An earlier patch discussed and fixed a scenario where Git could be used
as a vector to exfiltrate sensitive data through a Docker container when
a potential victim clones a suspicious repository with local submodules
that contain symlinks.
That security hole has since been plugged, but a similar one still
exists. Instead of convincing a would-be victim to clone an embedded
submodule via the "file" protocol, an attacker could convince an
individual to clone a repository that has a submodule pointing to a
valid path on the victim's filesystem.
For example, if an individual (with username "foo") has their home
directory ("/home/foo") stored as a Git repository, then an attacker
could exfiltrate data by convincing a victim to clone a malicious
repository containing a submodule pointing at "/home/foo/.git" with
`--recurse-submodules`. Doing so would expose any sensitive contents in
stored in "/home/foo" tracked in Git.
For systems (such as Docker) that consider everything outside of the
immediate top-level working directory containing a Dockerfile as
inaccessible to the container (with the exception of volume mounts, and
so on), this is a violation of trust by exposing unexpected contents in
the working copy.
To mitigate the likelihood of this kind of attack, adjust the "file://"
protocol's default policy to be "user" to prevent commands that execute
without user input (including recursive submodule initialization) from
taking place by default.
Suggested-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
* maint-2.33:
Git 2.33.4
Git 2.32.3
Git 2.31.4
Git 2.30.5
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
* maint-2.32:
Git 2.32.3
Git 2.31.4
Git 2.30.5
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
* maint-2.31:
Git 2.31.4
Git 2.30.5
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
* maint-2.30:
Git 2.30.5
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
Previous changes introduced a regression which will prevent root for
accessing repositories owned by thyself if using sudo because SUDO_UID
takes precedence.
Loosen that restriction by allowing root to access repositories owned
by both uid by default and without having to add a safe.directory
exception.
A previous workaround that was documented in the tests is no longer
needed so it has been removed together with its specially crafted
prerequisite.
Helped-by: Johanness Schindelin <Johannes.Schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
bdc77d1d68 (Add a function to determine whether a path is owned by the
current user, 2022-03-02) checks for the effective uid of the running
process using geteuid() but didn't account for cases where that user was
root (because git was invoked through sudo or a compatible tool) and the
original uid that repository trusted for its config was no longer known,
therefore failing the following otherwise safe call:
guy@renard ~/Software/uncrustify $ sudo git describe --always --dirty
[sudo] password for guy:
fatal: unsafe repository ('/home/guy/Software/uncrustify' is owned by someone else)
Attempt to detect those cases by using the environment variables that
those tools create to keep track of the original user id, and do the
ownership check using that instead.
This assumes the environment the user is running on after going
privileged can't be tampered with, and also adds code to restrict that
the new behavior only applies if running as root, therefore keeping the
most common case, which runs unprivileged, from changing, but because of
that, it will miss cases where sudo (or an equivalent) was used to change
to another unprivileged user or where the equivalent tool used to raise
privileges didn't track the original id in a sudo compatible way.
Because of compatibility with sudo, the code assumes that uid_t is an
unsigned integer type (which is not required by the standard) but is used
that way in their codebase to generate SUDO_UID. In systems where uid_t
is signed, sudo might be also patched to NOT be unsigned and that might
be able to trigger an edge case and a bug (as described in the code), but
it is considered unlikely to happen and even if it does, the code would
just mostly fail safely, so there was no attempt either to detect it or
prevent it by the code, which is something that might change in the future,
based on expected user feedback.
Reported-by: Guy Maurel <guy.j@maurel.de>
Helped-by: SZEDER Gábor <szeder.dev@gmail.com>
Helped-by: Randall Becker <rsbecker@nexbridge.com>
Helped-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood123@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Johannes Schindelin <Johannes.Schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
With the addition of the safe.directory in 8959555ce
(setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level directory,
2022-03-02) released in v2.35.2, we are receiving feedback from a
variety of users about the feature.
