This commit refactors the use of verify_signed_buffer() outside of
gpg-interface.c to use check_signature() instead. It also turns
verify_signed_buffer() into a file-local function since it's now only
invoked internally by check_signature().
There were previously two globally scoped functions used in different
parts of Git to perform GPG signature verification:
verify_signed_buffer() and check_signature(). Now only
check_signature() is used.
The verify_signed_buffer() function doesn't guard against duplicate
signatures as described by Michał Górny [1]. Instead it only ensures a
non-erroneous exit code from GPG and the presence of at least one
GOODSIG status field. This stands in contrast with check_signature()
that returns an error if more than one signature is encountered.
The lower degree of verification makes the use of verify_signed_buffer()
problematic if callers don't parse and validate the various parts of the
GPG status message themselves. And processing these messages seems like
a task that should be reserved to gpg-interface.c with the function
check_signature().
Furthermore, the use of verify_signed_buffer() makes it difficult to
introduce new functionality that relies on the content of the GPG status
lines.
Now all operations that does signature verification share a single entry
point to gpg-interface.c. This makes it easier to propagate changed or
additional functionality in GPG signature verification to all parts of
Git, without having odd edge-cases that don't perform the same degree of
verification.
[1] https://dev.gentoo.org/~mgorny/articles/attack-on-git-signature-verification.html
Signed-off-by: Hans Jerry Illikainen <hji@dyntopia.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
"git merge signed-tag" while lacking the public key started to say
"No signature", which was utterly wrong. This regression has been
reverted.
* hi/gpg-use-check-signature:
Revert "gpg-interface: prefer check_signature() for GPG verification"
This reverts commit 72b006f4bf, which
breaks the end-user experience when merging a signed tag without
having the public key. We should report "can't check because we
have no public key", but the code with this change claimed that
there was no signature.
gpg.minTrustLevel configuration variable has been introduced to
tell various signature verification codepaths the required minimum
trust level.
* hi/gpg-mintrustlevel:
gpg-interface: add minTrustLevel as a configuration option
Previously, signature verification for merge and pull operations checked
if the key had a trust-level of either TRUST_NEVER or TRUST_UNDEFINED in
verify_merge_signature(). If that was the case, the process die()d.
The other code paths that did signature verification relied entirely on
the return code from check_commit_signature(). And signatures made with
a good key, irregardless of its trust level, was considered valid by
check_commit_signature().
This difference in behavior might induce users to erroneously assume
that the trust level of a key in their keyring is always considered by
Git, even for operations where it is not (e.g. during a verify-commit or
verify-tag).
The way it worked was by gpg-interface.c storing the result from the
key/signature status *and* the lowest-two trust levels in the `result`
member of the signature_check structure (the last of these status lines
that were encountered got written to `result`). These are documented in
GPG under the subsection `General status codes` and `Key related`,
respectively [1].
The GPG documentation says the following on the TRUST_ status codes [1]:
"""
These are several similar status codes:
- TRUST_UNDEFINED <error_token>
- TRUST_NEVER <error_token>
- TRUST_MARGINAL [0 [<validation_model>]]
- TRUST_FULLY [0 [<validation_model>]]
- TRUST_ULTIMATE [0 [<validation_model>]]
For good signatures one of these status lines are emitted to
indicate the validity of the key used to create the signature.
The error token values are currently only emitted by gpgsm.
"""
My interpretation is that the trust level is conceptionally different
from the validity of the key and/or signature. That seems to also have
been the assumption of the old code in check_signature() where a result
of 'G' (as in GOODSIG) and 'U' (as in TRUST_NEVER or TRUST_UNDEFINED)
were both considered a success.
The two cases where a result of 'U' had special meaning were in
verify_merge_signature() (where this caused git to die()) and in
format_commit_one() (where it affected the output of the %G? format
specifier).
I think it makes sense to refactor the processing of TRUST_ status lines
such that users can configure a minimum trust level that is enforced
globally, rather than have individual parts of git (e.g. merge) do it
themselves (except for a grace period with backward compatibility).
I also think it makes sense to not store the trust level in the same
struct member as the key/signature status. While the presence of a
TRUST_ status code does imply that the signature is good (see the first
paragraph in the included snippet above), as far as I can tell, the
order of the status lines from GPG isn't well-defined; thus it would
seem plausible that the trust level could be overwritten with the
key/signature status if they were stored in the same member of the
signature_check structure.
