A few variables in this file use camelCase, while the overall standard
is snake_case. A consistent naming scheme will improve readability of
future changes. To avoid mixing naming changes with semantic changes,
this commit contains only naming changes.
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Gilbert <JonathanG@iQmetrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Pratyush Yadav <me@yadavpratyush.com>
Changes involving only blank lines are hidden with --ignore-blank-lines,
unless they appear in the context lines of other changes. This is
handled by xdl_get_hunk() for context added by --inter-hunk-context, -u
and -U.
Function context for -W and --function-context added by xdl_emit_diff()
doesn't pay attention to such ignored changes; it relies fully on
xdl_get_hunk() and shows just the post-image of ignored changes
appearing in function context. That's inconsistent and confusing.
Improve the result of using --ignore-blank-lines and --function-context
together by fully showing ignored changes if they happen to fall within
function context.
Signed-off-by: René Scharfe <l.s.r@web.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
While the only permitted drive letters for physical drives on Windows
are letters of the US-English alphabet, this restriction does not apply
to virtual drives assigned via `subst <letter>: <path>`.
To prevent targeted attacks against systems where "funny" drive letters
such as `1` or `!` are assigned, let's handle them as regular drive
letters on Windows.
This fixes CVE-2019-1351.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
On Windows, filenames cannot have trailing spaces or periods, when
opening such paths, they are stripped automatically. Read: you can open
the file `README` via the file name `README . . .`. This ambiguity can
be used in combination with other security bugs to cause e.g. remote
code execution during recursive clones. This patch series fixes that.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
This patch fixes a vulnerability in the Windows-specific code where a
submodule names ending in a backslash were quoted incorrectly, and that
bug could be abused to insert command-line parameters e.g. to `ssh` in a
recursive clone.
Note: this bug is Windows-only, as we have to construct a command line
for the process-to-spawn, unlike Linux/macOS, where `execv()` accepts an
already-split command line.
While at it, other quoting issues are fixed as well.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Recursive clones are currently affected by a vulnerability that is
caused by too-lax validation of submodule names.
This topic branch fixes that.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
This patch series makes it safe to use Git on Windows drives, even if
running on a mounted network share or within the Windows Subsystem for
Linux (WSL).
This topic branch addresses CVE-2019-1353.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Over a decade ago, in 25fe217b86 (Windows: Treat Windows style path
names., 2008-03-05), Git was taught to handle absolute Windows paths,
i.e. paths that start with a drive letter and a colon.
Unbeknownst to us, while drive letters of physical drives are limited to
letters of the English alphabet, there is a way to assign virtual drive
letters to arbitrary directories, via the `subst` command, which is
_not_ limited to English letters.
It is therefore possible to have absolute Windows paths of the form
`1:\what\the\hex.txt`. Even "better": pretty much arbitrary Unicode
letters can also be used, e.g. `ä:\tschibät.sch`.
While it can be sensibly argued that users who set up such funny drive
letters really seek adverse consequences, the Windows Operating System
is known to be a platform where many users are at the mercy of
administrators who have their very own idea of what constitutes a
reasonable setup.
Therefore, let's just make sure that such funny paths are still
considered absolute paths by Git, on Windows.
In addition to Unicode characters, pretty much any character is a valid
drive letter, as far as `subst` is concerned, even `:` and `"` or even a
space character. While it is probably the opposite of smart to use them,
let's safeguard `is_dos_drive_prefix()` against all of them.
Note: `[::1]:repo` is a valid URL, but not a valid path on Windows.
As `[` is now considered a valid drive letter, we need to be very
careful to avoid misinterpreting such a string as valid local path in
`url_is_local_not_ssh()`. To do that, we use the just-introduced
function `is_valid_path()` (which will label the string as invalid file
name because of the colon characters).
This fixes CVE-2019-1351.
Reported-by: Nicolas Joly <Nicolas.Joly@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
This patch series plugs an attack vector we had overlooked in our
December 2014 work on `core.protectNTFS`.
Essentially, the path `.git::$INDEX_ALLOCATION/config` is interpreted as
`.git/config` when NTFS Alternate Data Streams are available (which they
are on Windows, and at least on network shares that are SMB-mounted on
macOS).