Some users have a very large list of shared repositories and find it
cumbersome to add this config for every one of them.
In a more difficult case, certain workflows involve running Git commands
within containers. The container boundary prevents any global or system
config from communicating `safe.directory` values from the host into the
container. Further, the container almost always runs as a different user
than the owner of the directory in the host.
To simplify the reactions necessary for these users, extend the
definition of the safe.directory config value to include a possible '*'
value. This value implies that all directories are safe, providing a
single setting to opt-out of this protection.
Note that an empty assignment of safe.directory clears all previous
values, and this is already the case with the "if (!value || !*value)"
condition.
Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <derrickstolee@github.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
* maint-2.33:
Git 2.33.2
Git 2.32.1
Git 2.31.2
GIT-VERSION-GEN: bump to v2.33.1
Git 2.30.3
setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level directory
Add a function to determine whether a path is owned by the current user
* maint-2.32:
Git 2.32.1
Git 2.31.2
Git 2.30.3
setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level directory
Add a function to determine whether a path is owned by the current user
* maint-2.31:
Git 2.31.2
Git 2.30.3
setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level directory
Add a function to determine whether a path is owned by the current user
* maint-2.30:
Git 2.30.3
setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level directory
Add a function to determine whether a path is owned by the current user
It poses a security risk to search for a git directory outside of the
directories owned by the current user.
For example, it is common e.g. in computer pools of educational
institutes to have a "scratch" space: a mounted disk with plenty of
space that is regularly swiped where any authenticated user can create
a directory to do their work. Merely navigating to such a space with a
Git-enabled `PS1` when there is a maliciously-crafted `/scratch/.git/`
can lead to a compromised account.
The same holds true in multi-user setups running Windows, as `C:\` is
writable to every authenticated user by default.
To plug this vulnerability, we stop Git from accepting top-level
directories owned by someone other than the current user. We avoid
looking at the ownership of each and every directories between the
current and the top-level one (if there are any between) to avoid
introducing a performance bottleneck.
This new default behavior is obviously incompatible with the concept of
shared repositories, where we expect the top-level directory to be owned
by only one of its legitimate users. To re-enable that use case, we add
support for adding exceptions from the new default behavior via the
config setting `safe.directory`.
The `safe.directory` config setting is only respected in the system and
global configs, not from repository configs or via the command-line, and
can have multiple values to allow for multiple shared repositories.
We are particularly careful to provide a helpful message to any user
trying to use a shared repository.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
"git log --grep=string --author=name" learns to highlight hits just
like "git grep string" does.
* hm/paint-hits-in-log-grep:
grep/pcre2: fix an edge case concerning ascii patterns and UTF-8 data
pretty: colorize pattern matches in commit messages
grep: refactor next_match() and match_one_pattern() for external use
Fix-up for the other topic already in 'next'.
* fs/ssh-signing-fix:
gpg-interface: fix leak of strbufs in get_ssh_key_fingerprint()
gpg-interface: fix leak of "line" in parse_ssh_output()
ssh signing: clarify trustlevel usage in docs
ssh signing: fmt-merge-msg tests & config parse
Use ssh public crypto for object and push-cert signing.
* fs/ssh-signing:
ssh signing: test that gpg fails for unknown keys
ssh signing: tests for logs, tags & push certs
ssh signing: duplicate t7510 tests for commits
ssh signing: verify signatures using ssh-keygen
ssh signing: provide a textual signing_key_id
ssh signing: retrieve a default key from ssh-agent
ssh signing: add ssh key format and signing code
ssh signing: add test prereqs
ssh signing: preliminary refactoring and clean-up
Fix a regression in 8c32856133 (blame: document --color-* options,
2021-10-08), which added an extra newline before the "+" syntax.
The "Documentation/doc-diff HEAD~ HEAD" output with this applied is:
[...]