This patch introduces a new configuration option: gpg.minTrustLevel. It
consolidates trust-level verification to gpg-interface.c and adds a new
`trust_level` member to the signature_check structure.
Backward-compatibility is maintained by introducing a special case in
verify_merge_signature() such that if no user-configurable
gpg.minTrustLevel is set, then the old behavior of rejecting
TRUST_UNDEFINED and TRUST_NEVER is enforced. If, on the other hand,
gpg.minTrustLevel is set, then that value overrides the old behavior.
Similarly, the %G? format specifier will continue show 'U' for
signatures made with a key that has a trust level of TRUST_UNDEFINED or
TRUST_NEVER, even though the 'U' character no longer exist in the
`result` member of the signature_check structure. A new format
specifier, %GT, is also introduced for users that want to show all
possible trust levels for a signature.
Another approach would have been to simply drop the trust-level
requirement in verify_merge_signature(). This would also have made the
behavior consistent with other parts of git that perform signature
verification. However, requiring a minimum trust level for signing keys
does seem to have a real-world use-case. For example, the build system
used by the Qubes OS project currently parses the raw output from
verify-tag in order to assert a minimum trust level for keys used to
sign git tags [2].
[1] https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gnupg.git;a=blob;f=doc/doc/DETAILS;h=bd00006e933ac56719b1edd2478ecd79273eae72;hb=refs/heads/master
[2] 9674c1991d/scripts/verify-git-tag (L43)
Signed-off-by: Hans Jerry Illikainen <hji@dyntopia.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
This commit refactors the use of verify_signed_buffer() outside of
gpg-interface.c to use check_signature() instead. It also turns
verify_signed_buffer() into a file-local function since it's now only
invoked internally by check_signature().
There were previously two globally scoped functions used in different
parts of Git to perform GPG signature verification:
verify_signed_buffer() and check_signature(). Now only
check_signature() is used.
The verify_signed_buffer() function doesn't guard against duplicate
signatures as described by Michał Górny [1]. Instead it only ensures a
non-erroneous exit code from GPG and the presence of at least one
GOODSIG status field. This stands in contrast with check_signature()
that returns an error if more than one signature is encountered.
The lower degree of verification makes the use of verify_signed_buffer()
problematic if callers don't parse and validate the various parts of the
GPG status message themselves. And processing these messages seems like
a task that should be reserved to gpg-interface.c with the function
check_signature().
Furthermore, the use of verify_signed_buffer() makes it difficult to
introduce new functionality that relies on the content of the GPG status
lines.
Now all operations that does signature verification share a single entry
point to gpg-interface.c. This makes it easier to propagate changed or
additional functionality in GPG signature verification to all parts of
Git, without having odd edge-cases that don't perform the same degree of
verification.
[1] https://dev.gentoo.org/~mgorny/articles/attack-on-git-signature-verification.html
Signed-off-by: Hans Jerry Illikainen <hji@dyntopia.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Obtain the primary key fingerprint off VALIDSIG status message,
and expose it via %GP format.
Signed-off-by: Michał Górny <mgorny@gentoo.org>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Support processing VALIDSIG status that provides additional information
for valid signatures. Use this information to propagate signing key
fingerprint and expose it via %GF pretty format. This format can be
used to build safer key verification systems that verify the key via
complete fingerprint rather than short/long identifier provided by %GK.
Signed-off-by: Michał Górny <mgorny@gentoo.org>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
I looped over the toplevel header files, creating a temporary two-line C
program for each consisting of
#include "git-compat-util.h"
#include $HEADER
This patch is the result of manually fixing errors in compiling those
tiny programs.
Signed-off-by: Elijah Newren <newren@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Turn parse_gpg_output into a static function, the only outside user was
migrated in an earlier commit.
Signed-off-by: Henning Schild <henning.schild@siemens.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Even though our object sizes (from which these buffers would
come) are typically "unsigned long", this is something we'd
like to eventually fix (since it's only 32-bits even on
64-bit Windows). It makes more sense to use size_t when
taking an in-memory buffer.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Toews <mastahyeti@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Let's drop "extern" from our declarations, which brings us
in line with our modern style guidelines. While we're
here, let's wrap some of the overly long lines, and move
docstrings for public functions to their declarations, since
they document the interface.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Toews <mastahyeti@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Functions that print git object information may require that the
gpg-interface functions be silent. Add GPG_VERIFY_OMIT_STATUS flag and
prevent print_signature_buffer from being called if flag is set.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Puehringer <luk.puehringer@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
verify-commit by default displays human-readable output on standard
error. However, it can also be useful to get access to the raw gpg
status information, which is machine-readable, allowing automated
implementation of signing policy. Add a --raw option to make
verify-commit produce the gpg status information on standard error
instead of the human-readable format.