Needless to say: we don't want that.
In fact, we want to stay on the very safe side and not even special-case
the `$INDEX_ALLOCATION` stream type: let's just prevent Git from
touching _any_ explicitly specified Alternate Data Stream of `.git`.
In essence, we'll prevent Git from tracking, or writing to, any path
with a segment of the form `.git:<anything>`.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
When creating a directory on Windows whose path ends in a space or a
period (or chains thereof), the Win32 API "helpfully" trims those. For
example, `mkdir("abc ");` will return success, but actually create a
directory called `abc` instead.
This stems back to the DOS days, when all file names had exactly 8
characters plus exactly 3 characters for the file extension, and the
only way to have shorter names was by padding with spaces.
Sadly, this "helpful" behavior is a bit inconsistent: after a successful
`mkdir("abc ");`, a `mkdir("abc /def")` will actually _fail_ (because
the directory `abc ` does not actually exist).
Even if it would work, we now have a serious problem because a Git
repository could contain directories `abc` and `abc `, and on Windows,
they would be "merged" unintentionally.
As these paths are illegal on Windows, anyway, let's disallow any
accesses to such paths on that Operating System.
For practical reasons, this behavior is still guarded by the
config setting `core.protectNTFS`: it is possible (and at least two
regression tests make use of it) to create commits without involving the
worktree. In such a scenario, it is of course possible -- even on
Windows -- to create such file names.
Among other consequences, this patch disallows submodules' paths to end
in spaces on Windows (which would formerly have confused Git enough to
try to write into incorrect paths, anyway).
While this patch does not fix a vulnerability on its own, it prevents an
attack vector that was exploited in demonstrations of a number of
recently-fixed security bugs.
The regression test added to `t/t7417-submodule-path-url.sh` reflects
that attack vector.
Note that we have to adjust the test case "prevent git~1 squatting on
Windows" in `t/t7415-submodule-names.sh` because of a very subtle issue.
It tries to clone two submodules whose names differ only in a trailing
period character, and as a consequence their git directories differ in
the same way. Previously, when Git tried to clone the second submodule,
it thought that the git directory already existed (because on Windows,
when you create a directory with the name `b.` it actually creates `b`),
but with this patch, the first submodule's clone will fail because of
the illegal name of the git directory. Therefore, when cloning the
second submodule, Git will take a different code path: a fresh clone
(without an existing git directory). Both code paths fail to clone the
second submodule, both because the the corresponding worktree directory
exists and is not empty, but the error messages are worded differently.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
It is unfortunate that we need to quote arguments differently on
Windows, depending whether we build a command-line for MSYS2's `sh` or
for other Windows executables.
We already have a test helper to verify the latter, with this patch we
can also verify the former.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Certain characters are not admissible in file names on Windows, even if
Cygwin/MSYS2 (and therefore, Git for Windows' Bash) pretend that they
are, e.g. `:`, `<`, `>`, etc
Let's disallow those characters explicitly in Windows builds of Git.
Note: just like trailing spaces or periods, it _is_ possible on Windows
to create commits adding files with such illegal characters, as long as
the operation leaves the worktree untouched. To allow for that, we
continue to guard `is_valid_win32_path()` behind the config setting
`core.protectNTFS`, so that users _can_ continue to do that, as long as
they turn the protections off via that config setting.
Among other problems, this prevents Git from trying to write to an "NTFS
Alternate Data Stream" (which refers to metadata stored alongside a
file, under a special name: "<filename>:<stream-name>"). This fix
therefore also prevents an attack vector that was exploited in
demonstrations of a number of recently-fixed security bugs.
Further reading on illegal characters in Win32 filenames:
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/naming-a-file
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
A `git clone` will end with exit code 0 when `merged_entry()` returns a
positive value during a call of `unpack_trees()` to `traverse_trees()`.
The reason is that `unpack_trees()` will interpret a positive value not
to be an error.
The problem is, however, that `add_index_entry()` (which is called by
`merged_entry()` can report an error, and we really should fail the
entire clone in such a case.
