* maint-2.34:
Git 2.34.4
Git 2.33.4
Git 2.32.3
Git 2.31.4
Git 2.30.5
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
* maint-2.33:
Git 2.33.4
Git 2.32.3
Git 2.31.4
Git 2.30.5
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
* maint-2.32:
Git 2.32.3
Git 2.31.4
Git 2.30.5
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
* maint-2.31:
Git 2.31.4
Git 2.30.5
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
* maint-2.30:
Git 2.30.5
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
Previous changes introduced a regression which will prevent root for
accessing repositories owned by thyself if using sudo because SUDO_UID
takes precedence.
Loosen that restriction by allowing root to access repositories owned
by both uid by default and without having to add a safe.directory
exception.
A previous workaround that was documented in the tests is no longer
needed so it has been removed together with its specially crafted
prerequisite.
Helped-by: Johanness Schindelin <Johannes.Schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
bdc77d1d68 (Add a function to determine whether a path is owned by the
current user, 2022-03-02) checks for the effective uid of the running
process using geteuid() but didn't account for cases where that user was
root (because git was invoked through sudo or a compatible tool) and the
original uid that repository trusted for its config was no longer known,
therefore failing the following otherwise safe call:
guy@renard ~/Software/uncrustify $ sudo git describe --always --dirty
[sudo] password for guy:
fatal: unsafe repository ('/home/guy/Software/uncrustify' is owned by someone else)
Attempt to detect those cases by using the environment variables that
those tools create to keep track of the original user id, and do the
ownership check using that instead.
This assumes the environment the user is running on after going
privileged can't be tampered with, and also adds code to restrict that
the new behavior only applies if running as root, therefore keeping the
most common case, which runs unprivileged, from changing, but because of
that, it will miss cases where sudo (or an equivalent) was used to change
to another unprivileged user or where the equivalent tool used to raise
privileges didn't track the original id in a sudo compatible way.
Because of compatibility with sudo, the code assumes that uid_t is an
unsigned integer type (which is not required by the standard) but is used
that way in their codebase to generate SUDO_UID. In systems where uid_t
is signed, sudo might be also patched to NOT be unsigned and that might
be able to trigger an edge case and a bug (as described in the code), but
it is considered unlikely to happen and even if it does, the code would
just mostly fail safely, so there was no attempt either to detect it or
prevent it by the code, which is something that might change in the future,
based on expected user feedback.
Reported-by: Guy Maurel <guy.j@maurel.de>
Helped-by: SZEDER Gábor <szeder.dev@gmail.com>
Helped-by: Randall Becker <rsbecker@nexbridge.com>
Helped-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood123@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Johannes Schindelin <Johannes.Schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
With the addition of the safe.directory in 8959555ce
(setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level directory,
2022-03-02) released in v2.35.2, we are receiving feedback from a
variety of users about the feature.
Some users have a very large list of shared repositories and find it
cumbersome to add this config for every one of them.
In a more difficult case, certain workflows involve running Git commands
within containers. The container boundary prevents any global or system
config from communicating `safe.directory` values from the host into the
container. Further, the container almost always runs as a different user
than the owner of the directory in the host.
To simplify the reactions necessary for these users, extend the
definition of the safe.directory config value to include a possible '*'
value. This value implies that all directories are safe, providing a
single setting to opt-out of this protection.
Note that an empty assignment of safe.directory clears all previous
values, and this is already the case with the "if (!value || !*value)"
condition.
Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <derrickstolee@github.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
* maint-2.34:
Git 2.34.2
Git 2.33.2
Git 2.32.1
Git 2.31.2
GIT-VERSION-GEN: bump to v2.33.1
Git 2.30.3
setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level directory
Add a function to determine whether a path is owned by the current user
* maint-2.33:
Git 2.33.2
Git 2.32.1
Git 2.31.2
GIT-VERSION-GEN: bump to v2.33.1
Git 2.30.3
setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level directory
Add a function to determine whether a path is owned by the current user
* maint-2.32:
Git 2.32.1
Git 2.31.2
Git 2.30.3
setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level directory
Add a function to determine whether a path is owned by the current user
* maint-2.31:
Git 2.31.2
Git 2.30.3
setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level directory
Add a function to determine whether a path is owned by the current user
* maint-2.30:
Git 2.30.3
setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level directory
Add a function to determine whether a path is owned by the current user
It poses a security risk to search for a git directory outside of the
directories owned by the current user.
For example, it is common e.g. in computer pools of educational
institutes to have a "scratch" space: a mounted disk with plenty of
space that is regularly swiped where any authenticated user can create
a directory to do their work. Merely navigating to such a space with a
Git-enabled `PS1` when there is a maliciously-crafted `/scratch/.git/`
can lead to a compromised account.