@@ -1815,13 +1815,13 @@ CONFIGURATION FILE
specified colors if the line was introduced before the given
timestamp, overwriting older timestamped colors.
- + Instead of an absolute timestamp relative timestamps work as well,
- e.g. 2.weeks.ago is valid to address anything older than 2 weeks.
+ Instead of an absolute timestamp relative timestamps work as well,
+ e.g. 2.weeks.ago is valid to address anything older than 2 weeks.
- + It defaults to blue,12 month ago,white,1 month ago,red, which colors
- everything older than one year blue, recent changes between one month
- and one year old are kept white, and lines introduced within the last
- month are colored red.
+ It defaults to blue,12 month ago,white,1 month ago,red, which
+ colors everything older than one year blue, recent changes between
+ one month and one year old are kept white, and lines introduced
+ within the last month are colored red.
color.blame.repeatedLines
Use the specified color to colorize line annotations for git blame
Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
The "--color-lines" and "--color-by-age" options of "git blame"
have been missing, which are now documented.
* bs/doc-blame-color-lines:
blame: document --color-* options
blame: describe default output format
The "--preserve-merges" option of "git rebase" has been removed.
* js/retire-preserve-merges:
sequencer: restrict scope of a formerly public function
rebase: remove a no-longer-used function
rebase: stop mentioning the -p option in comments
rebase: remove obsolete code comment
rebase: drop the internal `rebase--interactive` command
git-svn: drop support for `--preserve-merges`
rebase: drop support for `--preserve-merges`
pull: remove support for `--rebase=preserve`
tests: stop testing `git rebase --preserve-merges`
remote: warn about unhandled branch.<name>.rebase values
t5520: do not use `pull.rebase=preserve`
facca53ac added verification for ssh signatures but incorrectly
described the usage of gpg.minTrustLevel. While the verifications
trustlevel is stil set to fully or undefined depending on if the key is
known or not it has no effect on the verification result. Unknown keys
will always fail verification. This commit updates the docs to match
this behaviour.
Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <fs@gigacodes.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Doc update plus improved error reporting.
* jk/log-warn-on-bogus-encoding:
docs: use "character encoding" to refer to commit-object encoding
logmsg_reencode(): warn when iconv() fails
* fs/ssh-signing:
ssh signing: test that gpg fails for unknown keys
ssh signing: tests for logs, tags & push certs
ssh signing: duplicate t7510 tests for commits
ssh signing: verify signatures using ssh-keygen
ssh signing: provide a textual signing_key_id
ssh signing: retrieve a default key from ssh-agent
ssh signing: add ssh key format and signing code
ssh signing: add test prereqs
ssh signing: preliminary refactoring and clean-up
"git multi-pack-index write --bitmap" learns to propagate the
hashcache from original bitmap to resulting bitmap.
* tb/midx-write-propagate-namehash:
t5326: test propagating hashcache values
p5326: generate pack bitmaps before writing the MIDX bitmap
p5326: don't set core.multiPackIndex unnecessarily
p5326: create missing 'perf-tag' tag
midx.c: respect 'pack.writeBitmapHashcache' when writing bitmaps
pack-bitmap.c: propagate namehash values from existing bitmaps
t/helper/test-bitmap.c: add 'dump-hashes' mode
The "git log" command limits its output to the commits that contain strings
matched by a pattern when the "--grep=<pattern>" option is used, but unlike
output from "git grep -e <pattern>", the matches are not highlighted,
making them harder to spot.
Teach the pretty-printer code to highlight matches from the
"--grep=<pattern>", "--author=<pattern>" and "--committer=<pattern>"
options (to view the last one, you may have to ask for --pretty=fuller).
Also, it must be noted that we are effectively greping the content twice
(because it would be a hassle to rework the existing matching code to do
a /g match and then pass it all down to the coloring code), however it only
slows down "git log --author=^H" on this repository by around 1-2%
(compared to v2.33.0), so it should be a small enough slow down to justify
the addition of the feature.