Let's fix this problem, in preparation for a Windows-specific patch
disallowing `mkdir()` with directory names that contain a trailing space
(which is illegal on NTFS): we want `git clone` to abort when a path
cannot be checked out due to that condition.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
When the, say, 93rd trial run fails, it is a good idea to have a way to
skip the first 92 trials and dig directly into the 93rd in a debugger.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
On Windows, file names cannot contain asterisks nor newline characters.
In an upcoming commit, we will make this limitation explicit,
disallowing even the creation of commits that introduce such file names.
However, in the test scripts touched by this patch, we _know_ that those
paths won't be checked out, so we _want_ to allow such file names.
Happily, the stringent path validation will be guarded via the
`core.protectNTFS` flag, so all we need to do is to force that flag off
temporarily.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
When the stress test reported a problem with quoting certain arguments,
it is helpful to have a facility to play with those arguments in order
to find out whether variations of those arguments are affected, too.
Let's allow `test-run-command quote-stress-test -- <args>` to be used
for that purpose.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
On Windows, we have to do all the command-line argument quoting
ourselves. Worse: we have to have two versions of said quoting, one for
MSYS2 programs (which have their own dequoting rules) and the rest.
We care mostly about the rest, and to make sure that that works, let's
have a stress test that comes up with all kinds of awkward arguments,
verifying that a spawned sub-process receives those unharmed.
Signed-off-by: Garima Singh <garima.singh@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Currently it is technically possible to let a submodule's git
directory point right into the git dir of a sibling submodule.
Example: the git directories of two submodules with the names `hippo`
and `hippo/hooks` would be `.git/modules/hippo/` and
`.git/modules/hippo/hooks/`, respectively, but the latter is already
intended to house the former's hooks.
In most cases, this is just confusing, but there is also a (quite
contrived) attack vector where Git can be fooled into mistaking remote
content for file contents it wrote itself during a recursive clone.
Let's plug this bug.
To do so, we introduce the new function `validate_submodule_git_dir()`
which simply verifies that no git dir exists for any leading directories
of the submodule name (if there are any).
Note: this patch specifically continues to allow sibling modules names
of the form `core/lib`, `core/doc`, etc, as long as `core` is not a
submodule name.
This fixes CVE-2019-1387.
Reported-by: Nicolas Joly <Nicolas.Joly@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Back in the DOS days, in the FAT file system, file names always
consisted of a base name of length 8 plus a file extension of length 3.
Shorter file names were simply padded with spaces to the full 8.3
format.
Later, the FAT file system was taught to support _also_ longer names,
with an 8.3 "short name" as primary file name. While at it, the same
facility allowed formerly illegal file names, such as `.git` (empty base
names were not allowed), which would have the "short name" `git~1`
associated with it.
For backwards-compatibility, NTFS supports alternative 8.3 short
filenames, too, even if starting with Windows Vista, they are only
generated on the system drive by default.
We addressed the problem that the `.git/` directory can _also_ be
accessed via `git~1/` (when short names are enabled) in 2b4c6efc82
(read-cache: optionally disallow NTFS .git variants, 2014-12-16), i.e.
since Git v1.9.5, by introducing the config setting `core.protectNTFS`
and enabling it by default on Windows.
In the meantime, Windows 10 introduced the "Windows Subsystem for Linux"
(short: WSL), i.e. a way to run Linux applications/distributions in a
thinly-isolated subsystem on Windows (giving rise to many a "2016 is the
Year of Linux on the Desktop" jokes). WSL is getting increasingly
popular, also due to the painless way Linux application can operate
directly ("natively") on files on Windows' file system: the Windows
drives are mounted automatically (e.g. `C:` as `/mnt/c/`).
Taken together, this means that we now have to enable the safe-guards of
Git v1.9.5 also in WSL: it is possible to access a `.git` directory
inside `/mnt/c/` via the 8.3 name `git~1` (unless short name generation
was disabled manually). Since regular Linux distributions run in WSL,
this means we have to enable `core.protectNTFS` at least on Linux, too.
To enable Services for Macintosh in Windows NT to store so-called
resource forks, NTFS introduced "Alternate Data Streams". Essentially,
these constitute additional metadata that are connected to (and copied
with) their associated files, and they are accessed via pseudo file
names of the form `filename:<stream-name>:<stream-type>`.
