An earlier patch discussed and fixed a scenario where Git could be used
as a vector to exfiltrate sensitive data through a Docker container when
a potential victim clones a suspicious repository with local submodules
that contain symlinks.
That security hole has since been plugged, but a similar one still
exists. Instead of convincing a would-be victim to clone an embedded
submodule via the "file" protocol, an attacker could convince an
individual to clone a repository that has a submodule pointing to a
valid path on the victim's filesystem.
For example, if an individual (with username "foo") has their home
directory ("/home/foo") stored as a Git repository, then an attacker
could exfiltrate data by convincing a victim to clone a malicious
repository containing a submodule pointing at "/home/foo/.git" with
`--recurse-submodules`. Doing so would expose any sensitive contents in
stored in "/home/foo" tracked in Git.
For systems (such as Docker) that consider everything outside of the
immediate top-level working directory containing a Dockerfile as
inaccessible to the container (with the exception of volume mounts, and
so on), this is a violation of trust by exposing unexpected contents in
the working copy.
To mitigate the likelihood of this kind of attack, adjust the "file://"
protocol's default policy to be "user" to prevent commands that execute
without user input (including recursive submodule initialization) from
taking place by default.
Suggested-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
* maint-2.31:
Git 2.31.4
Git 2.30.5
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
* maint-2.30:
Git 2.30.5
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
Previous changes introduced a regression which will prevent root for
accessing repositories owned by thyself if using sudo because SUDO_UID
takes precedence.
Loosen that restriction by allowing root to access repositories owned
by both uid by default and without having to add a safe.directory
exception.
A previous workaround that was documented in the tests is no longer
needed so it has been removed together with its specially crafted
prerequisite.
Helped-by: Johanness Schindelin <Johannes.Schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
bdc77d1d68 (Add a function to determine whether a path is owned by the
current user, 2022-03-02) checks for the effective uid of the running
process using geteuid() but didn't account for cases where that user was
root (because git was invoked through sudo or a compatible tool) and the
original uid that repository trusted for its config was no longer known,
therefore failing the following otherwise safe call:
guy@renard ~/Software/uncrustify $ sudo git describe --always --dirty
[sudo] password for guy:
fatal: unsafe repository ('/home/guy/Software/uncrustify' is owned by someone else)
Attempt to detect those cases by using the environment variables that
those tools create to keep track of the original user id, and do the
ownership check using that instead.
This assumes the environment the user is running on after going
privileged can't be tampered with, and also adds code to restrict that
the new behavior only applies if running as root, therefore keeping the
most common case, which runs unprivileged, from changing, but because of
that, it will miss cases where sudo (or an equivalent) was used to change
to another unprivileged user or where the equivalent tool used to raise
privileges didn't track the original id in a sudo compatible way.
Because of compatibility with sudo, the code assumes that uid_t is an
unsigned integer type (which is not required by the standard) but is used
that way in their codebase to generate SUDO_UID. In systems where uid_t
is signed, sudo might be also patched to NOT be unsigned and that might
be able to trigger an edge case and a bug (as described in the code), but
it is considered unlikely to happen and even if it does, the code would
just mostly fail safely, so there was no attempt either to detect it or
prevent it by the code, which is something that might change in the future,
based on expected user feedback.
Reported-by: Guy Maurel <guy.j@maurel.de>
Helped-by: SZEDER Gábor <szeder.dev@gmail.com>
Helped-by: Randall Becker <rsbecker@nexbridge.com>
Helped-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood123@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Johannes Schindelin <Johannes.Schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
With the addition of the safe.directory in 8959555ce
(setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level directory,
2022-03-02) released in v2.35.2, we are receiving feedback from a
variety of users about the feature.
Some users have a very large list of shared repositories and find it
cumbersome to add this config for every one of them.
In a more difficult case, certain workflows involve running Git commands
within containers. The container boundary prevents any global or system
config from communicating `safe.directory` values from the host into the
container. Further, the container almost always runs as a different user
than the owner of the directory in the host.
To simplify the reactions necessary for these users, extend the
definition of the safe.directory config value to include a possible '*'
value. This value implies that all directories are safe, providing a
single setting to opt-out of this protection.
Note that an empty assignment of safe.directory clears all previous
values, and this is already the case with the "if (!value || !*value)"
condition.
Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <derrickstolee@github.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
* maint-2.31:
Git 2.31.2
Git 2.30.3
setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level directory
Add a function to determine whether a path is owned by the current user
* maint-2.30:
Git 2.30.3
setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level directory
Add a function to determine whether a path is owned by the current user
It poses a security risk to search for a git directory outside of the
directories owned by the current user.
For example, it is common e.g. in computer pools of educational
institutes to have a "scratch" space: a mounted disk with plenty of
space that is regularly swiped where any authenticated user can create
a directory to do their work. Merely navigating to such a space with a
Git-enabled `PS1` when there is a maliciously-crafted `/scratch/.git/`
can lead to a compromised account.
The same holds true in multi-user setups running Windows, as `C:\` is
writable to every authenticated user by default.
To plug this vulnerability, we stop Git from accepting top-level
directories owned by someone other than the current user. We avoid
looking at the ownership of each and every directories between the
current and the top-level one (if there are any between) to avoid
introducing a performance bottleneck.