Signed-off-by: Hamza Mahfooz <someguy@effective-light.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Commit cdc2d5f11f (builtin/blame: dim uninteresting metadata lines,
2018-04-23) and 25d5f52901 (builtin/blame: highlight recently changed
lines, 2018-04-23) introduce --color-lines and --color-by-age options to
git blame, respectively. While both options are mentioned in usage help,
they aren't documented in git-blame(1). Document them.
Co-authored-by: Dr. Matthias St. Pierre <m.st.pierre@ncp-e.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. Matthias St. Pierre <m.st.pierre@ncp-e.com>
Signed-off-by: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
In the previous commit, the bitmap writing code learned to propagate
values from an existing hash-cache extension into the bitmap that it is
writing.
Now that that functionality exists, let's expose it by teaching the 'git
multi-pack-index' builtin to respect the `pack.writeBitmapHashCache`
option so that the hash-cache may be written at all.
Two minor points worth noting here:
- The 'git multi-pack-index write' sub-command didn't previously read
any configuration (instead this is handled in the base command). A
separate handler is added here to respect this write-specific
config option.
- I briefly considered adding a 'bitmap_flags' field to the static
options struct, but decided against it since it would require
plumbing through a new parameter to the write_midx_file() function.
Instead, a new MIDX-specific flag is added, which is translated to
the corresponding bitmap one.
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
To verify a ssh signature we first call ssh-keygen -Y find-principal to
look up the signing principal by their public key from the
allowedSignersFile. If the key is found then we do a verify. Otherwise
we only validate the signature but can not verify the signers identity.
Verification uses the gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile (see ssh-keygen(1) "ALLOWED
SIGNERS") which contains valid public keys and a principal (usually
user@domain). Depending on the environment this file can be managed by
the individual developer or for example generated by the central
repository server from known ssh keys with push access. This file is usually
stored outside the repository, but if the repository only allows signed
commits/pushes, the user might choose to store it in the repository.
To revoke a key put the public key without the principal prefix into
gpg.ssh.revocationKeyring or generate a KRL (see ssh-keygen(1)
"KEY REVOCATION LISTS"). The same considerations about who to trust for
verification as with the allowedSignersFile apply.
Using SSH CA Keys with these files is also possible. Add
"cert-authority" as key option between the principal and the key to mark
it as a CA and all keys signed by it as valid for this CA.
See "CERTIFICATES" in ssh-keygen(1).
Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <fs@gigacodes.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
If user.signingkey is not set and a ssh signature is requested we call
gpg.ssh.defaultKeyCommand (typically "ssh-add -L") and use the first key we get
Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <fs@gigacodes.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Implements the actual sign_buffer_ssh operation and move some shared
cleanup code into a strbuf function
Set gpg.format = ssh and user.signingkey to either a ssh public key
string (like from an authorized_keys file), or a ssh key file.
If the key file or the config value itself contains only a public key
then the private key needs to be available via ssh-agent.
gpg.ssh.program can be set to an alternative location of ssh-keygen.
A somewhat recent openssh version (8.2p1+) of ssh-keygen is needed for
this feature. Since only ssh-keygen is needed it can this way be
installed seperately without upgrading your system openssh packages.
Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <fs@gigacodes.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
The logic for auto-correction of misspelt subcommands learned to go
interactive when the help.autocorrect configuration variable is set
to 'prompt'.
* ab/help-autocorrect-prompt:
help.c: help.autocorrect=prompt waits for user action
Doc update plus improved error reporting.
* jk/log-warn-on-bogus-encoding:
docs: use "character encoding" to refer to commit-object encoding
logmsg_reencode(): warn when iconv() fails
"git upload-pack" which runs on the other side of "git fetch"
forgot to take the ref namespaces into account when handling
want-ref requests.