In a recent patch, we extended `core.protectNTFS` to also protect
against accesses via NTFS Alternate Data Streams, e.g. to prevent
contents of the `.git/` directory to be "tracked" via yet another
alternative file name.
While it is not possible (at least by default) to access files via NTFS
Alternate Data Streams from within WSL, the defaults on macOS when
mounting network shares via SMB _do_ allow accessing files and
directories in that way. Therefore, we need to enable `core.protectNTFS`
on macOS by default, too, and really, on any Operating System that can
mount network shares via SMB/CIFS.
A couple of approaches were considered for fixing this:
1. We could perform a dynamic NTFS check similar to the `core.symlinks`
check in `init`/`clone`: instead of trying to create a symbolic link
in the `.git/` directory, we could create a test file and try to
access `.git/config` via 8.3 name and/or Alternate Data Stream.
2. We could simply "flip the switch" on `core.protectNTFS`, to make it
"on by default".
The obvious downside of 1. is that it won't protect worktrees that were
clone with a vulnerable Git version already. We considered patching code
paths that check out files to check whether we're running on an NTFS
system dynamically and persist the result in the repository-local config
setting `core.protectNTFS`, but in the end decided that this solution
would be too fragile, and too involved.
The obvious downside of 2. is that everybody will have to "suffer" the
performance penalty incurred from calling `is_ntfs_dotgit()` on every
path, even in setups where.
After the recent work to accelerate `is_ntfs_dotgit()` in most cases,
it looks as if the time spent on validating ten million random
file names increases only negligibly (less than 20ms, well within the
standard deviation of ~50ms). Therefore the benefits outweigh the cost.
Another downside of this is that paths that might have been acceptable
previously now will be forbidden. Realistically, though, this is an
improvement because public Git hosters already would reject any `git
push` that contains such file names.
Note: There might be a similar problem mounting HFS+ on Linux. However,
this scenario has been considered unlikely and in light of the cost (in
the aforementioned benchmark, `core.protectHFS = true` increased the
time from ~440ms to ~610ms), it was decided _not_ to touch the default
of `core.protectHFS`.
This change addresses CVE-2019-1353.
Reported-by: Nicolas Joly <Nicolas.Joly@microsoft.com>
Helped-by: Garima Singh <garima.singh@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
We just safe-guarded `.git` against NTFS Alternate Data Stream-related
attack vectors, and now it is time to do the same for `.gitmodules`.
Note: In the added regression test, we refrain from verifying all kinds
of variations between short names and NTFS Alternate Data Streams: as
the new code disallows _all_ Alternate Data Streams of `.gitmodules`, it
is enough to test one in order to know that all of them are guarded
against.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
We need to be careful to follow proper quoting rules. For example, if an
argument contains spaces, we have to quote them. Double-quotes need to
be escaped. Backslashes need to be escaped, but only if they are
followed by a double-quote character.
We need to be _extra_ careful to consider the case where an argument
ends in a backslash _and_ needs to be quoted: in this case, we append a
double-quote character, i.e. the backslash now has to be escaped!
The current code, however, fails to recognize that, and therefore can
turn an argument that ends in a single backslash into a quoted argument
that now ends in an escaped double-quote character. This allows
subsequent command-line parameters to be split and part of them being
mistaken for command-line options, e.g. through a maliciously-crafted
submodule URL during a recursive clone.
Technically, we would not need to quote _all_ arguments which end in a
backslash _unless_ the argument needs to be quoted anyway. For example,
`test\` would not need to be quoted, while `test \` would need to be.
To keep the code simple, however, and therefore easier to reason about
and ensure its correctness, we now _always_ quote an argument that ends
in a backslash.
This addresses CVE-2019-1350.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Previously, this function was written without focusing on speed,
intending to make reviewing the code as easy as possible, to avoid any
bugs in this critical code.
Turns out: we can do much better on both accounts. With this patch, we
make it as fast as this developer can make it go:
- We avoid the call to `is_dir_sep()` and make all the character
comparisons explicit.
- We avoid the cost of calling `strncasecmp()` and unroll the test for
`.git` and `git~1`, not even using `tolower()` because it is faster to
compare against two constant values.
- We look for `.git` and `.git~1` first thing, and return early if not
found.