This new default behavior is obviously incompatible with the concept of
shared repositories, where we expect the top-level directory to be owned
by only one of its legitimate users. To re-enable that use case, we add
support for adding exceptions from the new default behavior via the
config setting `safe.directory`.
The `safe.directory` config setting is only respected in the system and
global configs, not from repository configs or via the command-line, and
can have multiple values to allow for multiple shared repositories.
We are particularly careful to provide a helpful message to any user
trying to use a shared repository.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Another brown paper bag inconsistency fix for a new feature
introduced during this cycle.
* dl/stash-show-untracked-fixup:
stash show: use stash.showIncludeUntracked even when diff options given
If options pertaining to how the diff is displayed is provided to
`git stash show`, the command will ignore the stash.showIncludeUntracked
configuration variable, defaulting to not showing any untracked files.
This is unintuitive behaviour since the format of the diff output and
whether or not to display untracked files are orthogonal.
Use stash.showIncludeUntracked even when diff options are given. Of
course, this is still overridable via the command-line options.
Update the documentation to explicitly say which configuration variables
will be overridden when a diff options are given.
Signed-off-by: Denton Liu <liu.denton@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Regression fix for a change made during this cycle.
* cs/http-use-basic-after-failed-negotiate:
Revert "remote-curl: fall back to basic auth if Negotiate fails"
t5551: test http interaction with credential helpers
"git mailinfo" (hence "git am") learned the "--quoted-cr" option to
control how lines ending with CRLF wrapped in base64 or qp are
handled.
* dd/mailinfo-quoted-cr:
am: learn to process quoted lines that ends with CRLF
mailinfo: allow stripping quoted CR without warning
mailinfo: allow squelching quoted CRLF warning
mailinfo: warn if CRLF found in decoded base64/QP email
mailinfo: stop parsing options manually
mailinfo: load default metainfo_charset lazily
"git push" learns to discover common ancestor with the receiving
end over protocol v2.
* jt/push-negotiation:
send-pack: support push negotiation
fetch: teach independent negotiation (no packfile)
fetch-pack: refactor command and capability write
fetch-pack: refactor add_haves()
fetch-pack: refactor process_acks()
Over-the-wire protocol learns a new request type to ask for object
sizes given a list of object names.
* ba/object-info:
object-info: support for retrieving object info
The way the command line specified by the trailer.<token>.command
configuration variable receives the end-user supplied value was
both error prone and misleading. An alternative to achieve the
same goal in a safer and more intuitive way has been added, as
the trailer.<token>.cmd configuration variable, to replace it.
* zh/trailer-cmd:
trailer: add new .cmd config option
docs: correct descript of trailer.<token>.command
Various test and documentation updates about .gitsomething paths
that are symlinks.
* jk/symlinked-dotgitx-cleanup:
docs: document symlink restrictions for dot-files
fsck: warn about symlinked dotfiles we'll open with O_NOFOLLOW
t0060: test ntfs/hfs-obscured dotfiles
t7450: test .gitmodules symlink matching against obscured names
t7450: test verify_path() handling of gitmodules
t7415: rename to expand scope
fsck_tree(): wrap some long lines
fsck_tree(): fix shadowed variable
t7415: remove out-dated comment about translation
In previous changes, mailinfo has learnt to process lines that decoded
from base64 or quoted-printable, and ends with CRLF.
Let's teach "am" that new trick, too.
Signed-off-by: Đoàn Trần Công Danh <congdanhqx@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
In previous changes, we've turned on warning for quoted CR in base64 or
quoted-printable email messages. Some projects see those quoted CR a lot,
they know that it happens most of the time, and they find it's desirable
to always strip those CR.
Those projects in question usually fall back to use other tools to handle
patches when receive such patches.
Let's help those projects handle those patches by stripping those
excessive CR.
Signed-off-by: Đoàn Trần Công Danh <congdanhqx@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
In previous change, Git starts to warn for quoted CRLF in decoded
base64/QP email. Despite those warnings are usually helpful,
quoted CRLF could be part of some users' workflow.
Let's give them an option to turn off the warning completely.
Signed-off-by: Đoàn Trần Công Danh <congdanhqx@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
The description of "%ch" is missing a space after "human style", before
the parenthetical remark. This description was introduced in b722d4560e
("pretty: provide human date format", 2021-04-25). That commit also
added "%ah", which does have the space already.
Signed-off-by: Martin Ågren <martin.agren@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Drop the ")" at the end of this paragraph. There's a parenthetical
remark in this paragraph, but it's been closed on the line above.
Signed-off-by: Martin Ågren <martin.agren@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
"git rev-list" learns the "--filter=object:type=<type>" option,
which can be used to exclude objects of the given kind from the
packfile generated by pack-objects.
* ps/rev-list-object-type-filter:
rev-list: allow filtering of provided items
pack-bitmap: implement combined filter
pack-bitmap: implement object type filter
list-objects: implement object type filter
list-objects: support filtering by tag and commit
list-objects: move tag processing into its own function
revision: mark commit parents as NOT_USER_GIVEN
uploadpack.txt: document implication of `uploadpackfilter.allow`
"git rebase --[no-]reschedule-failed-exec" did not work well with
its configuration variable, which has been corrected.
* ab/rebase-no-reschedule-failed-exec:
rebase: don't override --no-reschedule-failed-exec with config
rebase tests: camel-case rebase.rescheduleFailedExec consistently
