git-commit-vandalism/sha1dc/sha1.h
Jeff King 8325e43b82 Makefile: add DC_SHA1 knob
This knob lets you use the sha1dc implementation from:

      https://github.com/cr-marcstevens/sha1collisiondetection

which can detect certain types of collision attacks (even
when we only see half of the colliding pair). So it
mitigates any attack which consists of getting the "good"
half of a collision into a trusted repository, and then
later replacing it with the "bad" half. The "good" half is
rejected by the victim's version of Git (and even if they
run an old version of Git, any sha1dc-enabled git will
complain loudly if it ever has to interact with the object).

The big downside is that it's slower than either the openssl
or block-sha1 implementations.

Here are some timings based off of linux.git:

  - compute sha1 over whole packfile
      sha1dc: 3.580s
    blk-sha1: 2.046s (-43%)
     openssl: 1.335s (-62%)

  - rev-list --all --objects
      sha1dc: 33.512s
    blk-sha1: 33.514s (+0.0%)
     openssl: 33.650s (+0.4%)

  - git log --no-merges -10000 -p
      sha1dc: 8.124s
    blk-sha1: 7.986s (-1.6%)
     openssl: 8.203s (+0.9%)

  - index-pack --verify
      sha1dc: 4m19s
    blk-sha1: 2m57s (-32%)
     openssl: 2m19s (-42%)

So overall the sha1 computation with collision detection is
about 1.75x slower than block-sha1, and 2.7x slower than
sha1. But of course most operations do more than just sha1.
Normal object access isn't really slowed at all (both the
+/- changes there are well within the run-to-run noise); any
changes are drowned out by the other work Git is doing.

The most-affected operation is `index-pack --verify`, which
is essentially just computing the sha1 on every object. This
is similar to the `index-pack` invocation that the receiver
of a push or fetch would perform. So clearly there's some
extra CPU load here.

There will also be some latency for the user, though keep in
mind that such an operation will generally be network bound
(this is about a 1.2GB packfile). Some of that extra CPU is
"free" in the sense that we use it while the pack is
streaming in anyway. But most of it comes during the
delta-resolution phase, after the whole pack has been
received. So we can imagine that for this (quite large)
push, the user might have to wait an extra 100 seconds over
openssl (which is what we use now). If we assume they can
push to us at 20Mbit/s, that's 480s for a 1.2GB pack, which
is only 20% slower.

Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2017-03-17 10:40:25 -07:00

123 lines
4.8 KiB
C

/***
* Copyright 2017 Marc Stevens <marc@marc-stevens.nl>, Dan Shumow <danshu@microsoft.com>
* Distributed under the MIT Software License.
* See accompanying file LICENSE.txt or copy at
* https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT
***/
#ifndef SHA1DC_SHA1_H
#define SHA1DC_SHA1_H
#if defined(__cplusplus)
extern "C" {
#endif
/* uses SHA-1 message expansion to expand the first 16 words of W[] to 80 words */
/* void sha1_message_expansion(uint32_t W[80]); */
/* sha-1 compression function; first version takes a message block pre-parsed as 16 32-bit integers, second version takes an already expanded message) */
/* void sha1_compression(uint32_t ihv[5], const uint32_t m[16]);
void sha1_compression_W(uint32_t ihv[5], const uint32_t W[80]); */
/* same as sha1_compression_W, but additionally store intermediate states */
/* only stores states ii (the state between step ii-1 and step ii) when DOSTORESTATEii is defined in ubc_check.h */
void sha1_compression_states(uint32_t[5], const uint32_t[16], uint32_t[80], uint32_t[80][5]);
/*
// function type for sha1_recompression_step_T (uint32_t ihvin[5], uint32_t ihvout[5], const uint32_t me2[80], const uint32_t state[5])
// where 0 <= T < 80
// me2 is an expanded message (the expansion of an original message block XOR'ed with a disturbance vector's message block difference)
// state is the internal state (a,b,c,d,e) before step T of the SHA-1 compression function while processing the original message block
// the function will return:
// ihvin: the reconstructed input chaining value
// ihvout: the reconstructed output chaining value
*/
typedef void(*sha1_recompression_type)(uint32_t*, uint32_t*, const uint32_t*, const uint32_t*);
/* table of sha1_recompression_step_0, ... , sha1_recompression_step_79 */
/* extern sha1_recompression_type sha1_recompression_step[80];*/
/* a callback function type that can be set to be called when a collision block has been found: */
/* void collision_block_callback(uint64_t byteoffset, const uint32_t ihvin1[5], const uint32_t ihvin2[5], const uint32_t m1[80], const uint32_t m2[80]) */
typedef void(*collision_block_callback)(uint64_t, const uint32_t*, const uint32_t*, const uint32_t*, const uint32_t*);
/* the SHA-1 context */
typedef struct {
uint64_t total;
uint32_t ihv[5];
unsigned char buffer[64];
int found_collision;
int safe_hash;
int detect_coll;
int ubc_check;
int reduced_round_coll;
collision_block_callback callback;
uint32_t ihv1[5];
uint32_t ihv2[5];
uint32_t m1[80];
uint32_t m2[80];
uint32_t states[80][5];
} SHA1_CTX;
/* initialize SHA-1 context */
void SHA1DCInit(SHA1_CTX*);
/*
// function to enable safe SHA-1 hashing:
// collision attacks are thwarted by hashing a detected near-collision block 3 times
// think of it as extending SHA-1 from 80-steps to 240-steps for such blocks:
// the best collision attacks against SHA-1 have complexity about 2^60,
// thus for 240-steps an immediate lower-bound for the best cryptanalytic attacks would 2^180
// an attacker would be better off using a generic birthday search of complexity 2^80
//
// enabling safe SHA-1 hashing will result in the correct SHA-1 hash for messages where no collision attack was detected
// but it will result in a different SHA-1 hash for messages where a collision attack was detected
// this will automatically invalidate SHA-1 based digital signature forgeries
// enabled by default
*/
void SHA1DCSetSafeHash(SHA1_CTX*, int);
/* function to disable or enable the use of Unavoidable Bitconditions (provides a significant speed up) */
/* enabled by default */
void SHA1DCSetUseUBC(SHA1_CTX*, int);
/* function to disable or enable the use of Collision Detection */
/* enabled by default */
void SHA1DCSetUseDetectColl(SHA1_CTX*, int);
/* function to disable or enable the detection of reduced-round SHA-1 collisions */
/* disabled by default */
void SHA1DCSetDetectReducedRoundCollision(SHA1_CTX*, int);
/* function to set a callback function, pass NULL to disable */
/* by default no callback set */
void SHA1DCSetCallback(SHA1_CTX*, collision_block_callback);
/* update SHA-1 context with buffer contents */
void SHA1DCUpdate(SHA1_CTX*, const char*, size_t);
/* obtain SHA-1 hash from SHA-1 context */
/* returns: 0 = no collision detected, otherwise = collision found => warn user for active attack */
int SHA1DCFinal(unsigned char[20], SHA1_CTX*);
/*
* Same as SHA1DCFinal, but convert collision attack case into a verbose die().
*/
void git_SHA1DCFinal(unsigned char [20], SHA1_CTX *);
/*
* Same as SHA1DCUpdate, but adjust types to match git's usual interface.
*/
void git_SHA1DCUpdate(SHA1_CTX *ctx, const void *data, unsigned long len);
#define platform_SHA_CTX SHA1_CTX
#define platform_SHA1_Init SHA1DCInit
#define platform_SHA1_Update git_SHA1DCUpdate
#define platform_SHA1_Final git_SHA1DCFinal
#if defined(__cplusplus)
}
#endif
#endif /* SHA1DC_SHA1_H */