- We also avoid calling a separate function for detecting chains of
spaces and periods.
Each of these improvements has a noticeable impact on the speed of
`is_ntfs_dotgit()`.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Probably inspired by HFS' resource streams, NTFS supports "Alternate
Data Streams": by appending `:<stream-name>` to the file name,
information in addition to the file contents can be written and read,
information that is copied together with the file (unless copied to a
non-NTFS location).
These Alternate Data Streams are typically used for things like marking
an executable as having just been downloaded from the internet (and
hence not necessarily being trustworthy).
In addition to a stream name, a stream type can be appended, like so:
`:<stream-name>:<stream-type>`. Unless specified, the default stream
type is `$DATA` for files and `$INDEX_ALLOCATION` for directories. In
other words, `.git::$INDEX_ALLOCATION` is a valid way to reference the
`.git` directory!
In our work in Git v2.2.1 to protect Git on NTFS drives under
`core.protectNTFS`, we focused exclusively on NTFS short names, unaware
of the fact that NTFS Alternate Data Streams offer a similar attack
vector.
Let's fix this.
Seeing as it is better to be safe than sorry, we simply disallow paths
referring to *any* NTFS Alternate Data Stream of `.git`, not just
`::$INDEX_ALLOCATION`. This also simplifies the implementation.
This closes CVE-2019-1352.
Further reading about NTFS Alternate Data Streams:
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-fscc/c54dec26-1551-4d3a-a0ea-4fa40f848eb3
Reported-by: Nicolas Joly <Nicolas.Joly@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
The config setting `core.protectNTFS` is specifically designed to work
not only on Windows, but anywhere, to allow for repositories hosted on,
say, Linux servers to be protected against NTFS-specific attack vectors.
As a consequence, `is_ntfs_dotgit()` manually splits backslash-separated
paths (but does not do the same for paths separated by forward slashes),
under the assumption that the backslash might not be a valid directory
separator on the _current_ Operating System.
However, the two callers, `verify_path()` and `fsck_tree()`, are
supposed to feed only individual path segments to the `is_ntfs_dotgit()`
function.
This causes a lot of duplicate scanning (and very inefficient scanning,
too, as the inner loop of `is_ntfs_dotgit()` was optimized for
readability rather than for speed.
Let's simplify the design of `is_ntfs_dotgit()` by putting the burden of
splitting the paths by backslashes as directory separators on the
callers of said function.
Consequently, the `verify_path()` function, which already splits the
path by directory separators, now treats backslashes as directory
separators _explicitly_ when `core.protectNTFS` is turned on, even on
platforms where the backslash is _not_ a directory separator.
Note that we have to repeat some code in `verify_path()`: if the
backslash is not a directory separator on the current Operating System,
we want to allow file names like `\`, but we _do_ want to disallow paths
that are clearly intended to cause harm when the repository is cloned on
Windows.
The `fsck_tree()` function (the other caller of `is_ntfs_dotgit()`) now
needs to look for backslashes in tree entries' names specifically when
`core.protectNTFS` is turned on. While it would be tempting to
completely disallow backslashes in that case (much like `fsck` reports
names containing forward slashes as "full paths"), this would be
overzealous: when `core.protectNTFS` is turned on in a non-Windows
setup, backslashes are perfectly valid characters in file names while we
_still_ want to disallow tree entries that are clearly designed to
exploit NTFS-specific behavior.
This simplification will make subsequent changes easier to implement,
such as turning `core.protectNTFS` on by default (not only on Windows)
or protecting against attack vectors involving NTFS Alternate Data
Streams.
Incidentally, this change allows for catching malicious repositories
that contain tree entries of the form `dir\.gitmodules` already on the
server side rather than only on the client side (and previously only on
Windows): in contrast to `is_ntfs_dotgit()`, the
`is_ntfs_dotgitmodules()` function already expects the caller to split
the paths by directory separators.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
In preparation to flipping the default on `core.protectNTFS`, let's have
some way to measure the speed impact of this config setting reliably
(and for comparison, the `core.protectHFS` config setting).
For now, this is a manual performance benchmark:
./t/helper/test-path-utils protect_ntfs_hfs [arguments...]
where the arguments are an optional number of file names to test with,
optionally followed by minimum and maximum length of the random file
names. The default values are one million, 3 and 20, respectively.
