before actually removing the path, which was
confusing. This has been corrected.
* jc/denoise-rm-to-resolve:
rm: resolving by removal is not a warning-worthy event
A codepath that reads from GPG for signed object verification read
past the end of allocated buffer, which has been fixed.
* sr/gpg-interface-stop-at-the-end:
gpg-interface: do not scan past the end of buffer
"git clean" silently skipped a path when it cannot lstat() it; now
it gives a warning.
* js/clean-report-too-long-a-path:
clean: show an error message when the path is too long
"git push --atomic" that goes over the transport-helper (namely,
the smart http transport) failed to prevent refs to be pushed when
it can locally tell that one of the ref update will fail without
having to consult the other end, which has been corrected.
* es/local-atomic-push-failure-with-http:
transport-helper: avoid var decl in for () loop control
transport-helper: enforce atomic in push_refs_with_push