Signed-off-by: brian m. carlson <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
The code to handle printing of signature data from a struct
signature_check is very similar between verify-commit and verify-tag.
Place this in a single function. verify-tag retains its special case
behavior of printing the tag even when no valid signature is found.
Signed-off-by: brian m. carlson <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
verify-commit and verify-tag both share a central codepath for verifying
commits: check_signature. However, verify-tag exited successfully for
untrusted signature, while verify-commit exited unsuccessfully.
Centralize this signature check and make verify-commit adopt the older
verify-tag behavior. This behavior is more logical anyway, as the
signature is in fact valid, whether or not there's a path of trust to
the author.
Signed-off-by: brian m. carlson <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
verify-tag was executing an entirely different codepath than
verify-commit, except for the underlying verify_signed_buffer. Move
much of the code from check_commit_signature to a generic
check_signature function and adjust both codepaths to call it.
Update verify-tag to explicitly output the signature text, as we now
call verify_signed_buffer with strbufs to catch the output, which
prevents it from being printed automatically.
Signed-off-by: brian m. carlson <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Our signed-tag objects set the standard format used by Git to store
GPG-signed payload (i.e. the payload followed by its detached
signature) [*1*], and it made sense to have a helper to find the
boundary between the payload and its signature in tag.c back then.
Newer code added later to parse other kinds of objects that learned
to use the same format to store GPG-signed payload (e.g. signed
commits), however, kept using the helper from the same location.
Move it to gpg-interface; the helper is no longer about signed tag,
but it is how our code and data interact with GPG.
[Reference]
*1* http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel/297998/focus=1383
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Earlier, ffb6d7d5 (Move commit GPG signature verification to
commit.c, 2013-03-31) moved this helper that used to be in pretty.c
(i.e. the output code path) to commit.c for better reusability.
It was a good first step in the right direction, but still suffers
from a myopic view that commits will be the only thing we would ever
want to sign---we would actually want to be able to reuse it even
wider.
The function interprets what GPG said; gpg-interface is obviously a
better place. Move it there.
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
In contrast to tag signatures, commit signatures are put into the
header, that is between the other header parts and commit messages.
Provide access to the commit content sans the signature, which is the
payload that is actually signed. Commit signature verification does the
parsing anyways, and callers may wish to act on or display the commit
object sans the signature.
Signed-off-by: Michael J Gruber <git@drmicha.warpmail.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
The struct has been growing members whose malloced memory needs to be
freed. Do this with one helper function so that no malloced memory shall
be left unfreed.
Signed-off-by: Michael J Gruber <git@drmicha.warpmail.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
When --verify-signatures is specified, abort the merge in case a good
GPG signature from an untrusted key is encountered.
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Götte <jaseg@physik-pool.tu-berlin.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Currently, verify_signed_buffer() returns the user facing output only.
Allow callers to request the status output also.
Signed-off-by: Michael J Gruber <git@drmicha.warpmail.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
This mostly moves existing code from builtin/tag.c (for signing)
and builtin/verify-tag.c (for verifying) to a new gpg-interface.c
file to provide a more generic library interface.
- sign_buffer() takes a payload strbuf, a signature strbuf, and a signing
key, runs "gpg" to produce a detached signature for the payload, and
appends it to the signature strbuf. The contents of a signed tag that
concatenates the payload and the detached signature can be produced by
giving the same strbuf as payload and signature strbuf.
- verify_signed_buffer() takes a payload and a detached signature as
<ptr, len> pairs, and runs "gpg --verify" to see if the payload matches
the signature. It can optionally capture the output from GPG to allow
the callers to pretty-print it in a way more suitable for their
contexts.
"verify-tag" (aka "tag -v") used to save the whole tag contents as if it
is a detached signature, and fed gpg the payload part of the tag. It
relied on gpg to fail when the given tag is not signed but just is
annotated. The updated run_gpg_verify() function detects the lack of
detached signature in the input, and errors out without bothering "gpg".
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