Just like `sqrti()` in `bisect.c`, we introduce a very simple function
to approximation the square root of a given value, in order to avoid
having to introduce the first user of `<math.h>` in Git's source code.
Note: this is _not_ implemented as a Unix shell script in t/perf/
because we really care about _very_ precise timings here, and Unix shell
scripts are simply unsuited for precise and consistent benchmarking.
Signed-off-by: Garima Singh <garima.singh@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
With `format.useAutoBase = true`, running rebase resulted in an
error:
fatal: failed to get upstream, if you want to record base commit automatically,
please use git branch --set-upstream-to to track a remote branch.
Or you could specify base commit by --base=<base-commit-id> manually
error:
git encountered an error while preparing the patches to replay
these revisions:
ede2467cdedc63784887b587a61c36b7850ebfac..d8f581194799ae29bf5fa72a98cbae98a1198b12
As a result, git cannot rebase them.
Fix this by always passing `--no-base` to format-patch from rebase so
that the effect of `format.useAutoBase` is negated.
Reported-by: Christian Biesinger <cbiesinger@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Denton Liu <liu.denton@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
If `format.useAutoBase = true`, there was no way to override this from
the command-line. Teach the `--no-base` option in format-patch to
override `format.useAutoBase`.
Helped-by: René Scharfe <l.s.r@web.de>
Signed-off-by: Denton Liu <liu.denton@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Instead of manually unsetting the config after the test case is done,
use test_config() to do it automatically. While we're at it, fix a typo
in a test case name.
Signed-off-by: Denton Liu <liu.denton@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Ever since bb52995f3e (format-patch: introduce format.useAutoBase
configuration, 2016-04-26), `git rebase` has been broken when
`format.useAutoBase = true`. It fails when rebasing a branch:
fatal: failed to get upstream, if you want to record base commit automatically,
please use git branch --set-upstream-to to track a remote branch.
Or you could specify base commit by --base=<base-commit-id> manually
error:
git encountered an error while preparing the patches to replay
these revisions:
ede2467cdedc63784887b587a61c36b7850ebfac..d8f581194799ae29bf5fa72a98cbae98a1198b12
As a result, git cannot rebase them.
Demonstrate that failure here.
Reported-by: Christian Biesinger <cbiesinger@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Denton Liu <liu.denton@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
In a pipe, only the return code of the last command is used. Thus, all
other commands will have their return codes masked. Rewrite pipes so
that there are no git commands upstream so that we will know if a
command fails.
Signed-off-by: Denton Liu <liu.denton@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Make the test more hash-agnostic by renaming variables from "sha1" to
some variation of "oid" or "packid". Also, replace the regex,
`[0-9a-f]\{40\}` with `$OID_REGEX`.
A better name for "incrpackid" (incremental pack-id) might have been
just "packid". However, later in the test suite, we have other uses of
"packid". Although the scopes of these variables don't conflict, a
future developer may think that commit_and_pack() and
test_has_duplicate_object() are semantically related somehow since they
share the same variable name. Give them distinct names so that it's
clear these uses are unrelated.
Signed-off-by: Denton Liu <liu.denton@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
The egrep expressions in this test suite were of the form `^$variable`.
Although egrep works just fine, it's overkill since we're not using any
extended regex. Replace egrep invocations with grep so that we aren't
swatting flies with a sledgehammer.
Signed-off-by: Denton Liu <liu.denton@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
The code to test that objects were not duplicated from the packfile was
duplicated many times. Extract the duplicated code into
test_has_duplicate_object() and use that instead.
Refactor the resulting extraction so that if the git command fails,
the return code is not silently lost.
Signed-off-by: Denton Liu <liu.denton@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
The code to test that objects were not missing from the packfile was
duplicated many times. Extract the duplicated code into
test_no_missing_in_packs() and use that instead.
Refactor the resulting extraction so that if any git commands fail,
their return codes are not silently lost.
Instead of verifying each file of `alt_objects/pack/*.idx` individually
in a for-loop, batch them together into one verification step.