* ka/want-ref-in-namespace:
docs: clarify the interaction of transfer.hideRefs and namespaces
upload-pack.c: treat want-ref relative to namespace
t5730: introduce fetch command helper
In preparation for `git-rebase--preserve-merges.sh` entering its after
life, we remove this (deprecated) option that would still rely on it.
To help users transition who still did not receive the memo about the
deprecation, we offer a helpful error message instead of throwing our
hands in the air and saying that we don't know that option, never heard
of it.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Reviewed-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Expand the section about namespaces in the documentation of
`transfer.hideRefs` to point out the subtle differences between
`upload-pack` and `receive-pack`.
ffcfb68176 (upload-pack.c: treat want-ref relative to namespace,
2021-07-30) taught `upload-pack` to reject `want-ref`s for hidden refs,
which is now mentioned. It is clarified that at no point the name of a
hidden ref is revealed, but the object id it points to may.
Signed-off-by: Kim Altintop <kim@eagain.st>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Tan <jonathantanmy@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Silently skipping commits when rebasing with --no-reapply-cherry-picks
(currently the default behavior) can cause user confusion. Issue
warnings when this happens, as well as advice on how to preserve the
skipped commits.
These warnings and advice are displayed only when using the (default)
"merge" rebase backend.
Update the git-rebase docs to mention the warnings and advice.
Signed-off-by: Josh Steadmon <steadmon@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
The word "encoding" can mean a lot of things (e.g., base64 or
quoted-printable encoding in emails, HTML entities, URL encoding, and so
on). The documentation for i18n.commitEncoding and i18n.logOutputEncoding
uses the phrase "character encoding" to make this more clear.
Let's use that phrase in other places to make it clear what kind of
encoding we are talking about. This patch covers the gui.encoding
option, as well as the --encoding option for git-log, etc (in this
latter case, I word-smithed the sentence a little at the same time).
That, coupled with the mention of iconv in the --encoding description,
should make this more clear.
The other spot I looked at is the working-tree-encoding section of
gitattributes(5). But it gives specific examples of encodings that I
think make the meaning pretty clear already.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Documentation on "git diff -l<n>" and diff.renameLimit have been
updated, and the defaults for these limits have been raised.
* en/rename-limits-doc:
rename: bump limit defaults yet again
diffcore-rename: treat a rename_limit of 0 as unlimited
doc: clarify documentation for rename/copy limits
diff: correct warning message when renameLimit exceeded
"git send-email" optimization.
* ab/send-email-optim:
perl: nano-optimize by replacing Cwd::cwd() with Cwd::getcwd()
send-email: move trivial config handling to Perl
perl: lazily load some common Git.pm setup code
send-email: lazily load modules for a big speedup
send-email: get rid of indirect object syntax
send-email: use function syntax instead of barewords
send-email: lazily shell out to "git var"
send-email: lazily load config for a big speedup
send-email: copy "config_regxp" into git-send-email.perl
send-email: refactor sendemail.smtpencryption config parsing
send-email: remove non-working support for "sendemail.smtpssl"
send-email tests: test for boolean variables without a value
send-email tests: support GIT_TEST_PERL_FATAL_WARNINGS=true
The doc for 'submodule.recurse' starts with "Specifies if commands
recurse into submodles by default". This is not exactly true of all
commands that have a '--recurse-submodules' option. For example, 'git
pull --recurse-submodules' does not run 'git pull' in each submodule,
but rather runs 'git submodule update --recursive' so that the submodule
working trees after the pull matches the commits recorded in the
superproject.
Clarify that by just saying that it enables '--recurse-submodules'.
Note that the way this setting interacts with 'fetch.recurseSubmodules'
and 'push.recurseSubmodules', which can have other values than true or
false, is already documented since 4da9e99e6e (doc: be more precise on
(fetch|push).recurseSubmodules, 2020-04-06).
Signed-off-by: Philippe Blain <levraiphilippeblain@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