The same holds true in multi-user setups running Windows, as `C:\` is
writable to every authenticated user by default.
To plug this vulnerability, we stop Git from accepting top-level
directories owned by someone other than the current user. We avoid
looking at the ownership of each and every directories between the
current and the top-level one (if there are any between) to avoid
introducing a performance bottleneck.
This new default behavior is obviously incompatible with the concept of
shared repositories, where we expect the top-level directory to be owned
by only one of its legitimate users. To re-enable that use case, we add
support for adding exceptions from the new default behavior via the
config setting `safe.directory`.
The `safe.directory` config setting is only respected in the system and
global configs, not from repository configs or via the command-line, and
can have multiple values to allow for multiple shared repositories.
We are particularly careful to provide a helpful message to any user
trying to use a shared repository.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
"git branch -h" incorrectly said "--track[=direct|inherit]",
implying that "--trackinherit" is a valid option, which has been
corrected.
source: <3de40324bea6a1dd9bca2654721471e3809e87d8.1642538935.git.steadmon@google.com>
source: <c3c26192-aee9-185a-e559-b8735139e49c@web.de>
* js/branch-track-inherit:
branch,checkout: fix --track documentation
Document that the accepted variants of the --track option are --track,
--track=direct, and --track=inherit. The equal sign in the latter two
cannot be replaced with whitespace; in general optional arguments need
to be attached firmly to their option.
Put "direct" consistently before "inherit", if only for the reasons
that the former is the default, explained first in the documentation,
and comes before the latter alphabetically.
Mention both modes in the short help so that readers don't have to look
them up in the full documentation. They are literal strings and thus
untranslatable. PARSE_OPT_LITERAL_ARGHELP is inferred due to the pipe
and parenthesis characters, so we don't have to provide that flag
explicitly.
Mention that -t has the same effect as --track and --track=direct.
There is no way to specify inherit mode using the short option, because
short options generally don't accept optional arguments.
Signed-off-by: René Scharfe <l.s.r@web.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Extend the guidance to choose the base commit to build your work
on, and hint/nudge contributors to read others' changes.
* jc/doc-submitting-patches-choice-of-base:
SubmittingPatchs: clarify choice of base and testing
"git -c branch.autosetupmerge=inherit branch new old" makes "new"
to have the same upstream as the "old" branch, instead of marking
"old" itself as its upstream.
* js/branch-track-inherit:
config: require lowercase for branch.*.autosetupmerge
branch: add flags and config to inherit tracking
branch: accept multiple upstream branches for tracking
"git fetch" and "git pull" are now declared sparse-index clean.
Also "git ls-files" learns the "--sparse" option to help debugging.
* ds/fetch-pull-with-sparse-index:
test-read-cache: remove --table, --expand options
t1091/t3705: remove 'test-tool read-cache --table'
t1092: replace 'read-cache --table' with 'ls-files --sparse'
ls-files: add --sparse option
fetch/pull: use the sparse index
The default merge message prepared by "git merge" records the name
of the current branch; the name can be overridden with a new option
to allow users to pretend a merge is made on a different branch.
* jc/merge-detached-head-name:
merge: allow to pretend a merge is made into a different branch
"git am" learns "--empty=(stop|drop|keep)" option to tweak what is
done to a piece of e-mail without a patch in it.
* xw/am-empty:
am: support --allow-empty to record specific empty patches
am: support --empty=<option> to handle empty patches
doc: git-format-patch: describe the option --always
The "init" and "set" subcommands in "git sparse-checkout" have been
unified for a better user experience and performance.
* en/sparse-checkout-set:
sparse-checkout: remove stray trailing space
clone: avoid using deprecated `sparse-checkout init`
Documentation: clarify/correct a few sparsity related statements
git-sparse-checkout.txt: update to document init/set/reapply changes
sparse-checkout: enable reapply to take --[no-]{cone,sparse-index}
sparse-checkout: enable `set` to initialize sparse-checkout mode
sparse-checkout: split out code for tweaking settings config
sparse-checkout: disallow --no-stdin as an argument to set
sparse-checkout: add sanity-checks on initial sparsity state
sparse-checkout: break apart functions for sparse_checkout_(set|add)
sparse-checkout: pass use_stdin as a parameter instead of as a global
We encourage identifying what, among many topics on `next`, exact
topics a new work depends on, instead of building directly on
`next`. Let's clarify this in the documentation.
Developers should know what they are building on top of, and be
aware of which part of the system is currently being worked on.
Encouraging them to make trial merges to `next` and `seen`
themselves will incentivize them to read others' changes and
understand them, eventually helping the developers to coordinate
among themselves and reviewing each others' changes.
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