The original testing construct was O(n^2): it used a grep in a loop to
test whether any objects were missing in the packfile. Rewrite this to
extract the hash using sed or cut, sort the files, then use `comm -23`
so that finding missing lines from the original file is done more
efficiently.
While we're at it, add a space to `commit_and_pack ()` for style.
Signed-off-by: Denton Liu <liu.denton@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Since we're now recommending lore.kernel.org, replace LKML link
with lore.kernel.org.
Although LKML has been around for a long time, nothing lasts forever
(see Gmane). Since LKML uses opaque message identifiers, switching to
lore.kernel.org should be a strict improvement since, even if
lore.kernel.org goes down, the Message-ID will allow future readers to
look up the referenced messages on any other archive.
Signed-off-by: Denton Liu <liu.denton@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
The only references to Gmane that remain are in RelNotes. Although these
are definitely not in active use, they might be of historical interest
for future readers so let's ensure that mail references are more robust.
Replace links to Gmane with links to lore.kernel.org (which is our new
preferred mailing list archive and has the Message-ID in the URL) and
bare Gmane ID references with Message-IDs.
The Message-IDs were found by searching for "gmane:<id>" on
https://public-inbox.org/git/ and taking the resulting message.
Signed-off-by: Denton Liu <liu.denton@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Since we're now recommending lore.kernel.org, replace marc.info links
with lore.kernel.org.
Although MARC has been around for a long time, nothing lasts forever
(see Gmane). Since MARC uses opaque message identifiers, switching to
lore.kernel.org should be a strict improvement since, even if
lore.kernel.org goes down, the Message-ID will allow future readers to
look up the referenced messages on any other archive.
We leave behind one reference to MARC in the README.md since it's a
perfectly fine mail archive for personal reading, just not for linking
messages for the future.
Signed-off-by: Denton Liu <liu.denton@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Decisions taken for simplicity:
1) For now, `--pathspec-from-file` is declared incompatible with
`--patch`, even when <file> is not `stdin`. Such use case it not
really expected.
2) It is not allowed to pass pathspec in both args and file.
`you must specify path(s) to restore` block was moved down to be able to
test for `pathspec.nr` instead, because testing for `argc` is no longer
correct.
`git switch` does not support the new options because it doesn't expect
`<pathspec>` arguments.
Signed-off-by: Alexandr Miloslavskiy <alexandr.miloslavskiy@syntevo.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
`git add` shows an example of good writing, follow it.
Signed-off-by: Alexandr Miloslavskiy <alexandr.miloslavskiy@syntevo.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
`git add` shows an example of good writing, follow it.
Signed-off-by: Alexandr Miloslavskiy <alexandr.miloslavskiy@syntevo.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
It was added in [1]. I understand that the duplicate change was not
intentional and comes from an oversight.
Also, in explanation, there was only one section for two synopsis
entries.
Fix both problems by removing duplicate synopsis.
<paths> vs <pathspec> is resolved in next patch.
[1] Commit b59698ae ("checkout doc: clarify command line args for "checkout paths" mode" 2017-10-11)
Signed-off-by: Alexandr Miloslavskiy <alexandr.miloslavskiy@syntevo.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Decisions taken for simplicity:
1) For now, `--pathspec-from-file` is declared incompatible with
`--interactive/--patch/--edit`, even when <file> is not `stdin`.
Such use case it not really expected. Also, it would require changes
to `interactive_add()` and `edit_patch()`.
2) It is not allowed to pass pathspec in both args and file.
Signed-off-by: Alexandr Miloslavskiy <alexandr.miloslavskiy@syntevo.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Some code blocks were moved down to be able to test for `pathspec.nr`
in the next patch. Blocks are moved as is without any changes. This
is done as separate patch to reduce the amount of diffs in next patch.
Signed-off-by: Alexandr Miloslavskiy <alexandr.miloslavskiy@syntevo.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
This patch series fixes an issue where Git could formerly have been
tricked into creating a `.git` file with an unexpected (and therefore
unprotected) NTFS short name.
Incidentally, it also fixes an issue where a tree entry containing a
backslash could be tricked into following a symbolic link, i.e. Git
could be tricked into writing files outside the worktree.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
The `--export-marks` option of `git fast-import` is exposed also via the
in-stream command `feature export-marks=...` and it allows overwriting
arbitrary paths.
This topic branch prevents the in-stream version, to prevent arbitrary
file accesses by `git fast-import` streams coming from untrusted sources
(e.g. in remote helpers that are based on `git fast-import`).
This fixes CVE-2019-1348.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Previously, this function was completely undocumented. It is worth,
though, to explain what is going on, as it is not really obvious at all.
Suggested-by: Garima Singh <garima.singh@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
The backslash character is not a valid part of a file name on Windows.
Hence it is dangerous to allow writing files that were unpacked from
tree objects, when the stored file name contains a backslash character:
it will be misinterpreted as directory separator.
This not only causes ambiguity when a tree contains a blob `a\b` and a
tree `a` that contains a blob `b`, but it also can be used as part of an
attack vector to side-step the careful protections against writing into
the `.git/` directory during a clone of a maliciously-crafted
repository.
Let's prevent that, addressing CVE-2019-1354.
Note: we guard against backslash characters in tree objects' file names
_only_ on Windows (because on other platforms, even on those where NTFS
volumes can be mounted, the backslash character is _not_ a directory
separator), and _only_ when `core.protectNTFS = true` (because users
might need to generate tree objects for other platforms, of course
without touching the worktree, e.g. using `git update-index
--cacheinfo`).
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
In addition to preventing `.git` from being tracked by Git, on Windows
we also have to prevent `git~1` from being tracked, as the default NTFS
short name (also known as the "8.3 filename") for the file name `.git`
is `git~1`, otherwise it would be possible for malicious repositories to
write directly into the `.git/` directory, e.g. a `post-checkout` hook
that would then be executed _during_ a recursive clone.
When we implemented appropriate protections in 2b4c6efc82 (read-cache:
optionally disallow NTFS .git variants, 2014-12-16), we had analyzed
carefully that the `.git` directory or file would be guaranteed to be
the first directory entry to be written. Otherwise it would be possible
e.g. for a file named `..git` to be assigned the short name `git~1` and
subsequently, the short name generated for `.git` would be `git~2`. Or
`git~3`. Or even `~9999999` (for a detailed explanation of the lengths
we have to go to protect `.gitmodules`, see the commit message of
e7cb0b4455 (is_ntfs_dotgit: match other .git files, 2018-05-11)).
However, by exploiting two issues (that will be addressed in a related
patch series close by), it is currently possible to clone a submodule
into a non-empty directory:
- On Windows, file names cannot end in a space or a period (for
historical reasons: the period separating the base name from the file
extension was not actually written to disk, and the base name/file
extension was space-padded to the full 8/3 characters, respectively).
Helpfully, when creating a directory under the name, say, `sub.`, that
trailing period is trimmed automatically and the actual name on disk
is `sub`.
This means that while Git thinks that the submodule names `sub` and
`sub.` are different, they both access `.git/modules/sub/`.
- While the backslash character is a valid file name character on Linux,
it is not so on Windows. As Git tries to be cross-platform, it
therefore allows backslash characters in the file names stored in tree
objects.
Which means that it is totally possible that a submodule `c` sits next
to a file `c\..git`, and on Windows, during recursive clone a file
called `..git` will be written into `c/`, of course _before_ the
submodule is cloned.
Note that the actual exploit is not quite as simple as having a
submodule `c` next to a file `c\..git`, as we have to make sure that the
directory `.git/modules/b` already exists when the submodule is checked
out, otherwise a different code path is taken in `module_clone()` that
does _not_ allow a non-empty submodule directory to exist already.
Even if we will address both issues nearby (the next commit will
disallow backslash characters in tree entries' file names on Windows,
and another patch will disallow creating directories/files with trailing
spaces or periods), it is a wise idea to defend in depth against this
sort of attack vector: when submodules are cloned recursively, we now
_require_ the directory to be empty, addressing CVE-2019-1349.
Note: the code path we patch is shared with the code path of `git
submodule update --init`, which must not expect, in general, that the
directory is empty. Hence we have to introduce the new option
`--force-init` and hand it all the way down from `git submodule` to the
actual `git submodule--helper` process that performs the initial clone.
Reported-by: Nicolas Joly <Nicolas.Joly@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
